Tomlin v. SCDPPP

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals George Tomlin, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent. Appeal from the Administrative Law Court Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-332 Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 30, 2012 VACATED AND REMANDED George Tomlin, pro se. Teresa A. Knox, J. Benjamin Aplin, and Tommy Evans, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: George Tomlin appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order affirming the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services's (the Department) decision denying him parole. He argues the ALC erred in finding (1) the code section permitting the Department to conduct parole hearings via video conferencing is not a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions; (2) the Department's criteria for parole consideration did not violate Tomlin's due process and equal protection rights and did not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause; (3) Tomlin's claim that he should have been eligible for parole at an earlier date was moot; and (4) no due process rights were implicated by the Department's criteria for parole eligibility. Because all of Tomlin's issues stem from a routine denial of parole, we vacate[1] the order of the ALC pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal in accordance with the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2011) (providing the ALC "shall not hear . . . an appeal involving the denial of parole to a potentially eligible inmate by the Department"); Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (holding an order denying parole and stating consideration of all statutory and Department criteria is sufficient to avoid deeming an inmate effectively ineligible for parole). VACATED AND REMANDED. PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.