Holt v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Quentin Holt, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002499

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-235 Submitted April 1, 2018 – Filed June 6, 2018

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Blume Norris & Franklin-Best LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole and Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395, 414, 745 S.E.2d 110, 120 (2013) ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law

subject to de novo review."); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) ("For purposes of definition under South Carolina law, a 'no parole offense' means a class A, B, or C felony . . . ."); Bolin v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 415 S.C. 276, 279, 781 S.E.2d 914, 915 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Whether a felony is a Class A, B, or C felony depends on the maximum sentence for the felony—a Class A felony is a felony punishable by not more than thirty years, a Class B felony is a felony punishable by not more than twenty-five years, and a Class C felony is a felony punishable by not more than twenty years."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B)(3) (2018) ("A person who . . . possesses with intent to distribute, . . . is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction: . . . for a third or subsequent offense, the offender must be imprisoned for not . . . more than thirty years . . . ."); id. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a third or subsequent offense in which all prior offenses were for possession of a controlled substance . . . is eligible for parole . . . ." (emphasis added)); Bolin, 415 S.C. at 282, 781 S.E.2d at 917 ("The legislature's use of the phrase, 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law,' in the amendments . . . expresses its intent to repeal section 24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with amended sections 44-53-375 . . . ." (emphasis added)); Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 447, 441 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1994) ("If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.").

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.