Locklear v. Modern Continental

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Bernard Locklear, Appellant, v. Modern Continental South, Inc., Respondent. Appeal From Marlboro County J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-067 Submitted February 2, 2009 – Filed February 9, 2009 AFFIRMED Christopher G. Isgett, of Columbia, for Appellant. M. Stephen Stubley, of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Bernard Locklear appeals the circuit court's affirmance of an order by the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission granting credit to Locklear's employer for temporary total disablity paid after he reached maximum medical improvement. Locklear argues the circuit court erred in affirming because such credit is expressly prohibited by section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code (1985). We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hendricks v. Pickens County, 335 S.C. 405, 416, 517 S.E.2d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's grant of credit to employer for temporary total disability paid after maximum medical improvement); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-210 (1985) ("Any payments made by an employer to an injured employee during the period of his disability . . . which by the terms of this Title were not due and payable when made may . . . be deducted from the amount to be paid as compensation. . . ."). AFFIRMED. Huff, Williams, and Konduros, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.