(PC) Thomas v. Gomez

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 MICHAEL THOMAS, Case No.: 1:24-cv-00508-SKO 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS AS TO OFFICIAL 13 v. CAPACITY ONLY AND FOR CLAIMS TO PROCEED ON INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 14 GOMEZ, et al., BASIS ONLY FOLLOWING SCREENING 15 Defendants. (Doc. 1) 16 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 17 Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge [19] Plaintiff Michael Thomas is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights [20] action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 . [21] I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT [22] The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a [23] governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). [24] The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, [25] fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant [26] who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if [27] it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 1 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 3 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 4 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 5 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 7 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 8 quotation marks & citation omitted). 9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 10 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” [13] Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 14 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ). 15 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 16 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 17 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 18 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 , 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 19 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 20 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251 , 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 21 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 22 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 23 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 24 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 25 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 26 B. Linkage and Causation 27 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 1 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 2 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, [3] 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 4 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 5 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 6 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 , 7 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 10 Plaintiff names Correctional Officers Gomez and Lindquist, who are employed at Kern 11 Valley State Prison, as defendants. (Doc. 1 at 1-2, 8-9.) Plaintiff states each is “sued individually 12 and in his/her official capacity.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment,1 compensatory 13 and punitive damages, and costs of suit. (Id. at 14.) 14 B. The Factual Allegations 15 Plaintiff states he currently has four herniated lumbar discs, spondylosis, annular fissure, 16 spinal stenosis, claudication, neural foraminal narrowing and nerve impingement, as well as five 17 bulging cervical discs with foraminal stenosis and central canal narrowing. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff 18 states he is in chronic and acute pain and has recurring episodes of debilitating spasms. (Id.) 19 In January 2015, following a hospital stay, Plaintiff was prescribed a walker. (Id.) His 20 condition continued to deteriorate while at KVSP, and on April 17, 2019, an MRI revealed the 21 same. (Id.) Following an incident in September 2019 when an officer refused to provide a 22 wheelchair to transport Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request for a wheelchair [23] 1 To the extent Plaintiff's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, it is unnecessary. “A declaratory [24] judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). [25] “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling 26 the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). If 27 this action reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that any defendant violated Plaintiff's rights is unnecessary. 1 was granted in October 2019. (Id. at 9-10.) 2 On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff was to be transported to Corcoran State Prison for a 3 settlement conference. (Doc. 1 at 10.) He informed the transport staff, Defendants Gomez and 4 Lindquist, that he was disabled and needed a wheelchair. (Id.) Plaintiff states Lindquist indicated 5 he did not feel like retrieving a wheelchair. (Id. at 10-11.) When Plaintiff presented Gomez and 6 Lindquist with a copy of the reasonable accommodation document regarding his need for a 7 wheelchair, they “still refused” his request. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff contends that even after another 8 officer advised Gomez and Lindquist that Plaintiff had serious mobility issues and that the 9 reasonable accommodation had been granted to “prevent this very scenario from happening 10 again,” Defendants continued to refuse his request. (Id.) Defendants advised Plaintiff he could 11 “either walk (using his walker) or refuse to go.” (Id.) Plaintiff felt compelled to endure the long 12 walk, fearing consequences for not attending the settlement conference. (Id.) During the walk, 13 Plaintiff stopped often and again requested a wheelchair, but Defendants refused his request. (Id.) 14 At receiving and release (R&R), Plaintiff was placed in leg restraints, making walking even more 15 challenging and uncomfortable, and when he had arrived at R&R “barely able to walk and on the 16 verge of collapse.” (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff states he could not walk, but had to “’shuffle,’ thereby 17 worsening his plight exponentially.” (Id.) 18 Plaintiff contends he was then forced to climb into a van even though he should have been 19 provided a wheelchair with a wheelchair lift. (Id.) Plaintiff states he “wanted to give up,” and that 20 Defendant Lindquist, recognizing his condition, stated, “Don’t worry. You won’t have to walk at 21 Corcoran. We’ll pull right up to the door.” (Id.) Upon arrival, however, due to construction, 22 Defendants made Plaintiff “’shuffle’ through an unpaved, uneven, dirt-and-mud, narrow, fenced23 off detour” from the parking lot to the visiting room. (Id.) Upon returning to the van, Plaintiff 24 contends he was in extreme pain and had to stop about 15 times, nearly collapsing. (Id.) His 25 numerous requests for a wheelchair during that occasion were denied. (Id.) Upon his return to 26 KVSP, he was required to walk again, causing “tear-inducing pain.” (Id.) On A yard, Plaintiff 27 contends Defendants “handed” him off to another officer, who also denied him the use of a 1 step of the journey to and from Corcoran was excruciating. (Id.) 2 C. Plaintiff’s Claim 3 Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment threat to safety or failure to protect claims against 4 Defendants Gomez and Lindquist. (Doc. 1 at 13-14.) 