(PC) Hammler v. Hernandez

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ALLEN HAMMLER, Case No. 1:19-cv-00616 SKO (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 v. (Docs. 77 & 81) 14 J. HERNANDEZ, 15 Defendant. [16] 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights case pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. section 1983 . The action proceeds on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against 19 Defendant J. Hernandez. 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2024. (Doc. 77.) Plaintiff 22 filed a motion for summary judgment on February 1, 2024. (Doc. 81.) 23 On February 15, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 82), and 24 Plaintiff replied on May 28, 2024 (Doc. 92). Following several extensions of time, Plaintiff filed 25 an opposition to Defendant’s motion (Docs. 93, 94) on June 17, 2024, and Defendant filed a 26 reply. (Doc. 95). 27 For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary 28 judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 1 II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 2 On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff alerted Defendant J. Hernandez, a psychiatric technician, 3 to a “rash” or “[f]ungal infection” on his legs. (Doc. 21 at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that the rash had 4 “open sores, … some of which were actively [b]leeding and causing him great pain.” (Id. at 2.) 5 Defendant examined Plaintiff through his cell door, and Plaintiff asked Defendant to escort him to 6 the nurse’s station so that Defendant could clean his sores. (Id. at 3.) Defendant stated he could 7 not. (Id.) Plaintiff, “becoming [f]rustrated with … Defendant’s excuses[,] told him that he could 8 clean the wounds himself” and asked Defendant for alcohol pads. (Id. at 4.) Defendant replied 9 that he would bring some pads to Plaintiff. (Id.) At noon, when Defendant had not returned with 10 the alcohol pads, Plaintiff called out to Defendant as he was passing by, who said he had 11 forgotten about the pads. (Id. at 4-5.) 12 A few minutes later, Defendant gave Plaintiff four alcohol pads. (Doc. 21 at 5.) The pads 13 were “inside their individual packs but … [were] intentionally [punctured] by Defendant, using 14 some … unknown object of circular shape.” (Id.) Plaintiff explained to Defendant that, due to his 15 Rastafarian faith, he could not use the pads because they were “tainted.” (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff 16 asked Defendant to bring him new pads and, if he must open them, that he do so in front of 17 Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could confirm that the pads were not tainted. (Id. at 6.) Defendant told 18 Plaintiff that he could not so and after a brief argument, Defendant walked away. (Id.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 20 A. Summary Judgment 21 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine 22 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by 24 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 25 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 26 purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....” Fed. R. 27 Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 28 Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 1 against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 2 essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See 3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an 4 essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. 5 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 6 establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. 7 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 8 existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 9 of their pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, 10 and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists or shows 11 that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the 13 fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 14 governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., 15 Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 , 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party 16 must also demonstrate that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 17 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 18 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the 19 opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient 20 that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ 21 differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of 22 summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there 23 is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory 24 committee's note on 1963 amendments). 25 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be 26 believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 . All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 27 facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 28 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's 1 obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. 2 Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 , 902 (9th 3 Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply 4 show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a 5 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine 6 issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). 7 B. First Amendment: Free Exercise of Religion 8 Prisoners “do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and 9 confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). Inmates “retain protections 10 afforded by the First Amendment, … including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free 11 exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). 