Estate of Anderson v. SC Department of Mental Health

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Julia Mae Caldwell Anderson, Representative of the Estate of Tonia LaQuita Anderson, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health, Richland County Sheriff’s Department, City of Columbia Police Department, Defendants, Of Whom South Carolina Department of Mental Health is Respondent. Appeal From Richland County Jackson V. Gregory, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-095 Submitted November 20, 2002 – Filed February 4, 2003 AFFIRMED Donald E. Jonas, of Columbia, for appellant. S. Elizabeth Brosnan, Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., and William C. McDow, all of Columbia, for respondent. PER CURIAM: The Estate of Tonia LaQuita Anderson (“the Estate”) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its wrongful death suit against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“the Department”). The trial court found the two-year statute of limitations expired before the Estate filed its suit. The Estate appeals, asserting several alleged errors. We affirm. ISSUES The Estate argues the trial court erred by: 1) considering the Department’s motion to dismiss because it was not properly presented to the trial court; 2) converting the Department’s motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings into one motion for summary judgment; 3) granting the Department’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations; and 4) considering the affidavits submitted by the Department without first forcing the Department to comply with the Estate’s discovery requests. FACTS In its complaint, the Estate alleged the following facts. On several occasions prior to Anderson’s death, Martin punched, kicked, choked, and cut Anderson, purchased a pistol in violation of his status as a convicted felon, threatened and battered his own family, and threatened Anderson’s family. Twenty days before Anderson was murdered, Martin was arrested for stalking, assault and battery, and malicious injury to personal property, all with respect to Anderson. Only seven days before Anderson’s murder, Martin kidnapped Anderson. Following Anderson’s release, Martin was admitted to a psychiatric hospital run by the Department, where he was treated for a period of five days. This was at least the fourth time the Department treated Martin prior to Anderson’s murder. During his treatment, Martin made specific threats against Anderson’s life. Following his short treatment, the Department released Martin without warning to Anderson. Four days later, on June 5, 1998, Martin shot Anderson to death. On June 6, 2000, the Estate filed a complaint for wrongful death, claiming the Department was liable because its failure to warn Anderson of Martin’s release was the proximate cause of Anderson’s death. Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), SCRCP, the Department filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the Estate filed its wrongful death claim. The Department filed and served affidavits in support of its motions approximately fifteen days after it filed the motions and nearly seven months before the motions were heard. The trial court converted the 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions into a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Estate’s case, finding the two-year statute of limitations expired before the Estate filed its suit. The trial court also determined the Estate’s pending motion to compel discovery was moot. The Estate appeals. DISCUSSION I. Motion to Dismiss Initially, the Estate appears to argue the trial court should not have heard, or perhaps did not actually hear, the Department’s motion to dismiss at the same hearing where the trial court heard the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, the Estate argues it was error for the trial court to issue an order in which it seemingly ruled on a motion to dismiss, which was never heard. This argument is without merit. On July 3, 2000, the Department filed its answer to the Estate’s amended complaint, asserting it was filing a “Motion to Dismiss pursuant to SCRCP Rule 12 (b) . . . (6).” (R. 24) Accompanying the Department’s answer was a separate motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. Both of these documents were filed and served more than seven months before the motions hearing. Following the commencement of this lawsuit and filing of the Department’s motion to dismiss, the clerk of court’s office transmitted three notices to the parties regarding the motions hearing. Each of these notices indicated that “All Outstanding Motions” would be heard at the scheduled hearing. In addition, the Estate’s memorandum, submitted during the motions, hearing specifically addressed the Department’s motion to dismiss, which it now claims was not properly before the trial court. The record reflects the Estate knew the Department’s motion to dismiss was pending before the trial court prior to the motions hearing and thus would be addressed at the hearing. Therefore, the Estate cannot now claim the trial court did not actually hear or should not have heard the motion. II. Conversion of Motions The Estate argues the trial court erred in converting the motions to dismiss and judgment on the pleadings into one for summary judgment. We disagree. When supported by materials outside the pleadings, and relied on by the trial court, both a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings may be considered as a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), SCRCP. See Pitts v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., Op. No. 3571 (Ct. App. filed Nov. 25, 2002) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 39 at 65, 68-69) (holding motions to dismiss, supported by matters outside the pleadings and relied on by the trial court, should be treated as motions for summary judgment); Diminch v. 2001 Enterprises, Inc., 292 S.C. 141, 142, 355 S.E.2d 275, 275 (Ct. App. 1987) (“[M]otions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP, can be considered as motions for summary judgment.”). However, before the trial court may convert the motion to one for summary judgment, “all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion.” Rule 12(b)(6), (c), SCRCP. The Department filed and served affidavits in support of its motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings approximately fifteen days after it filed the motions and nearly seven months before the trial court heard the motions. In the Department’s motion to dismiss, it specifically stated the motion “will be based upon the pleadings, depositions, any furnished affidavits . . . and such other evidence as may be acceptable to the