Bruce v. Pikes Peak

20CA0531 Bruce v Pikes Peak 10-21-2021 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 20CA0531 El Paso County District Court No. 19CV362 Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge Douglas Bruce, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pikes Peak Regional Building Department, City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, and El Paso County Public Trustee, Defendants-Appellees. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE FOX Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 21, 2021 Douglas Bruce, Pro Se Sparks Wilson, P.C., Eric V. Hall, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee Pikes Peak Regional Building Department Wynetta P. Massey, City Attorney, W. Erik Lamphere, Assistant City Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee City of Colorado Springs Diana K. May, County Attorney, Steven Klaffky, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee El Paso County Trustee 1 ¶ 1 Plaintiff, Douglas Bruce, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint against defendants Pikes Peak Regional Building Department (Department), City of Colorado Springs (City), and El Paso County Public Trustee (Trust ee). We affirm. I. Background ¶ 2 We glean the following facts fr om the allegations in Bruce’s complaint and the district court’s con strual of those allegations. A. Factual Basis of Claims Against the Trustee ¶ 3 Bruce owned a residential building located at 1326 W. Kiowa Street in Colorado Springs (th e Building) — the subject of this action. In 2016, he sold the Buildi ng to Renovation Management Group 106, LLC (Renovation), of which Joseph Graeve soon becam e the sole member. The sale of t he Building was secured by a deed of trust in Bruce’s favor. ¶ 4 In early 2018, Renovation default ed on payments it owed to Bruce for the sale of the Building. Bruce then initiated proceeding s to foreclose on the deed of trust, and the Trustee scheduled a foreclosure sale for November 7, 2018. ¶ 5 On November 6, 2018, Graeve fil ed for bankruptcy and listed the Building as one of his assets, which, pursuant to federal law, 2 automatically stayed any foreclosu re action against the Building. However, Graeve did not notify Bruce or the Trustee that he had filed for bankruptcy, and the forecl osure sale took place as scheduled the next day. Bruce wa s declared the successful bidd er at the sale. ¶ 6 The Trustee became aware of Gra eve’s bankruptcy filing and withheld recording a deed of sal e because the sale violated the automatic stay. Bruce met with the bankruptcy trustee and attempted to file a motion for r elief from the stay with the bankruptcy court; however, Bruce apparently did not pay the required filing fee and the court rejected Bruce’s motion. Bruce instead opted to wait until the ban kruptcy case closed to attempt to recover the Building, which he b elieved would be in March 2019. ¶ 7 Around September 20, 2019, Bruce claims that the bankruptcy court issued an order allow ing secured creditor foreclosures against Graeve’s propert y to proceed. Bruce then requested that the Trustee record t he foreclosure deed of sale withheld pending the bankruptcy proceedings. The Trustee, however, refused to so; such tim e had elapsed that he believed he was statutorily obligated to withdra w the 2018 sale. 3 B. Factual Basis of Claims Against the City and the Department ¶ 8 Meanwhile, the structural integrit y of the Building had substantially deteriorated, larg ely because Renovation had remov ed the roof, siding, and porch from the Building in 2017. ¶ 9 In early 2018, Bruce notified the C ity that the Building, which was apparently vacant, had becom e an “attractive nuisance” and asked the City to fence it off. In January 2019, the Department, acting pursuant to section 112 of the Pikes Peak Regional Building Code (RBC), issued a notice and or der declaring the Building to be a “dangerous building,” requiring that it be vacated, and ordering that the Building be repaired, rehabilita ted, or demolished. The Department served the notice and or der on Renovation with a copy to Bruce as a lienholder of the Buil ding. ¶ 10 Bruce appealed the “dangerous bu ilding” designation, and an administrative hearing was held on the matter before the Department’s board of appeals on March 20, 2019, and April 4, 2019. The board of appeals affir med the designation and the accompanying notice and order on April 17, 2019. The written decision stated that it was “a fin al agency decision for all purposes under Colorado law.” 4 ¶ 11 To prevent the demolition of the Buildin g, Bruce sought a permit from the Department allow ing him to repair the Building by installing a roof, siding, and porch . He did not, however, pursue a certificate of habitability of the Bui lding; he merely wanted it restored to its 2016 condition, hav e it remain vacant, and then eventually sell it to a buyer who w ould finish renovations. The Department denied his request on May 16, 2019, finding that Bruce did not submit sufficient plans to r epair the Building and that his request was untimely. Bruce ap pealed to the Department’s board of review, which, after an administrat ive