12 However, “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many 13 privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Id. 14 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (a 15 prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion “is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration”). 16 A plaintiff asserting a free exercise claim must show that the defendant’s actions 17 substantially burden his or her practice of religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023 , 1031 18 (9th Cir. 2015). “A substantial burden … place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious 19 exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious 20 beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his 21 beliefs.” Id. (internal quotation marks & citations omitted). “[A] prison policy that intentionally 22 puts significant pressure on inmates … to abandon their religious beliefs ... imposes a substantial 23 burden on [the inmate’s] religious practice.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) 24 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 25 Once a plaintiff establishes that state action substantially burdens his exercise of religion, 26 “the government bears the burden of establishing that the regulation serves a compelling 27 government interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.” Shakur, 514 F.3d 28 at 889 . In the prison context, the Supreme Court has held that alleged infringements of prisoners’ 1 free exercise rights are “judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily 2 applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 3 (citation omitted). The challenged conduct “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 4 penological interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). “[T]he availability of 5 alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant consideration” for claims under the First 6 Amendment. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 , 361 (2015) (citations omitted). 7 The Supreme Court has set forth four factors in determining whether a prison regulation is 8 valid: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the 9 legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;” (2) whether there are “alternative 10 means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates;” (3) whether “accommodation 11 of the asserted constitutional right” will “impact ... guards and other inmates, and on the 12 allocation of prison resources generally;” and (4) whether there is an “absence of ready 13 alternatives” versus the “existence of obvious, easy alternatives.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 , 14 89 (1987); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 882 . 15 IV. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS 16 A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 17 Defendant alleges that the undisputed evidence establishes that he did not substantially 18 burden Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religion, and that all four Turner factors favor Defendant. 19 Defendant also contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. 20 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 21 Plaintiff contends his ability to practice his Rastafarian religion was substantially 22 burdened by Defendant’s act and he was coerced to abandon his religious beliefs in exchange for 23 receiving treatment for a medical condition. Plaintiff contends no rule or policy prohibited 24 Defendant from providing him with unopened, versus opened and tainted, alcohol pads. 25 V. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 26 1. At all times relevant to the allegations, Plaintiff was a prisoner in the California 27 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) housed at California State 28 Prison-Corcoran (CSP-Corcoran). 1 2. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff alerted Defendant to a “rash” on his legs and 2 requested Defendant provide him with alcohol disinfectant pads. 3 3. Per Plaintiff’s request, Defendant provided Plaintiff with four alcohol disinfectant 4 pads. 5 4. The alcohol pads packets that Defendants provided were pre-opened by Defendant in 6 such a way that prevented the pads from being stored for an extended period without 7 the imbued alcoholic liquid drying out. 8 5. Plaintiff demanded that he be provided with unopened alcohol pads, as he claimed it 9 was against his religious [beliefs] to use opened pads as they were tainted. 10 6. Defendant refused to give Plaintiff unopened pads due to his fear that Plaintiff could 11 use the unopened [pads for] creation and consumption of illicitly made prison 12 alcoholic drink concoctions commonly known as “Pruno.” 13 7. Plaintiff claimed that he need alcohol pads to treat the pain stemming from his leg 14 “rash.” 15 8. Alcohol pads are a disinfectant medical tool which are designed to prevent infection 16 not reduce pain. 17 (Doc. 77-2.) 18 VI. PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS1 19 1. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff was a prisoner in the custody of CDCR, housed at 20 CSP-Corcoran. 21 2. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff was a practicing Rastafarian by religious faith and 22 believe with the Oxford New Desktop Dictionary and other recognizing Rastafarian as 23 a religion. 24 3. On that same date, Plaintiff held the right to practice his religion freely. 25 4. