In the Matter of Eric Passmore

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Eric Passmore, Appellant. Appeal from Greenville County Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-037 Submitted January 2, 2009 – Filed January 15, 2009 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, Assistant Attorney General R. Westmoreland Clarkson, and Assistant Attorney General William Blitch, all of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Eric Passmore appeals his commitment to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator. Passmore argues the trial court erred in allowing the State’s witness to testify to the factual allegations of Passmore’s criminal sexual conduct with a minor charge when Passmore pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of committing a lewd act on a minor. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 577, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007) (“The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law.”); State v. Robinson, 305 S.C. 469, 474, 409 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1991) (stating a party cannot complain of prejudice from evidence to which he opened the door); State v. Stroman, 281 S.C. 508, 513, 316 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1984) (holding when a party introduces evidence of a particular matter, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence to explain or rebut it, even though the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially); State v. Culbreath, 377 S.C. 326, 333, 659 S.E.2d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] defendant may open the door to what would be otherwise improper evidence through his own introduction of evidence or witness examination.”); Floyd v. Floyd, 365 S.C. 56, 92, 615 S.E.2d 465, 484 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the door-opening doctrine applies not only in a criminal law context, but in a civil context as well). AFFIRMED. HUFF, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.