(SS) Barraza v. Commissioner of Social Security

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ANTHONY JULIAN BARRAZA, No. 2:16-cv-2286 SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, [15] 16 Defendant. [17] 18 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying her application for benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). 20 On March 12, 2018, the Court found that the ALJ erred and therefore entered judgment reversing 21 and remanding Plaintiff’s case for further administrative proceedings. ECF Nos. 30 & 31. 22 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s June 24, 2024, Motion for an award of 23 attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b). ECF No. 45. Defendant has not opposed the fee 24 request. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted. 25 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 26 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 27 agreement. ECF No. 35-1. Pursuant to that agreement Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 28 fees in the net amount of $5,645.00 (a gross amount of $12,145.00), which represents 23.5% of 1 the $51,602.00 in retroactive disability benefits awarded to Plaintiff on remand, for 34.7 hours of 2 attorney time expended on this matter. See ECF No. 35 at 3-4; see also ECF No. 35-2. 3 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 4 security claimants: 5 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 6 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 7 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 8 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. [10] 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 11 U.S.C. § 1988 , the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 12 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 13 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 14 § 406(b) is “to protect claimants against inordinately large fees and also to ensure that attorneys 15 representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” Parrish v. 16 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 17 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 18 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 19 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 20 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 21 boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 22 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 23 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 24 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 25 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808 ). 26 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 27 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d 28 at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 ). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 1 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 2 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” [3] Id. Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 4 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 -52 (citing Gisbrecht, [5] 535 U.S. at 808 ); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers 6 “the time and labor required”). Below, the Court will consider these factors in assessing whether 7 the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b) is reasonable. 8 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 9 Plaintiff. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 10 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 11 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $12,145.00 fee, which does 12 not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits to Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to 13 the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee 14 nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to 15 represent Plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed 16 significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or 17 that there would be a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). 18 Counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF 19 No. 35-3. The Court finds that hours expended are reasonable. The Court notes that the effective 20 hourly rate of $350/hour is reasonable. The effective hourly rate is well below the range 21 approved by other courts. In Crawford, the Ninth Circuit found the fee awards in the three 22 consolidated cases to be reasonable, and the fee requests ranged from $11,500 to $24,000, and if 23 divided by the hours expended would have resulted in effective rates in the range of $500 to 24 $900/hour. 586 F.3d at 1145-1147. The effective rate also does not appear excessive in regard to 25 recent rates approved in this District. See Garcia v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4121872 (E.D. Cal. 26 September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); Guzman Paz v. Commissoner, 2024 WL 27 4029592 (E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner, [28] 2024 WL 3968083 (E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $864). ] Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 2 || counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 3 I]. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 4 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 5 || under the Equal Access to Justice Act (““EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412 ; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 . 6 | Here, Plaintiff's attorney was previously awarded $6,500.00 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 34. 7 || Counsel therefore must remit that amount to Plaintiff. 8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 9 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b) (ECF No. 35), is 10 | GRANTED; 11 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $12,145.00 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b), to be 12 | offset by the $6,500 EAJA award; the Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to 13 | counsel from the funds previously withheld for the payment of such fees; and 14 3. The Commissioner shall pay counsel for plaintiff $5,645. 15 SO ORDERED: 16 | DATE: October 2, 2024 8 SEAN C. RIORDAN 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE