Davis v. Strus

1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jul 29, 2020 [2] SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON [4] BARBARA DAVIS, as Personal No. 2:17-cv-00062-SMJ 5 Representative of the Estate of G.B., deceased, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 6 AND DENYING IN PART Plaintiff, INDIVIDUAL STATE 7 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT [8] JENNIFER STRUS, individually and in 9 her official capacity acting under the color of state law; HEIDI KAAS, 10 individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; 11 MELISSA KEHMEIER, individually and in her official capacity acting under 12 the color of state law; JAMES DESMOND, individually and in his 13 official capacity acting under the color of state law; CASSIE ANDERSON, 14 individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; 15 BRINA CARRIGAN, individually and in her official capacity acting under the 16 color of state law; MAGGIE STEWART, individually and in her 17 official capacity acting under the color of state law; LORI BLAKE, 18 individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; 19 SHANNON SULLIVAN, individually and in her official capacity acting under 20 the color of state law; SUSAN STEINER, individually and in her 1 official capacity acting under the color of state law; CAMERON NORTON, 2 individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; 3 SARAH OASE, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color 4 of state law; RANA PULLOM, individually and in her official capacity 5 acting under the color of state law; DONALD WILLIAMS, individually 6 and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; CHRIS MEJIA, 7 individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; 8 RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 416, a Municipal Corporation duly 9 organized and existing under the laws of Washington State; JUANITA 10 MURRAY, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color 11 of state law; ROBERTA KRAMER, individually and in her official capacity 12 acting under the color of state law; SARAH RAMSDEN, individually and 13 in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; CAROLINE 14 RAYMOND, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color 15 of state law; CHERI MCQUESTEN, individually and in her official capacity 16 acting under the color of state law; SARAH RAMSEY, individually and in 17 her official capacity acting under the color of state law; TAMI BOONE, 18 individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; 19 MELISSA REED, individually and in her official capacity acting under the 20 color of state law; ANN STOPAR, individually and in her official capacity 1 acting under the color of state law; KRISTINA GRIFFITH, individually 2 and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; WENDY 3 SUPANCHICK, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color 4 of state law; SHERRY DORNQUAST, individually and in her official capacity 5 acting under the color of state law; GARY VANDERHOLM, individually 6 and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; ROGER PRATT, 7 individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; 8 CHRIS NIEUWENHUIS, individually and in his official capacity acting under 9 the color of state law; and JOHN DOES 1–50, individually and in their official 10 capacities acting under the color of state law, [11] Defendants. [12] 13 Before the Court, without oral argument, is the Individual State Defendants’1 14 Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 359. The Individual State Defendants 15 seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claims related to the death of 16 Plaintiff’s grandchild, G.B. Id. Plaintiff opposes the motion as to Defendants Sarah 17 Oase and James Desmond, two of the fourteen Individual State Defendants. ECF [18] 19 1 The Individual State Defendants include Cassie Anderson, Lori Blake, Brina Carrigan, James Desmond, Melissa Kehmeier, Chris Mejia, Cameron Norton, Sarah 20 Oase, Rana Pullom, Susan Steiner, Maggie Stewart, Jennifer Strus, Shannon Sullivan, and Donald Williams. ECF No. 359 at 1 n.1. 1 No. 376 at 2. Having reviewed the motion and the file in this matter, the Court is 2 fully informed. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in 3 part the motion. 4 BACKGROUND2 5 This case arises out of the tragic death of G.B., a minor child, in April 2015 6 while in the custody of his aunt. See ECF No. 1 at 1314. Following the death of his 7 parents, G.B. and his siblings became dependents of the State of Washington. Id. 8 at 1213. In early September 2014, G.B. and his younger brother were placed in 9 the care of their paternal aunt, Cynthia Khaleel, who lived in Chattaroy, Washington. 