State v. Rickey Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Rickey Brown, Appellant. Appeal from Richland County Michelle J. Childs, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-204 Submitted January 4, 2010 – Filed March 12, 2010 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General A. West Lee, of Columbia, and Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Warren B. Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Rickey Brown was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree. The trial court sentenced him to five years imprisonment and credited Brown with fourteen months for time served. Brown appeals arguing the trial court's sentence was disproportionate and excessive given the circumstances of the offense and of the offender. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR and the following authorities: State v. Cox, 328 S.C. 371, 373, 492 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (defendant and the State must make a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve an alleged error for appellate review); State v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 459, 462, 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999) (noting that, if an exceptional circumstance is presented, a sentence may be set aside on appeal even if an objection has not been made at trial); Article 1, section 15 of the South Carolina State Constitution (stating that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 354, 46 S.E.2d 273, 275-76 (1948) ("[t]he weight of authority is to the effect that if the statute fixing the punishment for an offense is not unconstitutional, a sentence within the limits prescribed by such statute will not be regarded as cruel and unusual"; and the court did not have jurisdiction to "correct a sentence on the ground that it is excessive when it is within the limits prescribed by law for the discretion of the trial Judge (sic) and is not the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive."); State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441, 443, 343 S.E.2d 292, 293 (1986) (outlining the three objective criteria to be considered when reviewing sentences for proportionality); S.C. Code Ann. section 16-3-655 (B) and (C)(3) (2003) (defining the crime of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and the sentence that must be imposed).[1] AFFIRMED. HUFF, A.C.J., GEATHERS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.