SunTrust Mortgage v. Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as a nominee for SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., and SunTrust Bank, Respondents, v. Jonathan H. Smith and Nicole M. Smith, aka Nicole Smith, Appellants. Appeal From Charleston County Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-225 Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 18, 2011 AFFIRMED Christopher Michael Ramsey, of Charleston, for Appellants. Kirsten E. Small and Suzanne Taylor Graham Grigg, both of Greenville, for Respondents. PER CURIAM: Jonathan H. Smith and Nicole M. Smith appeal the master-in-equity's grant of a foreclosure in favor of SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as a nominee for SunTrust Mortgage; and SunTrust Bank. On appeal, the Smiths argue the master erred in denying a motion for leave to amend an answer and a motion for a continuance. Additionally, they contend the master erred in entering a foreclosure judgment against the Smiths based solely on the testimony of a SunTrust Bank employee who had no personal knowledge of Smith's account. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for leave to amend and the motion for a continuance: Berry v. McLeod, 328 S.C. 435, 450, 492 S.E.2d 794, 802 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Courts have wide latitude in amending pleadings. . . . [T]he decision to allow an amendment is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will rarely be disturbed on appeal. The trial [court's] finding will not be overturned without an abuse of discretion or unless manifest injustice has occurred."); State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 84, 94, 697 S.E.2d 622, 628 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he trial court's decision to deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the trial court's discretion. As such, [an appellate] court will not reverse the trial court unless there was an abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudice."). 2. As to whether the trial court erred in entering a foreclosure judgment against the Smiths based solely on the testimony of a SunTrust Bank employee who had no personal knowledge of Smith's account: Calcutt v. Calcutt, 282 S.C. 565, 569, 320 S.E.2d 55, 57 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The failure to make a timely and proper objection to the introduction of testimony waives the right to object to such testimony on appeal.") (citation omitted). AFFIRMED. SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.