10 ECF No. 218-4 at 10, 24–35. 11 During the 2014–15 school year, staff and teachers at the elementary school 12 G.B. was attending observed numerous signs that G.B. may have been suffering 13 abuse and neglect, and on December 12, 2014, school counselor Tiffany Zuck 14 submitted a report to the Washington Department of Social and Human Services 15 (“DSHS”) indicating that she believed G.B. and his siblings were being abused at 16 home. ECF No. 135-9 at 4. DSHS social worker Brina Carrigan investigated the [18] 2 The detailed factual background of G.B.’s death has been set forth in multiple prior 19 orders, see ECF Nos. 221, 281 & 368, and the Court finds it unnecessary to repeat that general background in full here. Because the contested issues pertain primarily 20 to the actions of Sarah Oase and James Desmond, the Court focuses on Oase and Desmond’s involvement with G.B.’s placement. 1 referral and ultimately closed it as unfounded. ECF No. 218-2 at 3–4; ECF 2 No. 218-4 at 3–4. 3 Heidi Kaas was G.B.’s primary social worker in 2014 and was involved in 4 G.B. and his younger brother’s placement. ECF No. 218-10 at 4. Sarah Oase served 5 as Kaas’s direct supervisor until August 30, 2014. ECF No. 382 at 2. Jeremy 6 Kirkland served as Kaas’s supervisor from September through December 2014. ECF 7 No. 218-3 at 4, 22–23. In an October 2014 review of Kaas’s work, Kirkland raised 8 concerns about the accuracy of Kaas’s reporting because the times she noted for 9 some health and safety visits were not possible given distances between the locations 10 of those visits. Id. at 28. Kaas stated that these must have been errors, and Kirkland 11 accepted this explanation. Id. at 29. In a November 2014 meeting with Kaas, 12 Kirkland noticed that Kaas had documented seeing G.B. in Chattaroy on the same 13 day she documented seeing another child in Port Angeles. Id. at 4–5, 26–27, 33–34. 14 Confronted with this inconsistency, Kaas admitted falsifying these records. Id. at 5, 15 34. Kirkland notified his supervisors of Kaas’s admission, and they opened an 16 investigation. Id. at 5, 34–35. 17 Susan Steiner replaced Kaas as G.B.’s primary social worker in 18 December 2014. ECF No. 218-12 at 3. Because no home study had been conducted 19 on Khaleel’s home, she also requested that the Spokane office of DSHS conduct a 20 home study. Id. at 4. Social worker James Desmond conducted a home study of 1 Khaleel’s home in late January 2015. ECF No. 218-5 at 3. During this visit, he 2 observed G.B., G.B.’s brother, and Khaleel’s other children, and he watched Khaleel 3 interact with them. Id. at 4. Desmond stated G.B. seemed to be happy and healthy. 4 Id. He also spoke by phone to Khaleel’s husband, who was in the military and 5 stationed in Kansas. Id. at 4. Desmond did have several concerns, which he reported 6 to Steiner, including that Khaleel reported a good childhood despite six CPS referrals 7 about her as a child; a 2008 referral against the Khaleels alleging that their two-year8 old child was found alone outside the home; the stability of the Khaleel marriage; 9 Khaleel’s hesitancy to discuss issues concerning the paternity of her youngest son; 10 and whether a background check had been completed on Khaleel’s parents, whom 11 she said helped her care for the children. Id. at 5–6. 12 Desmond and his supervisor, Nancy Sundin, went to Khaleel’s home in 13 March 2015. ECF No. 218-5 at 5. During this visit, the children were asleep, and 14 Desmond discussed his draft report with Khaleel and gave her background check 15 forms for her parents to complete. Id. Desmond returned again to the Khaleel home 16 to meet with Mr. and Ms. Khaleel on April 9, 2015. Id. He observed that the home 17 was in good condition with no visible safety concerns. Id. At this time Khaleel had 18 not completed the required forms and Desmond advised her that if she failed to do 19 so by the end of April, he would consider closing the home study without approval. 20 Id. 1 On April 17, 2015, emergency medical providers arrived at the Khaleel 2 residence and discovered G.B. in an unresponsive state. ECF No. 1 at 13. He was 3 taken to Sacred Heart Medical Center, where medical staff discovered multiple skull 4 fractures and traumatic brain injuries. Id. G.B. died from these injuries the following 5 day. Id. at 14. The Spokane County Medical examiner determined that G.B.’s cause 6 of death was a blunt force head injury and ruled the death a homicide. Id. G.B. also 7 sustained multiple other traumas, including an abdominal injury that was the result 8 of a forceful blow. Id. Khaleel was arrested in July 2015 and charged with second9 degree murder. Id. Desmond completed his home study after G.B.’s death, 10 recommending the home not be approved for placement of any children by DSHS. 11 ECF No. 218-5 at 6. 