Damballah v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Shango Damballah, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213456

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-478 Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed December 18, 2013

AFFIRMED

Shango Damballah, pro se.

Shanika Kenyetta Johnson, of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Shango Damballah, an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) dismissal of his appeal from a prison disciplinary conviction. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether SCDC afforded Damballah minimal due process: Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 369-70, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000) ("The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected 'liberty' interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due process to ensure the state-created right was not arbitrarily abrogated."); id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 ("[D]ue process in a prison disciplinary proceeding involving serious misconduct requires: (1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.").

2. As to whether substantial evidence supports the ALC's decision: Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995) (providing a reviewing court will not disturb the findings of an administrative agency if those findings are supported by substantial evidence); id. ("The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an [a]dministrative [a]gency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Rather, we need only find, considering the record as a whole, evidence that would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached." (internal quotations marks and citation omitted)).

3. As to whether the ALC abused its discretion: Rish v. Rish, 296 S.C. 14, 15, 370 S.E.2d 102, 103 (Ct. App. 1988) ("When an appellate court is in agreement with a discretionary ruling or is only mildly in disagreement, it says that the trial [court] did not abuse his discretion.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.