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff was suffering from a rash or other ailment to his legs 26 and contacted Defendant about the ailment while Defendant was passing out morning [27] 28 1 The Court has modified Plaintiff’s statements to exclude unnecessary dates, add necessary punctuation, 1 medications. 2 5. On that occasion, Plaintiff requested that Defendant provide Plaintiff with alcohol 3 pads to treat the ailment to his legs. Defendant informed Plaintiff he did not have 4 alcohol pads on the medical cart at that time but would provide the pads to Plaintiff 5 later that day. 6 6. Defendant was accompanied by Correctional Officer D. Hannameyer. 7 7. During the noon medication pass on September 4, 2018, Defendant, again 8 accompanied by Hannameyer, contacted Plaintiff about his request for alcohol pads. 9 8. The alcohol pads Defendant sought to provide Plaintiff were punctured through their 10 center with an unknown object. 11 9. Plaintiff advised Defendant he could not use the punctured alcohol pads because they 12 were open, and Plaintiff is a Rastafarian. Plaintiff told Defendant that if Defendant 13 needed to open the alcohol pads in order to provide them to Plaintiff, Defendant 14 needed to bring unopened alcohol pads and open them in front of Plaintiff. Defendant 15 told Plaintiff that he could not open them in front of Plaintiff and left Plaintiff to 16 suffer. 17 10. There was no rule and/or regulation that precluded Defendant from opening the 18 alcohol pads in front of Plaintiff in order to allow Plaintiff to freely practice his 19 religion, where in the Rasta faith a practicing Rastafarian is to seek to abstain from 20 coming into contact with impure objects such as alcohol pads that have been 21 punctured via a foreign object. 22 11. There was no reason in penal interest that justifies Defendant denying Plaintiff 23 unopened alcohol pads, and or opening the alcohol pads in front of Plaintiff where 24 Defendant tried to provide Plaintiff with punctured alcohol pads, and no rule 25 preventing Defendant providing those, for even being punctured, the alcohol pads still 26 contained alcohol in them. 27 12. Defendant knew that Plaintiff had a right to freely practice his religion and still 28 knowingly prevented Plaintiff from doing so via taking the additional coercive action 1 of seeking to compel Plaintiff to deviate from adhering to said religion “in a ‘take 2 these tainted alcohol pads to sooth your pain or leave them and suffer’ stance.” 3 (Doc. 81 at 5-9.) 4 VII. DISCUSSION2 5 For purposes of the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court finds the following to 6 facts to be undisputed: 7 1. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was in the custody of the CDCR and 8 incarcerated at CSP-Corcoran. 9 2. Plaintiff is a practitioner of the Rastafarian faith. 10 3. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff advised Defendant that he was suffering from a rash 11 or sores on his legs and requested that Defendant provide him with alcohol pads. 12 4. Later that same day, Defendant sought to provide Plaintiff with four alcohol 13 disinfectant pads in response to Plaintiff’s request. 14 5. Defendant pre-opened the alcohol pads in a manner that prohibits extended storage of 15 the liquid alcohol enclosed in the packet. 16 6. Plaintiff advised Defendant he could not use the alcohol pads because they were 17 opened and thus tainted, referencing his Rastafarian faith. 18 7. Plaintiff asked Defendant to provide him with unopened alcohol pads. 19 8. Defendant feared Plaintiff could use unopened alcohol pads to make and consume 20 “Pruno.” 21 9. Alcohol pads are a disinfectant medical tool designed to prevent infection. 22 10. Plaintiff was not prescribed nor directed to use alcohol pads by any medical 23 professional, staff member, or other individual at KVSP. 24 11. Plaintiff’s “leg rash” was the result of post inflammatory hyperpigmentation, for 25 which his physicians and medical team believed nothing could be done. 26 12. Plaintiff had the same “rash” prior to his transfer to CSP-Corcoran and prior to any [27] 2 In arriving at these determinations, the Court has reviewed and considered all arguments, points and 28 authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses, if any, objections, and 1 interactions with Defendant. 2 13. Plaintiff and Defendant have had no similar or negative interactions prior to or 3 following the events September 4, 2018. 4 14. The illicit creation and consumption of alcohol in prisons, commonly called “Pruno” 5 by CDCR inmates is an ongoing problem for which the government has a compelling 6 interest in combating. 7 15. Plaintiff has made and consumed Pruno on a number of previous occasions and prior 8 to 2016 consumed it on a daily basis and attempted to conceal or destroy it when 9 discovered. 10 16. Alcohol-based disinfectant pads contain a highly concentrated form of alcohol called 11 “isopropyl.” 12 17. Ingesting isopropyl alcohol can be extremely harmful to the human body. 13 18. The isopropyl alcohol imbued on a disinfectant pad can be consumed as an intoxicant. 14 19. It is illegal for an inmate to create or ingest alcohol. 15 20. Defendant and CDCR have a valid governmental and penological interest in 16 preventing inmates from illegally creating or consuming alcohol. 17 21. Pre-opening an alcohol-based disinfectant pad packet will cause the imbued alcohol to 18 dry out within hours thereby preventing storage for later use. 19 Analysis 20 Plaintiff’s Religious Beliefs Were Not Substantially Burdened 21 The Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s religious beliefs were substantially 22 burdened by Defendant’s conduct on September 4, 2018. