Harwell v. Cumbee

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Sharon Harwell, Appellant, v. Kendrick Cumbee, Patrick Cumbee, and Pamela S. Laury, Defendants, Of Whom Pamela S. Laury is, Respondent. Appeal From Richland County J. Michelle Childs, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-150 Heard February 15, 2012 – Filed March 7, 2012 AFFIRMED Paige Blair George, of Columbia, for Appellant. Robert A. McKenzie, of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Appellant Sharon Harwell appeals from an order of the circuit court granting Respondent Pamela S. Laury's motion for summary judgment on causes of action related to injuries Harwell suffered from a dog bite. On appeal, Harwell argues the trial court erred by failing to (1) address her cause of action for negligence; (2) address her argument that Laury's property was not in a fit and habitable condition because it was unfenced; (3) interpret the legislative intent of the statute providing liability for dog bites; and (4) permit a cause of action for negligent leasing or entrustment of real property. We find no error of law in the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, and therefore, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Nicholson v. Nicholson, 378 S.C. 523, 537, 663 S.E.2d 74, 82 (Ct. App. 2008) ("An issue is not preserved where the trial court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mitchell by Mitchell v. Bazzle, 304 S.C. 402, 405, 404 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding a landlord is not liable under the common law for injuries caused by a tenant's dog, even when the landlord knows of the animal's vicious propensities and has the right to cancel the tenant's lease); Bruce v. Durney, 341 S.C. 563, 571, 534 S.E.2d 720, 725 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding a landlord's statutory duty to keep the leased premises in a fit and habitable condition applies to the inherent physical qualities of the premises and does not alter the common law rule that a landlord is not vicariously liable for the actions of a tenant's dog (citation omitted)); Clea v. Odom, 394 S.C. 175, 180, 714 S.E.2d 542, 545 (2011) (finding a property owner is strictly liable for injuries from a dog bite only when the property owner exercises control over, and assumes responsibility for, the care and keeping of the dog); Mitchell, 304 S.C. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 912 (finding "no authority imposing liability upon a landlord based upon a theory of negligent rental or entrustment of land"). AFFIRMED. PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.