EUCLID v. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA NATHANIEL EUCLID, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-4335 : TRANSPORTATION SECURITY : ADMINISTRATION, , : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM Nathaniel Euclid alleges that agents of the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) opened his luggage and stole valuable Pokémon cards. TSA moves to dismiss his Complaint, and I will do so. In addition, because there doesn’t appear to be a way for Mr. Euclid to fix the problems with his claims, I will dismiss the case with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part, but without leave to amend. I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 2, 2023, Mr. Euclid traveled on Southwest Airlines from Oakland International Airport to Philadelphia International Airport, with a layover at Denver International Airport. Somewhere along this route, TSA agents “committed theft” by opening his locked luggage and removing rare and valuable Pokémon cards. (ECF No. 7 at § III.C.) On January 23, 2023, Mr. Euclid completed a TSA Tort Claim Package in which he acknowledged that his luggage contained a firearm, which might have prompted a TSA search. ( at p. 9.) The TSA denied his claim on May 2, 2023. ( at p. 20.) Mr. Euclid filed this case on November 4, 2023. I dismissed his initial Complaint after statutory screening and gave him leave to file an amended complaint. He did so on January 19, 2024, and I ordered service of the Complaint after another round of statutory screening. When I ordered service, I explained that I read the Amended Complaint to assert a tort claim, rather than claims under , 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). (ECF No. 8 at 1 n.1.) The TSA moved to dismiss on the grounds that it the FTCA does not apply to thefts and that Mr. Euclid’s claims are speculative. Mr. Euclid’s response argues that I should permit his claims to proceed, as well as defending his FTCA claim. The TSA’s motion is ripe for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court may dismiss a complaint where the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “On a motion to dismiss, a court must ‘accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” , 30 F.4th 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). To survive, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” , 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” . (citation omitted). Judges interpret complaints from litigants liberally. See , 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) ( filings are construed liberally). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack.” , 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack does not dispute the facts alleged in the complaint and therefore applies the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). , 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A] facial attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), , construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.”). The court must therefore “only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (internal quotations omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Claim Because Mr. Euclid seeks to revive his claims, I will address them again. provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by federal actors in very limited circumstances. , 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022). Since the Supreme Court decided , it has recognized an implied cause of action in only three types of cases ( , 137 S. Ct. at 1854-55) and “has repeatedly refused to recognize actions in any new contexts.” , 868 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2017). “To preserve the separation of powers, the Court has ‘consistently rebuffed’ efforts to extend further . . [because] [t]he Constitution entrusts Congress, not the courts, with the power to create new federal causes of action and remedies.” , 27 F.4th 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing , 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020)). I have no basis to extend to the conduct at issue in this case. First, Mr. Euclid’s case arises in a new context. , 113 F.4th 311, 326 (3d Cir. 2024). Mr. Euclid contends that his case does not arise in a new context but rather involves the same Fourth Amendment brand of claims that addressed. However, a claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a previously recognized claim. , 115 F.4th 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2024). Unlike in , the search that Mr. Euclid alleges did not occur in Mr. Euclid’s home by FBI agents; it was conducted at an airport by the TSA. The Fourth Circuit has held that this is a new context from , and I agree , 56 F.4th 271, 275 (4th Cir. 2022). Second, special factors, including national security interests, counsel against extending a remedy here. , 113 F.4th at 326 . In , the Third Circuit counseled that courts should not create causes of action if there is any reason to think Congress might be better situated to weigh the costs and benefits of a damages action. , 115 F.4th at 205 . That’s the case here, and it forecloses Mr. Euclid’s claim. Also, Mr. Euclid only sued the TSA, which is immune from suit. , 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); , 289 F. App’x 515, 516 (3d Cir. 2008) ( ) (“ claims against the United States are barred by sovereign immunity, absent an explicit waiver.”). As Mr. Euclid has only named a federal agency as a Defendant, any claims must be dismissed. B. FTCA Claim The FTCA waives the United States’s sovereign immunity for claims sounding in state tort law for money damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 . This waiver, however, applies only when the plaintiff’s injury or loss of property is “caused by the negligence or wrongful act or mission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of [their] . . . employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1). A court determines whether a government employee acted within the scope of his employment by the state law of the place where the act or omission occurred. . It's not clear from the Amended Complaint where the search in question. The TSA argued that it had to occur in California, and it might be right. But it doesn’t matter. The search could have occurred in California, Colorado, or Pennsylvania. In each state, an employee who engaged in theft acts outside the scope of his employment. ., No. 12-1591, 2012 WL 3249513 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (quoting , Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1552, 1559 (1996)); ., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992); ., 832 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448-49 (E.D. Pa. 2011). TSA agents are not employed to steal items from luggage, and theft in no way serves the TSA. ., , No. 17-6395, 2018 WL 6264976 , at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018); ., No. 12-1591, 2012 WL 3249513 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012); ., 832 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448-49 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Therefore, the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to Mr. Euclid’s claims. IV. CONCLUSION I will grant the TSA’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss Mr. Euclid’s Amended Complaint. There’s no amendment that Mr. Euclid could make to cure the problems with his Amended Complaint, so I will dismiss the case without leave to amend. An appropriate Order follows. BY THE COURT: October 30, 2024 JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.