Lindqvist v. Clenance

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN DORIS M. LINDQVIST, ) ) Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-00013-RAM-RM ) KERVIN CLENANCE, ) ) Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff. ) ) ORDER THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Def.’s Mot.), filed on April 18, 2023. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 10, 2023, and Defendant filed a reply on May 22, 2023. (ECF Nos. 15, 26.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim, filed on June 3, 2023. (ECF No. 29.) Defendant filed an opposition to this motion on June 23, 2023. (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff filed a reply on July 5, 2023. (ECF No. 32.) For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant both motions, dismissing the pleadings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I. It is axiomatic that federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal See, e.g., district court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction based only upon federal question DeLagarde v. Tours VI Ltd. jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, and/or admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. , 76 V.I. 749 , 755 (D.V.I. 2022); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 . Moreover, Abulkhair v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. “[t]he basis for federal court jurisdiction must be apparent from the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” , 441 F. App'x 927, 930 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Although not raised by Plaintiff in her motion to dismiss the must amended counterclaim, the Court addresses this issue regarding both the complaint and the Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. amended counterclaim because the Court “ dismiss the action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added), if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. , 546 U.S. 500 , Ruhrgas 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subjectCase No. 3:23-cv-0013 O rder Page 2 of 4 McCann v. George W. Newman Irrevocable Trust Moreover, when jurisdiction is in question, the burden of proof falls on the party asserting McNutt v. General. Motors Acceptance Corp that jurisdiction exists. , 458 F.3d 281 , 286 Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc (3d Cir. 2006) (citing ., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) and ., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004)). In the matter at bar, Plaintiff asserts, “This court has jurisdiction over this matter 28 U.S.C. 1332 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 .” Complaint (Compl.) (ECF No. 1) at ¶ 1. Defendant likewise alleges, “This Court has jurisdiction pursuant [sic].” First Amended Counterclaim (Am. Countercl.) (ECF No. 28) at ¶ 3. Section 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction, allowing the court to exercise jurisdiction when the citizenship of all plaintiffs is completely diverse from the citizenship of all defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,0000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). II. Defendant does not dispute that the citizenship of the parties is diverse. Def’s Mot. at Id at 2. However, as Defendant argues, the complaint is completely devoid of any allegation of See e.g., the amount in controversy or that Plaintiff’s damages exceed the jurisdictional minimum. . DeLagarde at 2-3. Without such an allegation, the Court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction. , , 76 V.I. at 758-59 (“The complaint in this matter makes no mention of the amount in controversy. Furthermore, DeLagarde does not provide his own citizenship. As such, the See also, e.g., complaint establishes neither a sufficient amount in controversy nor the requisite diversity DePhillips v. Equifax Inc between the parties to satisfy diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 .”). ., Civil No. 22-03247 (RMB/SAK), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8493 , at *7 (D. Walega v. N.J. Jan. 17, 2023) (“Without a good-faith allegation supporting an amount in Lackawanna Cnty. Gov't Office controversy that exceeds the statutory floor, this Court cannot proceed.”); , Civil No. 1:21-CV-02006, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223168 , at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2022) (“Here, Walega has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that this court has diversity jurisdiction. She does not allege an amount in Decozen Chrysler Jeep Corp. v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., LLC controversy. Thus, she has not satisfied the requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”); , Civil Action No: 22-0068, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210356 , at *8-9 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2022) (where the Case No. 3:23-cv-0013 O rder Page 3 of 4 however, to the amount-in-controversy requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). A complaint asserting diversity jurisdiction ‘is fatally defective unless it contains a proper allegation of the amount in controversy.’ . . . Moreover, the Complaint references ‘economic loss’ (¶ 129), ‘substantial economic deprivation’ (¶ 130), ‘economic harm’ (¶ 136(f)), and ‘substantial economic injury’ (¶ 155), but does not describe such loss in any way that would permit the Schlesinger v. Councilman Court to infer the amount-in-controversy is met . . . Accordingly, Plaintiff has Shah v. Vora insufficiently pleaded diversity jurisdiction.” (quoting , 420 U.S. 738, 745 (1975) and citing , No. 09-1294, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27355 , 2010 WL Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York v. First 1076244, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010) (”Plaintiff has not plead diversity jurisdiction, as she Nat. Bank in Ft. Lee has not stated a particular amount in controversy.”) and [1] , 397 F. Supp. 587, 591 (D.N.J. 1975))). Thus, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion. Even though one of the grounds of Defendant’s motion to dismiss is Plaintiff’s failure to plead the amount in controversy to establish diversity jurisdiction, Defendant’s [28] counterclaim suffers from the same deficiency. The amended counterclaim also fails to allege U.S.C. 1332 the amount in controversy, merely declaring that the “Court has jurisdiction pursuant to [sic].” Am. Countercl. at ¶ 3. Moreover, as with the complaint, the Court cannot determine whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied from the facts alleged in the amended counterclaim. In certain instances, a counterclaim can survive a dismissal of the underlying La Gorce Country Club, complaint. However, the conditions permitting such survival are not present in the matter at Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London bar. As the Southern District of the Florida District Court explains in , Case No. 09-22340-Hoeveller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122131 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2009): 1See, e.g., Atuahene v. Sears Mortg. Corp Nothing in the complaint allows the Court to infer that the amount in controversy requirement has been met. ., Civil Action No. 98-930, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1017 , at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 200H0a) m(“iIltt oisn evs. tHaabrlitsfhoredd ,A hcociwdeenvet ra,n tdh aInt dtheem c. oCmoplaint must allege facts sufficient to determine whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied and not plead an amount solely to obtain federal court jurisdiction.” (citing ., 425 F. Supp. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1977)). In the matter at bar, Plaintiff fails to plead any amount in controversy. She does not even make the bare allegation that her damages Case No. 3:23-cv-0013 O rder Page 4 of 4 "It appears to be settled," the Seventh Circuit wrote, "that where a counterclaim states a cause of action seeking affirmative relief independent of that stated in the complaint, the dismissal of the complaint does not preclude a trial and determination of the issues presented by the counterclaim." Id. at 410. A year later, the Tenth Circuit elaborated: But it is apparent in those exceptional cases where a counterclaim may survive the jurisdictional failure of a complaint that at least three premises must exist. Jurisdiction must exist within the scope of the allegations of the counterclaim; the claim made in the counterclaim must be independent of that made in the main case; and, lastly, affirmative relief must be sought. Id Arapahoe Drilling Co., 267 F. 2d at 8. . at *6-7. In the absence of allegations sufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction is not apparent from the face of the amended counterclaim. Thus, the first required condition for the counterclaim to survive has not been met. Consequently, the Court will dismiss Defendant’s amended counterclaim. III. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that subject matter jurisdiction over either Plaintiff’s Complaint or Defendant’s First Amended Co unterclaim has not been established, and, therefore, the Court must dismiss both pleadings. AOcRcDorEdRinEgDly, it is hereby GRANTED ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to DismiDssIS, EMCIFS SNEoD. 8 W, iIsT HOUT PRE; iJtU iDs fIuCrEther that the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is ; it is furtherO RDERED GRANTED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Counterclaim, ECF No. 29, is ORDE RonE Dother grounds, namely, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; itD isI SfuMrItShSeEr D WITHOUT PREJU DthIaCtE D efendant’s First Amended Counterclaim, ECF No. 28, is ORDERED ;it is finally CLOSE that the Clerk’s Office shall this case. Dated: / Robert A. Molloy ROBERT A. MOLLOY Febru a ry 5, 20 24 Csh/i ef Judge