Dept. of Human Services v. K. J. V.

No. 42 January 24, 2024 341

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. L. V., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent, v. K. J. V., aka K. S., aka K. M., Appellant. Jackson County Circuit Court 19JU02539; A181543

David J. Orr, Judge. Submitted November 6, 2023. George W. Kelly filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed.

342 Dept. of Human Services v. K. J. V.

EGAN, J. Mother appeals from a juvenile court judgment denying her motion to set aside the relinquishment of her parental rights. In mother’s single assignment of error, she challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her motion, arguing that she did revoke the signed release prior to child being placed with adoptive parents on May 20, 2021. In an earlier opinion involving this case, Dept. of Human Services v. K. J. V., 320 Or App 56, 64, 512 P3d 469 (2022), we reversed the juvenile court’s judgment and instructed the juvenile court that, on remand, the “court must determine whether [mother] revoked her relinquish- ment before May 20, 2021, when, under ORS 418.270(4), the relinquishment became irrevocable.” On remand, the juve- nile court entered a judgment denying mother’s motion to revoke, and specifically finding that mother had failed to properly revoke her relinquishment of parental rights before May 20, 2021. Mother argues that de novo review is required, alleging that the juvenile court’s judgment “effects” the ter- mination of her parental rights. Under ORS 19.415(3)(a), we review de novo judgments in a proceeding for the ter- mination of parental rights. The juvenile court’s denial of mother’s motion to revoke did not arise in the context of a termination of parental rights and therefore we are not required to review this case de novo. See Dept. of Human Services v. J. L. J., 233 Or App 544, 549, 226 P3d 112 (2010) (“[A] surrender does not, itself, effect a termination or sever- ance of a child’s relationship with his or her parent. Rather, such a severance can be accomplished only by way of a court order.” (Emphasis in original.) (Citing ORS 418.270(2).)). Alternatively, mother requests that even if we conclude that de novo review is not required, that we exercise our discre- tion to review de novo. We decline to do so, as this is not an exceptional case in which de novo review would be appro- priate. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (providing this court with dis- cretion to conduct de novo review in equitable cases); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (de novo review is appropriate only in exceptional cases).

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 330 Or App 341 (2024) 343

Therefore, “we review the juvenile court’s legal con- clusions for errors of law but are bound by its findings of his- torical fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. S., 246 Or App 341, 344, 265 P3d 792 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 586 (2012). Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by find- ing that she did not revoke her relinquishment of paren- tal rights before May 20, 2021, because mother testified that she sent text messages to the Department of Human Services (DHS) in late February 2021 revoking relinquish- ment. However, the juvenile court made a factual finding that mother did not unequivocally communicate that she wished to revoke her relinquishment prior to May 20, 2021. Furthermore, DHS elicited testimony and provided records which support the juvenile court’s finding that mother did not revoke prior to May 20, 2021. We conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s ruling denying mother’s motion to revoke. Affirmed.