Lucas Marchant v. John Doe

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Lucas Marchant, Respondent,

v.

John Doe and John Doe d/b/a Democrats for Marchant, Defendants,

Of which John Doe is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001605

Appeal From Greenville County Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-413 Submitted October 3, 2022 – Filed November 23, 2022

DISMISSED

Samuel Darryl Harms, III, of Double Aught Injury Lawyers, LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Joshua Snow Kendrick, of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Greenville, and Christopher Shannon Leonard, of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this defamation action filed by Lucas Marchant against John Doe and John Doe d/b/a Democrats for Marchant, Doe appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) finding it had subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failing to find his speech is protected by the federal and state constitutions; (3) denying his motion to dismiss; (4) denying his motion for a protective order; and (5) denying his motion to quash a subpoena. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory and not immediately appealable.

In conjunction with filing an answer in this case, Doe, claiming a right to anonymity based on political speech, filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash and for a protective order. After a hearing on the motions, the circuit court found it had jurisdiction over Doe and subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motions to dismiss, for a protective order, and to quash the subpoena. We dismiss, finding the order is not immediately appealable. See Allison v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 394 S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011) (finding an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not directly appealable); Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 336, 426 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1993) (explaining an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction "is interlocutory and not directly appealable"); Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 377 S.C. 12, 30, 659 S.E.2d 112, 122 (2008) (explaining that "discovery orders, in general, are interlocutory and are not immediately appealable"); Tucker v. Honda of S.C. Mfg., Inc., 354 S.C. 574, 577, 582 S.E.2d 405, 407 (2003) (holding an order compelling discovery involving privileged information is not immediately appealable); Waddell v. Kahdy, 309 S.C. 1, 4, 419 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1992) (explaining an order requiring a party to submit to a deposition is not immediately appealable); Ex parte Whetstone, 289 S.C. 580, 580, 347 S.E.2d 881, 881 (1986) (applying the same rule to a non-party).

In this case, the merits of the lawsuit concern whether Doe defamed Marchant. Although Doe has a substantial right in anonymous political speech, the order does not prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. See Laura Rogal, Anonymity in Social Media, 7 Phoenix L. Rev. 61, 66–67 (2013) ("Although the courts readily uphold the right to speak anonymously, the right to do so is not absolute. . . . [I]t is no surprise that political speech receives the highest level of protection. . . . [However, t]ypes of speech such as defamation, obscenity, and fighting words remain completely unprotected."); id. at 67 ("In the context of a conflict between anonymous authors' First Amendment rights and the ability of tort victims to unmask anonymous speakers, courts have engaged in a wary balancing act between the two interests . . . . As a result, the identity of an anonymous

speaker may be disclosed during discovery to protect a litigant's legitimate interest in vindicating a legal right in court.").

DISMISSED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.