United States v. Chauncey Montague

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4479 Doc: 34 Filed: 10/30/2024 Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4479

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHAUNCEY LAMONT MONTAGUE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville. Michael F. Urbanski, Senior District Judge. (4:21-cr-00009-MFU-1)

Submitted: September 17, 2024 Decided: October 30, 2024

Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, dismissed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Donna L. Biderman, LAW OFFICE OF DONNA L. BIDERMAN, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, Jonathan Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4479 Doc: 34 Filed: 10/30/2024 Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:

Chauncey Lamont Montague pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution

of a quantity of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court

sentenced Montague to 144 months’ imprisonment, a $250 fine, and three years of

supervised release. Montague’s counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal

but raising as issues whether Montague’s guilty plea is valid and whether the district court

erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement. Montague was

notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. The Government

moved to dismiss Montague’s appeal as barred by the appeal waiver contained in his plea

agreement.

After conducting review pursuant to Anders, this court deferred action on the

Government’s motion to dismiss and ordered supplemental briefing to address the

potentially meritorious issue of whether reversible error is present under United States v.

Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341

(4th Cir. 2021). In his supplemental brief, Montague argues that reversible error is present

under Rogers and Singletary because the district court did not announce at the sentencing

hearing five discretionary conditions of his supervised release term that appear in the

criminal judgment. In its supplemental response brief, the Government maintains that the

district court orally announced at sentencing most of the discretionary supervision

conditions to which Montague objects. The Government acknowledges, however, that the

district court did not orally announce at sentencing the portion of special condition three *3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4479 Doc: 34 Filed: 10/30/2024 Pg: 3 of 6

requiring that Montague warn other occupants that his premises may be subject to searches.

Acknowledging that this court has recognized that such a failure amounts to error under

Rogers and Singletary and that the only remedy for such error is a remand for resentencing,

the Government argues that this case should be remanded for resentencing. We affirm in

part, dismiss the appeal in part, vacate Montague’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.

Turning to the challenge to the validity of Montague’s guilty plea, 1 we note that,

before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy during which

it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the rights

he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charge to which he is pleading, and the penalties

he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea was voluntary

and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that a factual basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

Because Montague did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the adequacy of the

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622

(4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if

(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and

(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

1 Although the Government moves to dismiss this issue as barred by the appeal waiver in Montague’s plea agreement, the appeal waiver does not prevent our consideration of the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v. Marsh, 944 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 2019).

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quotation marks omitted). “In the Rule 11 context, this inquiry means that [the defendant]

must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded

guilty.” United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, the record reveals that the district court substantially complied with the

requirements of Rule 11 in accepting Montague’s guilty plea and that any omissions did

not affect Montague’s substantial rights. Montague entered his plea knowingly and

voluntarily, and a factual basis supports his plea. We thus conclude that Montague’s guilty

plea is valid.

Turning to Montague’s appeal waiver, we review its validity de novo and “will

enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of the waiver.”

United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). A waiver is valid if it is

“knowing and voluntary.” Id. To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary,

“we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the

defendant, his educational background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement and its

terms.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Generally, “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver

of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Our review of the record confirms that Montague knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. We therefore conclude

that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the challenge to the district court’s denial

of the motion to suppress falls squarely within the scope of the waiver. *5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4479 Doc: 34 Filed: 10/30/2024 Pg: 5 of 6

Next, whether there is reversible error under Rogers and Singletary with respect to

discretionary conditions of supervised release is a matter we review de novo. United

States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193, 196 n.5 (4th Cir. 2024). Rogers and Singletary “require a

district court to orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release at the

sentencing hearing.” Id. at 197; see Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344; Rogers, 961 F.3d at

296-99. A challenge to discretionary supervised release terms present in the judgment that

were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of an appeal waiver

because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first

time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the defendant.” Singletary,

984 F.3d at 345.

In imposing Montague’s supervised release conditions at the sentencing hearing, the

district court orally pronounced as to special condition three that “[p]robation may search

[Montague’s] person, his property, his vehicle, for any evidence to suggest that there’s a

violation of the terms and conditions of the supervised release, and probation may do so

without a warrant provided they have reasonable suspicion that a violation has taken

place.” The written judgment, by contrast, directs in special condition three that Montague

had to

submit his person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, or office, to searches conducted by a United States probation officer. Failure to submit to searches may be grounds for revocation of release. The defendant shall warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition. An officer may conduct searches pursuant to this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that the defendant has violated a condition of his supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation.

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At no point during its oral pronouncements of the discretionary conditions of Montague’s

supervised release did the district court pronounce that Montague had to warn other

occupants that the premises may be subject to searches. This, we conclude, is reversible

error under Rogers and Singletary warranting vacatur of Montague’s sentence and a

remand for resentencing. Mathis, 103 F.4th at 198-200. 2

Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the remainder of the record

in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm in part,

grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal, vacate Montague’s sentence,

and remand for resentencing. This court requires that counsel inform Montague, in writing,

of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

If Montague requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would

be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Montague.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

2 Consequently, we need not address Montague’s argument in his supplemental brief that the district court also erred by failing to announce four other discretionary supervised release conditions.