Amaro v. Bee Sweet Citrus, Inc.

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 RAFAEL MARQUEZ AMARO, JAVIER Case No. 1:20-cv-00382-JLT-EPG BARRERA, on behalf of themselves and 12 others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO 13 Plaintiffs, STRIKE 14 v. (Doc. 37) 15 BEE SWEET CITRUS, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, [16] Defendants, 17 ___________________________________ 18 BEE SWEET CITRUS, INC., 19 Counter-Complainant, 20 v. 21 RAFAEL MARQUEZ AMARO, JAVIER BARRERA, on behalf of themselves and 22 others similarly situated, 23 Counter-Defendants. [24] 25 I. INTRODUCTION 26 Before the Court is Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 27 Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, motion to strike under Rule 12(f). (Doc. 37.) For the 28 reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Rafael Marquez Amaro and Javier Barrera initiated this action on March 3, 2012, on 3 behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiffs are farm 4 workers who picked citrus fruit for Bee Sweet. (Doc. 1 at 3.) The complaint contains eight 5 claims arising from alleged federal and state labor code violations that occurred during their 6 employment. (Doc. 1 at 3–23.) Bee Sweet filed a counterclaim alleging violations of due 7 process, substantive due process, excessive fines and punishment, and equal protection under both 8 the federal and California Constitutions. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 15–52.) 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD1 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 11 the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 13 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, 14 “all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 15 non-moving party.” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 16 2020). In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be 17 accepted as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678–79 (2009). 18 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 19 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . A complaint that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 21 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., [22] 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal 23 theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, [24] 250 F.3d at 732 . 25 If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 26 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured [27] 1 Counter-Defendants move to strike the counterclaim as duplicative of Bee Sweet’s twenty-second affirmative 28 defense. Because the Court resolves Counter-Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the legal standard focuses 1 by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making 2 this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue 3 delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, 4 undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” Moore v. 5 Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531 , 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 A. Counter-Defendants Acting “Under Color of State Law” 8 Bee Sweet alleges five counterclaims against Plaintiffs under both the federal 9 Constitution, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and the California Constitution. (See generally Doc. 31.) 10 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants argue that these constitutional challenges must be dismissed 11 because Counter-Defendants are private citizens, not state actors. (Doc. 37 at 12.) To state a 12 claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) deprived them of a right 13 secured by the Constitution, and (2) acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; see West v. 14 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The California Constitutional challenges alleged here require the 15 same. See Pineda v. Sun Valley Packing, L.P., No. 1:20-CV-00169-DAD-EPG, 2022 WL 16 1308141, *3 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2022); Cal. Bus. & Indus. All. v. Becerra, 80 Cal. App. 5th 734 , 17 745 (2022). The primary dispute here is whether, by bringing a claim under California Labor 18 Code § 2810.3, Counter-Defendants have acted under color of state law. (Doc. 37 at 12–14.) 19 “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in 20 a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 21 because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting 22 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). To constitute state action, “the deprivation 23 must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . or by a person 24 for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person 25 who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 , 936 26 (1982). Otherwise, “private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely 27 on some [statute] governing their interactions with the community surrounding them.” Id. at 937 ; 28 see also Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 877 F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Pineda, 2022 1 WL 1308141 , * 4 (explaining that even the filing of an action under the Private Attorney General 2 Act did not convert the counter-defendant into a state actor). “The state-action element in § 1983 3 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” 4 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and 5 citation omitted). “[C]onstitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State 6 is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Naoko Ohno v. Yuko 7 Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). 8 In its first counterclaim, Bee Sweet alleges that Counter-Defendants unconstitutionally 9 sued under § 2810.3. (Doc. 31 at 3.) Section 2810.3 provides that “[a] client employer shall 10 share with a labor contractor all civil legal responsibility and civil liability for all workers 11 supplied by that labor contractor for . . . [t]he payment of wages.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2810.3 (b)(1). 12 Bee Sweet argues that it had no responsibility to pay Counter-Defendants’ wages because no 13 employment relationship existed between Bee Sweet and Counter-Defendants, and thus, the labor 14 contractors alone should be sued for the failure to pay wages. (Doc. 31 at 3–4.) Therefore, Bee 15 Sweet alleges that § 2810.3 unconstitutionally imposes “vicarious and implied passive liability for 16 the farmers usage of independent contractors (labor contractors) who violate their own payroll.” 17 (Doc. 31 at 3–4.) Bee Sweet argues that the California Legislature, through the enactment of 18 § 2810.3, encourages private actors to pursue civil actions to impose civil liability, which 19 constitutes state action. (Doc. 31, ¶ 22.) Bee Sweet further argues that Counter-Defendants are 20 not acting “under color of state law” because they filed a class action complaint under California 21 Labor Code § 2810.3, but rather “because the power of C[ounter]-Defendants to file their class 22 action complaint is ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 23 wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” (Doc. 41 at 17 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, [24] 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, [25] 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).) Bee Sweet contends that § 2810.3 is “the exclusive source, right, 26 authority, and state privilege supporting C[ounter]-Defendants right and privilege to bring their 27 action against Bee Sweet.” (Doc. 41 at 18.) 28 Counter-Defendants argue that “[w]ithout question, the present case involves rights and 1 privileges created by statute, but to satisfy prong two, Bee Sweet must allege some involvement 2 by the State beyond enacting the statute.” (Doc. 46 at 7.) The Court agrees. Though Bee Sweet 3 sufficiently alleges that the deprivation is caused by a right or privilege created by the State, Bee 4 Sweet fails to sufficiently allege how Counter-Defendants, by merely suing under the statute, are 5 “state actors.” See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 (establishing the two part test for state action); see also 6 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 , 1004–05 (1982) (“[A] State normally can be held responsible for 7 a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 8 encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 9 State.” (citations omitted)). Bee Sweet relies on Lugar—where the Supreme Court found joint 10 action between private parties and state officials when the state officials executed a levy against 11 property at the request of the private party—to argue that Counter-Defendants are jointly engaged 12 with the state by “asking this Court to enter judgment against and levy upon the property of Bee 13 Sweet pursuant to [§ 2810.3].” See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 . (Doc. 41 at 12–14.) But Bee 14 Sweet’s reliance on Lugar is misplaced. The state itself was not involved in the § 2810.3 claim to 15 any extent other than statutory enactment. Unlike in Lugar, the state did not intervene or act at 16 Counter-Defendants’ request to deprive Bee Sweet of any property; any civil liability 17 determination at trial does not equate to the unconstitutional deprivation of Bee Sweet’s property. 18 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 . Because the “[p]rivate use of state sanctioned private remedies or 19 procedures does not rise to the level of state action,” Counter-Defendants’ lawsuit under 20 California Labor Code § 2810.3 cannot equate to Counter-Defendants “acting under the color of 21 state law” under the federal Constitution or the California Constitution. See Tulsa Prof’l 22 Collection Servs., Inc., v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988); see also West, 487 U.S. at 48 ; Pineda, [23] 2022 WL 1308141 , *4. Thus, Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss Bee Sweet’s Constitutional 24 causes of action under § 1983 is GRANTED. 25 Bee Sweet requests that if the Court is inclined to grant Counter-Defendants’ motion, Bee 26 Sweet have leave to amend to add the California Attorney General as an additional 27 counter-defendant. (Doc. 41 at 20.) However, amendment would be futile because the Supreme 28 Court “has never held that a State’s mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into 1 | that of the State.” Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978); see also Nabors 2 | Well Servs. Co. v. Bradshaw, No. CV 05-8334-GAF-CTX, 2006 WL 8432088 , * 2 (C.D. Cal. 3 | Feb. 15, 2006) (holding that the inclusion of California Secretary of Labor and Workforce 4 | Development as a second defendant did not equate to “state action” for purposes of § 1983). 5 | Including the Attorney General in the present action would not rectify the lack of state action 6 | from the inception of this cause of action; the State did not exercise its power or provide any 7 || encouragement by merely codifying § 2810.3. Therefore, Counter-Defendants’ motion is 8 | GRANTED without leave to amend.” 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons set forth above: 11 1. Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend. [12] B IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: _ September 30, 2024 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [27] 28 2 Because the Court grants Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court need not address Counter-Defendants’ alternative motion to strike or the merits of the constitutionality arguments.