David v. Dorchester County School District Two

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Laurie L. David, Employee, Respondent, v. Dorchester County School District Two, Employer and South Carolina School Boards Insurance Trust, Insurer, Appellants. Appeal From Richland County L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-117 Submitted March 2, 2009 – Filed March 5, 2009 AFFIRMED Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants. J. Leeds Barroll, IV, and John Koon, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Laurie David brought this workers' compensation case seeking benefits and medical treatment for injuries resulting from a car accident. Dorchester School District Two and South Carolina School Boards Insurance Trust (collectively Appellants) argued: (1) most of David's injuries were preexisting; and (2) David was disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to section 42-1-560 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007). The single commissioner awarded compensation and held David was not disqualified from receiving benefits. The Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) reversed, holding David was disqualified from receiving benefits for failure to comply with section 42-1-560. The circuit court reversed. Appellants appeal, arguing the circuit court erred in reinstating the decision of the single commissioner and remanding the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission for any further action consistent with the order of the single commissioner. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Pelican Bldg. Ctrs. of Horry-Georgetown, Inc. v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 60, 427 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1993) (holding where an issue has not been ruled upon by the trial judge nor raised in a post-trial motion, such issue may not be considered on appeal); In re Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1998) ("When a party receives an order that grants certain relief not previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal."); Godfrey v. Heller, 311 S.C. 516, 520, 429 S.E.2d 859, 862 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding where a theory of relief was first raised in lower court's order, appellant must challenge this theory with a Rule 59, SCRCP, motion). AFFIRMED. HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. [1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.