Holmes v. Chen

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 KIARA HOLMES, Case No. 24-cv-00115-JST 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. RECUSE 10 STEVE CHEN, et al., Re: ECF No. 84 Defendants. [13] Plaintiff Kiara Holmes has filed a motion for this Court to recuse. ECF No. 84. The Court [14] will deny the motion. See Civ. L.R. 3–14. [15] Motions to disqualify or recuse a judge fall under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. [16] § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 . Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a timely and [17] sufficient affidavit averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias [18] or prejudice either against the party or in favor of an adverse party, and setting forth the facts and [19] reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 . [20] A judge finding a § 144 motion timely and the affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no [21] further and another judge must be assigned to hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 22 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Where the affidavit is not legally sufficient, however, the judge at [23] whom the motion is directed may determine the matter. See id. at 868 (holding judge challenged [24] under § 144 properly heard and denied motion where affidavit not legally sufficient). [25] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 144, the standard for recusal is “whether a reasonable person with [26] knowledge of all the facts would conclude the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be [27] questioned.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). “Judges are presumed 1 to be honest and to serve with integrity.” McCray v. Ryan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 663, 665 (D. Ariz. 2 2019) (citation omitted). 3 Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit is not legally sufficient. Plaintiff avers that a male judge is 4 || unable to decide matters concerning gender discrimination. ECF No. 84 at 4. That the 5 undersigned is male does not disqualify him from deciding a case alleging discrimination against a 6 woman on the basis of gender. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist, No. 1, 294 F.3d 981 , 984 (8th Cir. 7 |} 2002) (“Judges routinely decide hostile environment sexual harassment cases involving plaintiffs 8 || of the opposite sex.”); cf. United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-CR-19-PLR-DCP, 2019 WL 2932660 , 9 || at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2019) (“the Defendant’s preference for a male judge is not a reason for a 10 || judge to recuse herself.”). 11 Plaintiff also asks the Court to recuse because she believes the Court’s rulings “seem bias.” 12 || ECF No. 84 at 4. Plaintiff does not identify any evidence that supports this assertion. “A court’s g 13 adverse rulings are not an adequate basis for recusal.” Carr v. Allied Waste Sys. of Alameda Cnty., 14 || No. C 10-00715 WHA, 2010 WL 2557768 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (citing Liteky v. 15 United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549 (1994)). a 16 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for disqualification is DENIED. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: June 17, 2024 . 19 JON S. TIGA 20 nited States District Judge