Pendergrass v. SC Department of Probation, Pardon, and Parole Services

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Phillip J. Pendergrass, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Pardon , and Parole Services, Respondent. Appeal from Administrative Law Court John D. Geathers, Administrative Law Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-539 Submitted September 2, 2008 – Filed September 17, 2008 AFFIRMED Phillip J. Pendergrass, of Bennettsville, pro se, for Appellant. Tommy Evans, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Pendergrass was convicted for murder in 1976. He appeals the dismissal of his appeal by the Administrative Law Court. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Sullivan v. S. C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 443 n. 4, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 n.4 (2003) (“[A]n inmate has a right of review by the AL[C] after a final decision he is ineligible for parole, but that a parole-eligible inmate does not have the same right of review after a decision denying parole . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Slezak v. S. C. Dep’t of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 331, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004) (holding while the “AL[C] has subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final decision of the [Department of Corrections] in a non-collateral or administrative matter,” those matters can still be summarily dismissed where there is no state-created liberty or property interest implicated); Furtick v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 352 S.C. 594, 598 n. 4, 576 S.E.2d 146, 149, n. 4 (2003) (holding although an inmate has a liberty interest in parole eligibility, the statute governing that process does not create an interest in the granting of parole itself). AFFIRMED.[1] ANDERSON, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.