Court.” During the motions hearing, the Department presented testimony contained within its affidavits. The trial court referred to the Department’s affidavits when issuing its order dismissing the Estate’s suit. In addition, more than eight months passed between the motions hearing and the issuance of the trial court’s order. Therefore, the Estate had ample time to provide any supporting materials in accordance with Rule 56, SCRCP, and cannot now claim prejudice from the trial court having converted the Department’s motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment. See Pitts (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 39 at 65, 69) (holding the parties had ample opportunity to introduce additional evidentiary material where the trial court issued its order six months after a memorandum containing supplementary material was filed; thus, the trial court did not err in converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment). III. Statute of Limitations The Estate argues the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations because it was unaware it had a potential claim against the Department until approximately eight months after Anderson’s murder. We disagree. “In determining whether summary judgment is proper, this [C]ourt must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 344 S.C. 280, 285, 543 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2001). “Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Columbia v. ACLU of South Carolina, 323 S.C. 384, 386, 475 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1996). South Carolina Code Annotated section 15-78-100(a) (Supp. 2001) states any action brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“the Act”) is forever barred unless commenced “within two years after the loss was or should have been discovered.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (Supp. 2001). For purposes of the Act, “loss” includes death. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f) (Supp. 2001). In determining when the loss was discovered, the trial court must use an “objective, not subjective” standard. See Joubert v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 341 S.C. 176, 191, 534 S.E.2d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2000). Although the Estate concedes the two-year statute of limitations applies, it argues the statute should not have begun to run until approximately eight months after Anderson’s murder because it was at that time the Estate learned of its potential claim against the Department. Under the Estate’s theory, this Court would have to adopt a discovery rule in which the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of the negligence on the part of a particular defendant. However, our supreme court has previously rejected a similar argument, stating the significant date under the discovery rule is “the date of discovery of the injury, not the date of discovery of the wrongdoer.” Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 128, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1994) (emphasis added). According to our supreme court’s decision in Wiggins, the statute of limitations runs from the time a party is “‘on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist . . . not when advice of counsel is sought or a full-blown theory of recovery [is] developed.’” Id. at 128, 442 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting Snell v. Columbia Gun Exch., Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 303, 278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1981)); see also Bayle v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 122, 542 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding the date of “loss” for purposes of the Act was the date on which the plaintiff knew of the injury). The record reflects the Estate knew of its loss, Anderson’s murder, on June 5, 1998. As mentioned above, the Estate concedes the two-year statute of limitations applies. Finally, the record establishes the Estate filed its complaint on June 6, 2000, two years and one day after Anderson’s murder. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired before the Estate filed its claim, and the trial court’s order dismissing its claim was without error. IV. Motion to Compel The Estate further argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel discovery and in considering the affidavits submitted by the Department without first forcing the Department to comply with the Estate’s discovery requests. This argument is without merit. The record clearly establishes the Estate filed its complaint on June 6, 2000, two years and one day after Anderson’s murder. Thus, even without reference to the Department’s affidavits, a sufficient basis existed upon which to properly determine the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, forcing the Department to submit to discovery would not have aided the trial court in determining whether to grant summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Richland County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 441, 567 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2002) (holding appellant has no right to discovery where discovery would not aid the trial court in rendering its decision whether to grant summary judgment); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 128-29, 542 S.E.2d at 742-42 (holding the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment without allowing for additional discovery where no further discovery would have contributed to the resolution of the case). Furthermore, a trial court’s “rulings on discovery matters will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 502, 381 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1989) (emphasis added). “The burden is upon the party appealing from the order to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion.” Belk of Spartanburg, S.C., Inc. v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 127, 522 S.E.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, “[m]ere allegations of error are not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.” First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994). Given this Court’s limited standard of review with respect to discovery matters, and because the Estate merely alleges an abuse of discretion, the Estate has failed to affirmatively prove the trial court abused its discretion. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order dismissing the Estate’s wrongful death action and finding the Estate’s motion to compel was moot was without error, and therefore, is AFFIRMED. [1] CONNOR, STILWELL, and HOWARD, JJ., concur. [1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.