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031 . A substantial 23 burden is one that “’place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a 24 tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial 25 pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id. (citations omitted). 26 Here, the undisputed material facts indicate that Plaintiff was suffering from a rash on his 27 legs on September 4, 2018, and asked Defendant Hernandez, a psychiatric technician, to provide 28 him with alcohol pads. When Defendant provided Plaintiff with four alcohol pad packets that had 1 been opened, Plaintiff told Defendant he could not use the pads because they had been opened 2 and were tainted. 3 Plaintiff contends that when Defendant informed Plaintiff that he could not provide 4 Plaintiff with unopened alcohol pads, Plaintiff stated he needed to bring unopened alcohol pads 5 and open them in front of Plaintiff in accordance with his religious beliefs. Plaintiff states that 6 Defendant told Plaintiff he could not open the alcohol pads in front of Plaintiff and “left Plaintiff 7 to suffer.” 8 Defendant Hernandez’s sworn declaration states: “I do not recall an inmate ever asking 9 me to open an alcohol pad in their presence; however, if requested to do so, I would likely 10 comply.” (Doc. 77-3 at 2, ¶ 8.) Even assuming Defendant refused to open the alcohol pads in 11 Plaintiff’s presence after Plaintiff expressed his concern, Plaintiff cannot establish his free 12 exercise of religion was substantially burdened by Defendant’s conduct. 13 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that brief, short term, or sporadic incidents 14 do not constitute a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1032 -33 15 (“’A substantial burden … place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must 16 have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their beliefs or exert substantial 17 pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs’” [citations omitted]). 18 In Canell, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants on First 19 Amendment free exercise claims because “Canell’s only allegation is that on some occasions 20 Lightner interfered with his prayer activities by preaching about Christian gospel. While 21 Lightner’s evangelizing may have constituted an intrusion upon Canell’s prayers on some 22 occasions during the brief period involved, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that these 23 intrusions were ‘relatively short-term and sporadic’ and did not constitute a substantial 24 interference.” Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Brown v. 25 Washington, 752 Fed. App'x 402 , 405 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2018) (a “one-time set of circumstances 26 amounting to no more than an unintentional interference” with Plaintiff's ability to exercise his 27 religious beliefs is “not enough to constitute a substantial burden” [citation omitted]); Saif’ullah 28 v. Cruzen, 735 F. App’x 415 , 416 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (interruption of congregational prayer 1 “failed to raise a genuine issue of material facts as to whether defendants’ conduct constituted a 2 substantial burden”); Howard v. Skolnik, 372 F. App’x 781, 782 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2010) (two 3 incidents of interference with prisoner’s fasting did not constitute substantial burden on exercise 4 of religion); see also Austin v. Brown, No. 20-56028, 2022 WL 1537366 , at *1 (9th Cir. May 16, 5 2022) (Memo) (“mere fact that Buddhist chapel services were canceled for a number of weeks 6 does not amount to a per se substantial burden, nor does that alone create a genuine dispute of 7 material fact”); Chaparro v. Ducart, No. C 14-4955 LHK (PR), 2016 WL 491635 , at *5 (N.D. 8 Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff'd, 695 F. App'x 254 (9th Cir. 2017) (causing plaintiff to miss four chapel 9 services did not impose “substantial burden”); Davis v. John, 485 F. Supp. 3d 1207 , 1221(C.D. 10 Cal. 2020 ) (“According to the Ninth Circuit’s free exercise jurisprudence, the past alleged 11 deprivation of the [Nation of Islam] symbol’s display on only two occasions is insufficient to 12 have constituted a ‘substantial burden’ on Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religion”); Gonzales v. 13 Koranda, No. 2:22-cv-1345 KJM CSK P, 2024 WL 3861988 , at * (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2024) (a 14 single incident involving statements made to plaintiff by defendant during an interview 15 concerning an evaluation of parole suitability did not substantially burden plaintiff’s practice of 16 his religion). 17 Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant refused to provide him with unopened alcohol 18 disinfectant pads on a single occasion. Therefore, any interference was a short term 19 inconvenience. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1032-33 ; Canell, 143 F.3d at 1215 . Other than not being given 20 unopened alcohol pads on September 4, 2018, there are no facts indicating Plaintiff was coerced 21 into acting contrary to his Rastafarian beliefs. Nor are there facts establishing Defendant exerted 22 substantial pressure on Plaintiff to modify his behavior and to violate his religious beliefs. 