Peo in Interest of JT

21CA0809 Peo in Interest of JT 01-06-2022 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 21CA0809 Douglas County District Court No. 20JV110 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of J.T. and W.J.T., Children, and Concerning W.J.T., III, Appellant, and L.L.Z., Appellee. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Furman and Brown, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 6, 2022 Lance J. Ingalls, County Attorney, Kathryn Cherry, Assistant County Attorney , Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado Gina G. Bischofs, Guardian Ad Litem Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Debra Dodd, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Berthoud, Colorado, for Appellee 1 ¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect pr oceeding, W.J.T., III (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgme nt allocating parental responsibilities for J.T. and W.J.T. (the children) to L.L.Z. (mother). We affirm. I. Background ¶ 2 In June 2020, the Douglas County Department of Human Services (Department) initiated an action in dependency and neglect and assumed temporary legal cust ody of the children. The Department alleged that mother h ad mental health issues that impacted her ability to care for t he children. The Department further alleged that father lived in Utah, he had not had any recent contact with the children, and m other and father had a history of domestic violence. The parents ma de no-fault admissions to the petition, the juvenile court adjudicat ed the children dependent and neglected, and it adopted treatmen t plans for the parents. ¶ 3 In January 2021, mother moved fo r an order allocating parental responsibilities for the children and granting her sole decision-making responsibility f or, and primary physical custody of, them. She also asked that father’s parenting time be professionally supervised. The Department agree d with mother’s proposed 2 allocation of parental responsibiliti es (APR) arrangement, except that it recommended that father have unsupervised parenting t ime. ¶ 4 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing in April 2021. After hearing the evidence, the cou rt took the matter under advisement before issuing a writt en order in May 2021. The court granted decision-making responsi bilities and physical custody to mother; it awarded father supervis ed parenting time and provided a path for him to transition to unsup ervised visits. The court certified the case into a domestic relations proceeding and closed the dependency and neglect matter. II. Judicial Notice of Criminal Charg es ¶ 5 Father first contends that the juve nile court erred by taking judicial notice of his criminal convi ctions. Mother and the Department assert that, because th e court never took judicial notice of the criminal convictions, father ’s argument necessarily fails. W e agree with mother and the Depart ment. ¶ 6 During a discussion of preliminary matters, mother’s counsel asked the court to take judicial no tice of father’s two criminal convictions. See CRE 201(a)-(b) ( noting that a court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fa ct not subject to reasonable 3 dispute); People in Interest of T.T. , 845 P.2d 539, 541 (Colo. App. 1992) (concluding that the juveni le court did not err by taking judicial notice of the parent’s crimi nal convictions). Father objected, asserting that the court could not take judicial notice of the convictions without “a certified criminal record.” Contrary to mother’s assertion, the court did n ot make a definitive ruling abo ut whether it would take judicial not ice of the convictions; instead the court stated that it would require mother’s counsel to “prove the evidence that may make [the convi ctions] relevant” and then it would “take up arguments on those cases and [a] further request” for judicial notice. ¶ 7 Later, mother’s counsel asked the caseworker whether father had “a criminal history related to d omestic violence,” and father objected to relevance. The court ov erruled the objection, stating that it would “allow a little leew ay” but would only consider the evidence if it was “relevant with reg ard to [father’s] relationship [with mother] and these children.” Mother’s counsel then rephrase d the question to ask whether the D epartment had any information “relate[d] to domestic violence betw een [mother and father].” In response, the caseworker explained t hat the State of Utah denied 4 the Department’s request to place the children with father in Ut ah because he did not pass the “back ground check.” However, the caseworker testified that she did n ot know “the specifics [of] the background check” or the reasons for its denial. In other words, the caseworker had no information about whether Utah denied the placement request because of fat her’s criminal history or some other reason. ¶ 8 But the caseworker did testify t hat she investigated father’s criminal history as part of her bac kground investigation. The caseworker said that she “noted [f ather’s criminal history] in the Family Services Report,” which she said included “a trespassing case [and] a burglary case,” as well as “one past domestic violence case and a protection order violatio n.” The caseworker testified that she did not craft any treatment pl an components based on father’ s criminal history, however. ¶ 9 In sum, the record shows that mot her asked the court to take judicial notice of father’s criminal c onvictions, but the juvenile cou rt deferred ruling on the request at that time. Because mother neve r renewed her request for the cou rt to take judicial notice of father’s convictions, nothing in the record f rom the APR hearing indicates to 5 us that the court took judicial notice of father’s convictions. Nor do we see anything in the court’s orde r suggesting that it took judicial notice of those convictions. Theref ore, we agree with mother and the Department that the court did not take judicial notice of father’s criminal convictions. ¶ 10 Finally, to the extent that mother p roduced evidence of those convictions through the casewor ker’s testimony and report, fat her never objected to the admission of that evidence. See People in Interest of M.B. , 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (In dependency and neglect cases, “generally appellate courts review only issues presented t o and ruled on by the lower court.”). III. Supervised Parenting Time ¶ 11 Father next asserts that the juveni le court erred by entering an APR order that required him t o exercise his parenting time in a supervised setting. We are not pe rsuaded. ¶ 12 The Colorado Children’s Code auth orizes a juvenile court to enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child who is dependent and neglec ted. § 19-1-104(6), C.R.S. 2021; People in Interest of E.Q. , 2020 CO A 118, ¶ 10. Because the 6 overriding purpose of the Children’ s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing pr ocedures to serve the child’s best interests, the court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G. , 912 P.2d 1385 , 1 391-92 (Colo. 1996); L.G. v. People , 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995); People in Interest of H.K.W. , 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13 . ¶ 13 The allocation of parenting time an d decision-making responsibilities are within the court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on review if the judgmen t is supported by competent evidence in the record. See Peop le in Interest of A.M.K. , 68 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo. App. 2003); see a lso People in Interest of D.G. , 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006) (p roviding that visitation decisions are entrusted to the juvenile cou rt’s sound discretion). It is for t he juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of t he evidence, and to assess the credibility of witnesses. People in I nterest of A.J.L. , 243 P.3d 244 , 249-50 (Colo. 2010); see also I n re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D. , 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15 (when there is record 7 support for the court’s findings, it s resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review). ¶ 14 In its APR order, the court awarde d father in-person, supervised visitation to occur every other month beginning in June 2021 and continuing for six month s. The court furthered ordered that, following the initial six-mont h period, father could begin unsupervised visits in January 202 2. As relevant here, the court provided that supervised visitation was in the children’s best interests based on father’s “minim al contact” with the children an d “the length in time that the childre n lacked contact with” him. Because the record supports the co urt’s findings, we decline to disturb them. ¶ 15 Here, the record shows that, prior t o the case, father had not had any contact with the children since at least April 2019. As a result of father’s lack of a relations hip with the children, the Department recommended that he have supervised visitation. However, the record shows that su pervised visitation did not begin until March 2021, and father parti cipated in only four supervised visits by the time of the APR hearin g three months later. The caseworker testified that the Dep artment would have offered in- 8 person visitation earlier in the cas e, but it could not arrange those visits because father did not make himself available sooner. The caseworker also expressed concern about father’s consistency in visitation once it did begin, noting that father arrived nearly an hour late for one visit and about t wenty minutes late for another one. ¶ 16 To be sure, the caseworker testified that the Department was no longer recommending supervis ed visitation for father. But the caseworker also opined that, consi dering the young ages of the children and the fact that they had been in mother’s care for som e time, “more consistent visits for a l onger period of time would be beneficial for the [children] to reall y build [a] relationship with [father].” She also testified that, in general, supervised visitation should occur for a “consistent peri od of time” before transitioning t o unsupervised visitation. ¶ 17 Based on this record, we cannot sa y that the court abused its discretion by requiring father to c ontinue engaging in supervised visitation before transitioning to u nsupervised visitation. ¶ 18 Nevertheless, father contends that the evidence before the court did not support an order limi ting his parenting time to 9 supervised visits. Specifically, he d irects us to evidence that the caseworker no longer recommende d supervised visitation and that the visitation supervisors said that they did not observe any safety concerns related to father’s parenti ng. Because it is within the court’s purview to weigh the eviden ce and assess the credibility of witnesses, we discern no error fro m the court’s decision to disrega rd some of the caseworker’s opinion or otherwise afford little weight to the visitation supervisors’ testimon y. See A.J.L. , 243 P.3d at 249- 50. Nor can we reweigh the eviden ce or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court even if t here might be evidence supporting a different result. Id. at 256; see a lso B.R.D. , ¶ 15. Rather, decisions about parenting time a re within the court’s sound discretion, D.G. , 140 P.3d at 302 , and we cannot disturb the court’s decision where, as here, there is so me evidence in the record supporting the court’s finding, se e A.M.K. , 68 P.3d at 565 . ¶ 19 Father also appears to challenge the court’s decision that he exercise his parenting time in Colorado (rather than in Utah, w here he lived). But father did not suff iciently develop this argument for us to decide the issue. Because the argument is undeveloped, we 10 decline to address it. People v. Li ggett , 2021 COA 51 , ¶ 53, 492 P.3d 356, 366. IV. Conclusion ¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE BR OWN concur.