hearing, affirmed the permit denial on August 21, 2019. That w ritten decision also stated that it was “a final agency decision for all purposes under Colorado law.” C. District Court Proceedings ¶ 12 On October 22, 2019, Bruce filed a complaint in district court outlining a litany of cursory claims. Against the Department and the City, he alleged claims of tortio us conduct, asserted several violations of his constitutional rig hts, and sought injunctive relief from the Department’s rulings. As to the Trustee, he raised a number of claims seeking to com pel the Trustee to record the deed 5 of sale that was issued contrary t o the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay in November 2018. ¶ 13 The three defendants independent ly filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Bruce’s claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). In thr ee separate orders, the district court granted each defendant’s motion to dismiss. Together, the court’s orders dismissed with prejudic e all of the claims Bruce raised in hi s complaint. II. Request for Oral Argument ¶ 14 Bruce requests oral argument, but he does so only in his opening brief. Because “[a] requ est for oral argument must be made in a separate document entitled ‘r equest for oral argument,’” his request is denied and his appeal st ands submitted on the briefs. C.A.R. 34(a) (emphasis added). III. Compliance with C.A.R. 28 ¶ 15 We first note that Bruce’s opening brief is substantively deficient and fails to comply wit h C.A.R. 28. Though Bruce appeal s the district court’s three dismissal orders, he does not make any specific, developed argument as to w hy the court erred by 6 dismissing any of his claims. Instead, his brief reads as a long list of grievances and bald legal asserti ons and largely reiterates — in conclusory fashion — the claims he m ade in his complaint. In fact, his entire “argument” section is all of five sentences, and it does not include any mention of the trial co urt’s orders, explanation as to why the trial court erred, or citatio n to legal authority. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (Arguments “must cont ain . . . appellant’s contentions and reasoning, with citations to t he authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant r elies.”). And, among other failur es to comply with C.A.R. 28, his bri ef does not include any recitation of the standard of review, statemen t of preservation, or proper citation to the record. See C.A.R. 2 8(a)(7)(A) (Arguments “must contain . . . statements of the appl icable standard of review with citation to authority, whether th e issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise location in the record where the issue was raised and where the court ruled. ”). ¶ 16 Despite the deficiencies in Bruce’s brief, however, we opt to address the merits of his appeal a s best we can, which we constru e as a general challenge to the district court’s three dismissal orders. But we reiterate the admonishm ent from a previous division of thi s 7 court: Bruce is “cautioned that, in the future, his failure to comply with C.A.R. 28 or other applicable a ppellate rules may result in striking the noncomplying brief or other appropriate sanctions, including dismissal.” Bruce v. Cit y of Colorado Springs , 252 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo. App. 2010). IV. Standard of Review and Applica ble Law ¶ 17 The Department, City, and Trust ee moved to dismiss Bruce’s claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5). ¶ 18 A C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dism iss challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Wh ere the facts underlying a jurisdictional issue are undisput ed, we review the district court’s dismissal of a claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) de novo. Tulips Invs., LLC v. State ex rel. Suthers , 2015 CO 1, ¶ 11 . ¶ 19 A C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dism iss for failure to state a claim “serves as a test of the form al sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint.” Norton v. Rocky Mount ain Planned Parenthood, Inc. , 2016 COA 3, ¶ 12 , aff’d , 2018 CO 3 . Dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) is proper “where the fact ual allegations in the complaint cannot, as a matter of law, support the claim for relief.” Bew ley v. Semler , 2018 CO 79, ¶ 14 (quoting Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate 8 Majority Fund, LLC , 2012 CO 12, ¶ 16 ). To survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion, a complaint must include factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief “ above the speculative level.” Warne v. Hall , 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9 (qu oting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). ¶ 20 “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) m otion to dismiss de novo and apply the same standards as the t rial court.” Norton , 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. “[W]e accept all factual allegat ions in the complaint as true, viewing them in a light most favora ble to the plaintiff.” Bewley , ¶ 14. We are not, however, bound to accept the truth of bare l egal conclusions presented as fact. Wa rne , ¶ 9. V. Dismissal was Proper ¶ 21 Like the district court, we underst and Bruce’s complaint as raising the following claims: (1) a r equest for an injunction; (2) a challenge to the Department’s ruli ngs; (3) various tort claims; (4) a substantive due process claim; (5) an impairment of contract claim; and (6) several claims seeking to com pel the Trustee to record a 9 deed of sale. We address the dist rict court’s dismissal of each clai m in turn, and for the reasons below, we discern no error. 1 A. Request for Injunction and Chall enges to the Department’s Rulings ¶ 22 Bruce’s complaint appeared to cha llenge two specific Department rulings: (1) its det ermination that the Building qualifi ed as a “dangerous building” under t he RBC and (2) its denial of his request for a building permit to r estore the roof, siding, and porch of the Building. Because the distr ict court found that the Department’s rulings were quasi-j udicial in nature, it construed Bruce’s challenges as claims mad e pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). See C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) (permittin g review of “any governmental body or officer or any lower judicial bod y exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions”); see a lso Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Sundheim , 926 P.2d 545, 548 (Col o. 1996) (“C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) provides the exclusive remedy for reviewing a quasi-judicial decision 1 Bruce does not argue that the dist rict court improperly characterized his claims in its dism issal orders. Thus, we assume the district court properly constru ed Bruce’s complaint. 10 made by a government entity.”). We agree that the court properly characterized his challenges as C.R .C.P. 106(a)(4) claims. 2 ¶ 23 As the district court noted, a complain t seeking review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) must be filed in the district court “not later than [twenty-eight] days after the final d ecision of the body or officer.” C.R.C.P. 106(b). Because the twen ty-eight-day filing requirement is jurisdictional, Citizens for Respo nsible Growth v. RCI Dev. Part ners, Inc. , 252 P.3d 1104, 1106 (Colo. 2 011), “a [C.R.C.P.] 106(a)(4) complaint that is not filed in the di strict court by the [twenty-eight]- day jurisdictional deadline must b e dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” Maslak v. Town of Vail , 2015 COA 2, ¶ 17 . Bruce did not file his complaint unt il October 22, 2019 — 187 days after the Department’s final decisio n to designate the Building a “dangerous building” on April 17, 2019, and 62 days after its final 2 Bruce characterizes his claims as constitutionally based. But even constitutional claims, excluding a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 seeking mon etary damages, must be brought in a complaint seeking Rule 106(a)(4) review. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Sundheim , 926 P.2d 545, 548-49 (Colo. 1986) (excluding time bar in C.R.C.P. 106(b), as any interest in government efficiency and finality “must give way to th e compelling federal interest of giving § 1983 actions a broad bert h”). To the extent Bruce’s complaint raised a claim under 4 2 U.S.C. section 1983 , the district court correctly dismissed any such claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). 11 decision denying Bruce’s permit r equest on August 21, 2019. Thus, the court properly dismissed Bruc e’s challenges to those rulings f or lack of jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). See Maslak , ¶ 17. ¶ 24 Relatedly, Bruce also sought to enj oin the Department and the City from taking any action to dem olish the Building or prevent him from restoring it. So, in addition to directly challenging the Department’s rulings, Bruce sough t injunctive relief from the eff ects of those rulings. However, while a party can seek injunctive relief in connection with a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4 ) action, the effects of the quasi-judicial decision cannot be enjoined separate and apart from the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action. See Sundheim , 926 P.2d at 548 (Because “C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) provi des the exclusive remedy for reviewing a quasi-judicial decision made by a government entity . . . a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint mus t include all causes of action . . . in a single C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) actio n.”). Thus, Bruce’s request for injunctive relief could not be mad e apart from his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claims, which were properly dismi ssed as untimely. Indeed, substantively, Bruce’s request soug ht nothing more than the two time-barred claims: judicial revi ew of the Department’s rulings. Framing his request as one for inj unctive relief could not allow him 12 to circumvent the twenty-eight-day filing deadline for such claims. See Danielson v. Zoning Bd. o f Adjustment , 807 P.2d 541, 544 (Colo. 1990) (A plaintiff “cannot escape th e time limitation of C.R.C.P. 106(b) by labelling his request for judicial review as a prayer for declaratory judgment.”). Accordin gly, the district court properly dismissed Bruce’s request for in junctive relief. B. Tort Claims ¶ 25 Bruce sought damages from the Depart ment and the City for the following claims: “wrongful inf liction of emotional distress, bad faith interference in a business con tract, abuse of process, [and] related torts.” In addition, as to the Department, he asserted that it “repeatedly engaged in invidious r etaliation . . . with malice and in bad faith.” ¶ 26 The district court found that Bru ce’s claims either lay in tort or could lie in tort. Thus, becaus e the Department and the City were public entities, the court d etermined that Bruce’s claims fell within the purview of the Colorad o Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. 2020. See § 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2020 (The CGIA grants imm unity to public entities “from liability in all claims for injury w hich lie in tort or could lie in 13 tort . . . except as provided oth erwise in this section.”). We agr ee with the district court’s conclusion as to the applicability of the CGIA, which Bruce does not app ear to contest on appeal. ¶ 27 The CGIA requires that “[a]ny p erson claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity or by an employee thereof . . . shall file a written notice as provided in thi s section within one hundred eight-two days after the date of t he discovery of the injury.” § 24- 10-109(1), C.R.S. 2020. “‘[T]he stat ute plainly requires’ a claimant to file this notice with either the go verning body of the public entity or the entity’s attorney.” Johnson v. Toohey , 2021 COA 43M , ¶ 9 (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Healt h Servs. Ass’n v. Feeney , 974 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Colo. 1998)); see a lso § 24-10-109(3)(a). It is undisputed that Bruce never provi ded the City or the Department any such notice. Because complia nce with the CGIA’s notice provision is “a jurisdictional prer equisite to any action brought under the [CGIA],” the district court properly dismissed his tort claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). § 24-10-109(1); accord Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 , 79 P.3d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 2003); see also Kratzer v. Colo. Int ergovernmental Risk Share Agency , 18 P.3d 766, 769 (Colo. App. 2000) (“ Because it is undisputed that no 14 notice of claim was served on def endants, we conclude that plaintiff’s [CGIA] claims should hav e been dismissed on that basis.”). C. Substantive Due Process Claim ¶ 28 Bruce’s complaint also asserted that he “has a right to own an empty building,” and that he “is b eing denied that right and due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to th e U.S. constitution.” The district cou rt construed this as a claim made under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that Bruce had a substantive due process right t o own a vacant building, and sections of the RBC requiring repa ir and permitting demolition of the Building violated that right . Addressing the merits of Bruce’s contention, the court, accepting all of Bruce’s factual allegations as true, concluded that the RBC di d not impermissibly infringe on Bruce’s right to substantive due proc ess. Thus, it dismissed Bruce’s claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b )(5). ¶ 29 On appeal, Bruce reiterates that he “is being denied a permit and due process of law under th e Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constituti on,” and he asserts conclusory allegations that describes the RBC as “patently unconstitutional.” 15 But he does not explain why ownin g a vacant building is a fundamental right guaranteed by t he Due Process Clause. Nor do es he explain why, if such a right exists under the Federal Constitution, the RBC impermissi bly infringed on that right. In fact, Bruce does not even purport to assert with any specificity that the district court’s analysis of his substantive due process claim was erroneous. Thus, to the extent Bruce challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim, w e decline to address it. 3 See, e.g. , Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am. Inc. , 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We will not consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development.”). ¶ 30 Moreover, as the district court pointed out, Bruce’s claim as set forth in his complaint was equ ally deficient. In support of hi s claim, he merely cited to the Du e Process Clause; he offered no developed argument explaining ho w a right to own a vacant 3 Bruce also appears to suggest, for the first time on appeal, that the RBC violated his procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution. Howev er, because the issue is not preserved, we do not address it. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C. , 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (“It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be addressed for the first time on ap peal.”). 16 building is recognized in the constit ution, and as a result, how h e was legally entitled to the relief r equested. Thus, while the court dismissed his claim on the merits under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), dismissal of the claim was also proper for failure to comply with C.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). See C.R.C.P. 8(a)(2) (“A pl eading which sets forth a claim for a relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); see also Tay lor v. Taylor , 2016 COA 100, ¶ 31 (“A n appellate court may . . . affir m on any ground supported by the r ecord.”). D. Impairment of Contract Claim ¶ 31 We turn next to Bruce’s impairm ent of contract claim, which asserted that the Department unco nstitutionally infringed on his contractual right to repair and rest ore the Building as contemplated in the deed of trust. ¶ 32 The United States Constitution pro vides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impair ing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Col orado has a “virtually identical” constitutional provision, Sch. Di st. No. 1 v. Masters , 2018 CO 18, ¶ 16, which provides that “[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be passed by th e general assembly,” Colo. 17 Const. art. II, § 11. “Colorado cou rts apply the same three-party inquiry for claims brought under b oth: ‘(1) does a contractual relationship exist; (2) does the chan ge in the law impair that contractual relationship; and if so, (3) is the impairment substantial?’” Sch. Dist. No. 1 , ¶ 16 (quoting Justus v. State , 2014 CO 75, ¶¶ 18-19). “If all three pron gs are answered affirmatively, the impairment may nonetheless be constitutional if it is ‘reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.’” Id. (quoting Justus , ¶ 19). ¶ 33 Bruce did not specify what provisi on of the deed of trust actually granted, as he alleged, “a c ontractual right . . . to make repairs to the building to restor e its condition to time of sale in 2016.” Indeed, as the district cour t found, no provision in the deed of trust stated as much. Noneth eless, the court assumed, as do w e, that Bruce was referring to the foll owing provision: Bruce “may . . . take such action as is necessary to protect Lender’s interest . . . including . . . [paying] . . . repair and maintenance costs and expenses.” ¶ 34 But even if Bruce had established t he first prong of the Contracts Clause test, he failed to a llege facts that could establish 18 the second or third prongs, thus entitling him to relief. His complaint identifies no specific ordi nance that the Department enacted or changed that affected h is alleged contractual rights under the deed of trust. 4 And even if we were to assume, as the district court did, that Bruce was referring to sections of the RBC regulating “dangerous building” d esignations, he did not allege that those sections had been enacted or changed after the subject deed of trust was created. Nor does the record indicate as much. Thus, he failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that there had been any change in the law, yet alone on e that had substantially impaired his contractual relationsh ip. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed his claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). 5 See Sch. Dist. No. 1 , ¶ 16; Bewley , ¶ 14. 4 As discussed below, Bruce allud ed to a new state law governing foreclosure sales during bankruptc y proceedings. But he did so only in the context of his claims ag ainst the Trustee. He did not identify or otherwise describe any s pecific change in the law in the context of his claim against the Department. 5 The district court dismissed Bruc e’s claim on slightly different grounds. It generally assumed that Bruce alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the three prongs of the Con tracts Clause test, but it nonetheless appeared to conclud e that the relevant sections of the RBC were constitutional becaus e they were “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.” Justus v. Stat e , 19 E. Attempts to Compel the Trust ee to Record the Deed of Sale ¶ 35 Finally, Bruce raised at least four c laims, as we understand them, seeking to compel the Trust ee to record a deed of sale, which was voided by the federal bankrupt cy automatic stay. We discuss each in turn. 1. Challenge to the Bankruptcy Proc eedings ¶ 36 First, to the extent Bruce challeng ed Graeve’s inclusion of the Building in his bankruptcy filing, the district court properly determined that it had no jurisdict ion to consider such a claim. See Bright v. Fred C. Sproul, Inc. , 44 C olo. App. 542, 544, 616 P.2d 189, 191 (1980) (“The bankruptcy court ’s jurisdiction over the administration of the affairs of an in solvent is essentially exclusive.”). 2. Obligation to Record the Deed of Sale ¶ 37 Second, Bruce generally argued t hat the Trustee was legally obligated to record a deed of sal e. However, as the district court pointed out, the Trustee was statutor ily precluded from doing so. 2014 CO 75, ¶ 19 (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey , 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)). However, w e may affirm on any ground supported by the record. E.g. , Taylor v. Taylor , 2016 COA 100, ¶ 31. 20 ¶ 38 Section 38-38-109(2)(c), C.R.S. 2020, addresses circumstances where, as here, a foreclosure sal e has been requested or is pending but the debtor filed for bankruptcy before the sale was completed. As pertinent here, it provides that [i]f a sale is held in violation of t he automatic stay provisions of the federal ban kruptcy code . . . and an order is subsequently entered by a bankruptcy court of competent juri sdiction . . . closing the bankruptcy case . . . then the . . . deed of trust . . . being foreclosed s hall immediately be deemed reinstat ed. Immediately upon reinstatement, the power of sale provided therein, if any, shall be deemed revived. § 38-38-109(2)(c)(I). However, to r einitiate the sale, the holder of the deed of trust must notify the public trustee conducting the foreclosure sale of the bankruptcy co urt’s order in writing “no later than fifty calendar days prior to the la st possible sale date pursuant to subsections (1)(a) and (2)(e) of [section 38-38-109].” § 38-38- 109(2)(c)(II). If the holder fails to do so, the public trustee is required to administratively withd raw the sale. § 38-38- 109(2)(c)(III). ¶ 39 The district court correctly determi ned that the last possible date of sale under section 38-38-1 09 was November 6, 2019 — 21 twelve months after the originally designated date. See § 38-38- 109(1)(a) (“No sale shall be continu ed to a date later than twelve months from the originally designa ted date in the combined notice, except as provided in subsection (2 ) of this section.”). Thus, to reinitiate the sale, Bruce was requi red to notify the Trustee of the bankruptcy court’s order closing G raeve’s bankruptcy case by September 17, 2019. See § 38-3 8-109(2)(c)(II). It is undisputed that Bruce failed to do so. Thus, as the district court concluded, the Trustee was required to admini stratively withdraw the sale under section 38-38-109(2)(c)(III). Accordingly, the court properly dismissed Bruce’s claim under C. R.C.P. 12(b)(5). See Bewley , ¶ 14. 3. Ex Post Facto Claim ¶ 40 Third, apparently recognizing that he failed to comply with section 38-38-109(2)(c), Bruce ar gued that the statute violated the Colorado Constitution’s prohibitio n against ex post facto laws. See Colo. Const. art. II, § 11 (“No ex po st facto law . . . shall be passed by the general assembly.”). Howev er, the statute, not being criminal in nature, could not be consider ed an ex post facto law. See, e .g. , People v. DeWitt , 275 P.3d 728 , 73 1 (Colo. App. 2011) (An ex post facto law is one that “imposes a p unishment for an act which was 22 not punishable at the time it w as committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed. ” (quoting Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981))). Thus, the district court properly dismissed Bruce’s claim under C. R.C.P. 12(b)(5). See Bewley , ¶ 14. 4. Impairment of Contract Claim ¶ 41 Finally, Bruce also challenged th e constitutionality of section 38-38-109(2)(c) under the Contract s Clause. Specifically, he argu ed that, as applied, the statute “int erfered with the obligations of contract contained in the [deed of trust].” But the effect of the statute was to preclude the Trust ee from recording a deed of sale. And the deed of trust contained no provision requiring the Trustee to do so. Nor did Bruce make any such allegation in his complaint . Thus, Bruce did not establish any disc ernable violation of the Contracts Clause. See Sch. Dist . No. 1 , ¶ 16 (an impairment of contract claim must show that a c hange in law substantially impaired a contractual relationship ). Accordingly, the district court 23 properly dismissed the claim und er C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). 6 See Bewley , ¶ 14. VI. Remaining Contentions ¶ 42 To the extent Bruce purports to ad vance other contentions on appeal, we decline to review them because they are not properly before us, they are undeveloped, and Bruce cites no authority to support them. See Melat, Pressma n & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C. , 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (“ It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower co urt will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”); Barnett , 252 P.3d at 19 (“We will not consider a bald legal proposition pr esented without argument or development.”); Vallagio at I nverness Residential Condo. Ass’n, I nc. v. Metro. Homes, Inc. , 2017 CO 69, ¶¶ 39-40 (we do not consider undeveloped arguments lacking cit ation to controlling authority). 6 The district court also appears t o have reviewed a claim for breach of contract against the Trustee pr emised on a contractual relationship created by the deed of trust. However, we agree with the district court that to the extent Bruce raised such a claim, he did so merely in one conclusory s entence. Thus, the court properly dismissed the claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). See Warne v. Hall , 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9 . 24 VII. Conclusion ¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JO HNSON concur.