23 Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he could not use the topical creams prescribed by 24 physicians because they contained chemicals. (Hammler Depo., at 42-43, 46.) Plaintiff testified 25 he believes alcohol pads are the purest form of treatment because alcohol kills disease. (Id.) 26 Asked whether his beliefs prohibited him from accepting the opened alcohol pads offered by 27 Defendant, Plaintiff stated that “those alcohol pads would have caused [him] to subject [himself] 28 and the Holy Spirit to something that was unclean.” (Id. at 74.) He stated he had “no choice but to 1 reject the pads because they were tainted.” (Id. at 88.) Plaintiff also stated that no physician told 2 him to treat his rash with alcohol pads; it was his own belief that the alcohol pads could medically 3 protect him because he was not provided usable topical creams. (Id. at 104.) 4 Denying Plaintiff unopened alcohol pads on a single occasion does not equate to 5 Defendant exerting substantial pressure on Plaintiff to modify his behavior and to violate his 6 religious beliefs. Plaintiff did not accept or use the opened alcohol pads, and the Court is not 7 persuaded that Plaintiff’s lack of choice on a single occasion amounted to substantial pressure on 8 him to modify his behavior and to violate his religious beliefs. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 889 . 9 This Court finds Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing his right to the free 10 exercise of his religion was substantially burdened by Defendant Hernandez’s one time refusal to 11 provide Plaintiff with untainted (unopened and/or opened before Plaintiff) alcohol pads. Celotex, 12 477 U.S. at 322; Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031 . Simply put, no reasonable jury would return a verdict in 13 Plaintiff’s favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ; Wool, 818 F.2d at 1436 . Therefore, Defendant is 14 entitled to summary judgment. 15 The Turner Factors 16 Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s free exercise right was not substantially burdened, it 17 foregoes an analysis of the Turner factors. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 889 (“Once the plaintiff 18 establishes that the challenged state action substantially burdens his religious exercise, the 19 government bears the burden of establishing that the regulation serves a compelling government 20 interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest”); see also Gonzales, 2024 WL 21 3861988, at * 11 (“because plaintiff has not established that Koranda’s one-time interview 22 statements substantially burdened plaintiff’s religious exercise, the Court does not address the 23 Turner [] factors, which determine whether a prison regulation or policy is reasonably related to 24 legitimate penological interests”). 25 Qualified Immunity 26 Defendant also contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Court has 27 found no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s 28 constitutional rights, the Court need not reach the issue. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 1 U.S. 833 , 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of 2 qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation 3 of a constitutional right at all”). 4 Screening Standards Versus Summary Judgment Standards 5 To the extent Plaintiff contends his claim must survive summary judgment because it 6 survived screening, he is mistaken. The standards for screening a complaint are not equivalent to 7 the standards applicable to a summary judgment motion. At screening, the Court tests the 8 plausibility of the asserted claim and assumes the allegations to be true. On summary judgment, 9 the Court is tasked with determining whether a plaintiff can prove his claim. See, e.g., Porter v. 10 Rivas, No. 1:23-cv-00105-ADA-CDB (PC), 2023 WL 4765492 , at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2023) 11 (“at screening, the Court is tasked with determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently and 12 plausibly alleged a cause of action or claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. The merits of the 13 allegations are not tested, for the Court is to consider factual allegations to be true for purposes of 14 screening”); Gates v. LeGrand, No. 3:16-cv-00321-MMD-CBC, 2019 WL 1168527 , at *4, n.1 15 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2019) (“different standards apply screening than the standards that apply at 16 summary judgment”); see also Morales v. Rauch, No. 18-CV-1967, 2020 WL 6129342 , at *1 17 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 24, 2020) (“The standards at screening and summary judgment are different”); 18 Bishawi v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (NEOCC), No. 4:12-cv-3106, 2017 WL 1029105 , 19 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (“Given the difference in reviewing standards, a pleading that 20 might survive a screening determination cannot defeat a properly supported summary judgment 21 motion”). 22 In sum, Plaintiff fails to make the required showing that Defendant’s conduct—refusing to 23 provide Plaintiff with unopened alcohol pads or opening the alcohol pad packages in Plaintiff’s 24 presence on a single occasion—substantially burdened Plaintiff’s practice of his Rastafarian faith. 25 As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 26 VIII. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 27 Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 28 1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77) is GRANTED; 1 2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 81) is DENIED; and 2 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in Defendant’s favor and to close 3 this case. [4] IT IS SO ORDERED. [5] 6 Dated: September 10, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE