JP Morgan v. Army

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, Respondent,

v.

Wendy A. Army and Francis X. Army,

Of whom Francis X. Army is, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-163727

Appeal From Richland County Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-414 Submitted July 2, 2012 – Filed July 11, 2012

AFFIRMED

Francis X. Army, pro se, of Eastover.

John Judson Hearn, of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Army's motion for a continuance: Plyler v. Burns, 373 S.C. 637, 650, 647 S.E.2d 188, 195 (2007) ("The grant or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial [court] and is reviewable on appeal only when an abuse of discretion appears from the record."); id. ("[T]he denial of a motion for a continuance on the ground that [a party] has not had time to prepare is rarely disturbed on appeal."); Hudson v. Blanton, 282 S.C. 70, 74, 316 S.E.2d 432, 434 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting a moving party must show the absence of some material evidence and due diligence on his part to obtain such evidence to justify a continuance); Beasley v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 273 S.C. 523, 532, 257 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1979) (finding a movant failed to show due diligence to justify a continuance when he had eight months from filing of the complaint until trial to prepare).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting duplicates of the loan documents: Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 25-26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005) ("[T]he admission or exclusion of evidence in general is within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support. . . . To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the appellant must prove both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the . . . verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof." (citations omitted)).

3. As to the remaining issues: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.