5 Prison officials have a duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 6 inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. 7 Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, [8] 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) & Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005)). To 9 establish a violation of this duty, a prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate 10 indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (citing 11 Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). 12 A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the 13 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 14 837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of 15 fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, 16 ... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very 17 fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The duty to protect a prisoner from 18 serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and 19 well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33 ; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). As 20 “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” plaintiff 21 must allege facts showing the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson 22 v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotations marks, emphasis & citations omitted). 23 To state a claim, the Eighth Amendment requires allegations sufficient to plausibly show 24 that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm or safety. Farmer, [25] 511 U.S. at 847 . The objective component of an Eighth Amendment requires that a prisoner show 26 he was deprived of something “sufficiently serious.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th 27 Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 ). The state of mind requirement under the subjective 1 inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 . Under the “deliberate indifference” standard, a 2 prison official cannot be found liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 3 unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837 . 4 Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff plausibly alleges Eighth Amendment threat to 5 safety/failure to protect claims against Defendants Gomez and Lindquist. Plaintiff sufficiently 6 alleges that Gomez and Lindquist knew he faced a substantial risk of serious harm because he 7 showed them a copy of his reasonable accommodation document, another officer intervened to 8 advise Gomez and Lindquist of Plaintiff’s serious mobility issues, and Lindquist recognized the 9 seriousness of his condition. Plaintiff also alleges that Gomez and Lindquist refused his multiple 10 requests for a wheelchair, even after they witnessed him struggling to walk during a transport. 11 The Court notes that Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their individual and official 12 capacities. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff is advised that “[s]uits against state officials in their official 13 capacity ... should be treated as suits against the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); 14 Holley v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating prisoner's suit against 15 state officials in their official capacities as a suit against the state of California). An official 16 capacity suit “represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 17 officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). Such a suit 18 “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at 166 . 19 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 20 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Public 21 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144 , 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 22 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against 23 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid 24 congressional override....” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The State 25 of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought 26 under § 1983 in federal court....” Id. at 1025-26 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 27 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep't. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) 1 immunity). 2 As set forth above, Plaintiff cannot pursue claims for monetary damages against the 3 Gomez and Lindquist in their official capacities because they are barred by the Eleventh 4 Amendment. The Court will therefore recommend that this action proceed against Defendants 5 Gomez and Lindquist in their individual capacities only and will recommend that any claim 6 against them in their official capacities be dismissed. 7 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 Based on the foregoing, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to assign a district 9 judge to this action. 10 For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS as follows: 11 1. This action PROCEED against Defendants Gomez and Lindquist in their individual 12 capacities only; and 13 2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Gomez and Lindquist, to the extent they are 14 asserted as against their official capacities, be DISMISSED. 15 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 16 this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these 17 Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The 18 document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 19 Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 20 rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 21 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). [22] IT IS SO ORDERED. [23] 24 Dated: September 16, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE