Peo v. Amonette

19CA1778 Peo v Amonette 10-07-2021 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 19CA1778 Garfield County District Court No. 10CR402 Honorable James B. Boyd, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Michael Amonette, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 7, 2021 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Phillip Michael Amonette, Pro Se 1 ¶ 1 Defendant, Phillip Michael Amon ette, appeals the district court’s order denying his “Motion to Re-Hear Motion for Return of Property.” We affirm. I. Background ¶ 2 A jury found Amonette guilty of fir st degree assault of a peace officer and criminal mischief. Pe ople v. Amonette , slip op. at 2 (Colo. App. No. 12CA2329, Mar. 31, 2016) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The charges st emmed from evidence that Amonett e shot a police officer who had respon ded to a domestic dispute between Amonette and his girlfrien d. Id. at 1. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-nine year s in prison on September 25, 2012. A division of this court aff irmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal. Id. ¶ 3 Nearly seven years later, Amonett e filed a motion requesting that property “taken upon his arr est” be returned to his “next of kin.” He listed the property as (1) a Leatherman SuperTool with case; (2) a Zippo brand lighter wit h case; (3) a Bic lighter with silv er and turquoise case; (4) a small Ker shaw pocket knife; (5) a leath er belt; (6) a pair of leather work bo ots; and (7) a “‘small amount of currency’ (in bills) and change.” In his motion and reply in support 2 of his motion, he argued that t he court had ancillary jurisdiction to consider his request under People v. Hargrave , 179 P.3d 226 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 4 The prosecution responded, relying on People v. Chavez , 2018 COA 139, and People v. Wiedem er , 692 P.2d 327 (Colo. App. 1984), for the proposition that the court lack ed jurisdiction to consider Amonette’s motion because it was filed after he was sentenced. Th e prosecution further asserted that, even if the district court declined to follow Chavez and Wiedemer , it lacked authority under Hargra ve because “[t]here is a dispute as t o whether the property is subject to return,” and resolving that inquiry would involve substantial new factfinding proceedings. See Ha rgrave , 179 P.3d at 229-30 (describing the limited nature of t he proceedings). ¶ 5 Relying on Chavez and Wiedem er , the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to rule o n Amonette’s motion. Amonette filed a “Motion to Re-Hear Motion f or Return of Property.” The district court denied this motion too, concluding that its “original order correctly applied the law.” A monette appeals from the denial of this second motion. 3 II. Jurisdiction ¶ 6 Divisions of this court have differ ed on whether a district court retains jurisdiction in a criminal case to consider a motion for return of property after sentencing. ¶ 7 In Wiedemer , the division held that “[a] trial court loses jurisdiction upon imposition of a va lid sentence except under the circumstances specified in Crim. P. 35.” 692 P.2d at 329 . Thus, the division concluded, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion for return of property after sentencing because such a motion is not cognizable under Crim. P. 35 and “[t]he rule does not embrac e ancillary proceedings.” Id. ; s ee also People v. Galves , 955 P.2d 5 82, 583 (Colo. App. 1997) (“A fin al judgment includes, among other thi ngs, entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sent ence. Following the entry of a fin al judgment, the court retains subjec t matter jurisdiction only over matters that may be raised pursu ant to Crim. P. 35.”). ¶ 8 In Chavez , another division follow ed the reasoning in Wiedemer and concluded that t he trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion for return of property after sentencing. Chavez , ¶¶ 12-13. Th e division stated that “once a 4 valid sentence is imposed, apart from the limited claims described in Crim. P. 35, a criminal court has no further jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 13 (citation omitted). ¶ 9 Conversely, in Hargrave , another division concluded that a trial court may have ancillary juris diction to consider a motion for return of property after sentencing if a four-part test is met. 179 P.3d at 229-30. The test requires, among other things, that “the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new factfinding proceeding.” Id. ¶ 10 Amonette asks us to follow Ha rgrave and conclude that the trial court had ancillary jurisdictio n to rule on his motion for return of property filed nearly seven years after sentencing. We agree with the reasoning in Chavez and Wi edemer and conclude that the district court did not have jurisdict ion to consider Amonette’s motion. ¶ 11 First, Hargrave requires a court t o engage in a multi-part test to determine its jurisdiction. W e agree with Chavez that it is “cumbersome and anomalous to c ondition a court’s subject matt er jurisdiction on multi-part factual in quiries.” Chavez , ¶ 13 n.4. Likewise, we agree that, because C olorado district courts are courts 5 of general jurisdiction, “there is no need to borrow the federal court’s use of ancillary jurisdiction” as Hargrave did. Id. at ¶ 11 n.3. ¶ 12 But even assuming, without decid ing, that we should follow Hargrave instead of Wiedemer and Chavez, we cannot say that the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. ¶ 13 Unlike Hargrave , the prosecution her e did not confess Amonette’s motion. See 179 P.3d at 230 . Rather, the prosecution disputed whether the property w as subject to return and asserted that substantial new factfinding w ould be required. And, given th e age of the case, we are hard pr essed to conclude that the parties had “mutually shared knowledg e” of the pertinent circumstances of the case. Id. That is, because th e case was seven years old, we cannot conclude — as the Hargra ve division did — that ancillary proceedings would be “perfunctory ,” “straightforward,” or “brief.” 179 P.3d at 230 . ¶ 14 Finally, the supreme court’s recent decision in Strepka v. People , 2021 CO 58 , doesn’t persu ade us otherwise. Strepka answered “a different and much n arrower question” than the one posed in Chavez , Wiedemer , and Hargrave — namely, “How does a 6 person, whose property was unlaw fully obtained by the government, get that property back after all the charges against him or her a re dismissed ?” Strepka , ¶ 17 (emphasis added). The supreme court’s jurisdictional analysis is directly t ied to the time provided to appeal the merits of the case, holding that “trial courts retain jurisdiction to address motions for return of p roperty under Crim. P. 41(e) so long as such motions are filed befor e the appeal deadline expires.” Id. at ¶ 26. Here, the deadline to a ppeal expired years before Amonette filed his motion seeking return of his property. ¶ 15 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Am onette’s motion. Notwithstanding our conclusion, Amonette isn’t wit hout a remedy: he may file a civil action to seek the return of his pro perty, although “we express no opinion regarding the elements, av ailable defenses, or merits of any such claim.” Chavez , ¶ 14 n.5; see also People v. Rautenkranz , 641 P.2d 317, 318 (Colo. App. 1982). III. Conclusion ¶ 16 The order is affirmed. JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSO N concur.