Alexander v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals John Alexander, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2015-001761 Appeal From The Administrative Law Court S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-269 Submitted May 1, 2017 – Filed July 5, 2017 AFFIRMED John Alexander, pro se. Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B)(e) (Supp. 2016) ("The court of appeals may . . . reverse or modify the decision [of the ALC] if the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . ."); Friends of Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla; rather, it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the [ALC]."); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2016) (explaining an appellate court "may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact"); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 382, 527 S.E.2d 742, 757 (2000) ("Courts traditionally have adopted a 'hands off' doctrine regarding judicial involvement in prison disciplinary procedures and other internal prison matters, although they must intercede when infringements complained of by an inmate reach constitutional dimensions."); id. at 369-70, 527 S.E.2d at 750 ("The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected 'liberty' interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due process to ensure the state-created right was not arbitrarily abrogated." (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974))); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567 ("If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against [an] inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls."); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 ("The Supreme Court . . . held [an] inmate does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, although prison officials have the discretion to grant that right in appropriate cases."); Skipper v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 370 S.C. 267, 279, 633 S.E.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Due process in prison drug testing does not require that a prisoner be afforded duplicative testing, nor does it require utilizing a testing method chosen by the prisoner."). AFFIRMED.1 LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.