12 On September 14, 2016, G.B.’s grandmother, on behalf of G.B.’s Estate and 13 the Estate’s statutory beneficiaries, brought this action against the Washington State 14 Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) and the Riverside School 15 District, along with numerous employees of those entities. ECF No. 1. The 16 procedural history of this case, including ten prior motions for complete or partial 17 summary judgment, is substantial. See ECF Nos. 105, 144, 151, 157, 218, 226, 236, 18 239, 347, 359 & 361. The Individual State Defendants filed this motion solely as to 19 Plaintiff’s negligence claims. ECF No. 359. [20] 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 The Court must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is 3 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 4 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the 5 outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 6 U.S. 242 , 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence 7 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 8 In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence 9 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 10 U.S. 650 , 657 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 , 157 11 (1970)). Thus, the Court must accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true and 12 draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The 13 Court may not assess credibility or weigh evidence. See id. Nevertheless, the 14 nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading 15 but must instead set forth specific facts, and point to substantial probative evidence, 16 tending to support its case and showing a genuine issue requires resolution by the 17 finder of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49. 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Objections to Reply 20 After the Individual State Defendants filed their reply, Plaintiff filed an 1 objection, asking the Court to strike pages four through six of the reply. ECF 2 No. 383. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged the Individual State Defendants’ arguments 3 that Oase and Desmond did not owe G.B. a duty of care were raised for the first 4 time in their reply. Id. at 1. The Individual State Defendants responded to the 5 objection, asserting they had raised the arguments in the original motion and that, 6 even if the original summary judgment motion did not raise the issue of duty, 7 Plaintiff’s responsive pleadings expressly claim that Oase and Desmond owed G.B. 8 a legal duty, and so the Individual State Defendants were entitled to respond to that 9 argument. ECF No. 385 at 12. 10 The Individual State Defendants briefed the legal standards applicable to the 11 duty, breach, and causation elements of negligence in their motion for summary 12 judgment. ECF No. 359 at 47. However, in each of the fourteen sections devoted 13 to individual Defendants, the Individual State Defendants used general language 14 regarding Plaintiff’s failure to meet her burden. See id. at 715. For example, as to 15 Oase, the motion states Plaintiff cannot “present sufficient competent evidence that 16 (1) Oase personally committed a negligent act or omission with regard to the 17 investigation of allegations of abuse or neglect, or G.B.’s placement with Kahleel, 18 and (2) that any alleged negligent act or omission by Oase was a proximate cause [19] of the injuries being claimed by the Estate.” Id. at 1213. Similarly, for Desmond, [20] the motion states Plaintiff cannot “present sufficient competent evidence that (1) 1 Desmond personally committed a negligent act or omission with regard to the 2 investigation of allegations of abuse or neglect, or G.B.’s placement with Kahleel, 3 and (2) that any alleged negligent act or omission by Desmond was a proximate 4 cause of the injuries being claimed by the Estate.” Id. at 15. 5 Although the Individual State Defendants’ motion is not perfectly clear as to 6 whether they were challenging both the existence of a duty and the breach of that 7 duty, the Court understands “committed a negligent act or omission” to mean both 8 the duty and breach. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s objection regarding 9 whether Oase and Desmond owed G.B. a duty of care. Given Plaintiff’s 10 misunderstanding of the motion, the Court would ordinarily permit supplemental 11 briefing on the issue of duty. However, because the Court finds Defendants have 12 failed to show that there no genuine issue of material fact exists as to each of the 13 elements of Plaintiff’s negligence claims, summary judgment is not appropriate and 14 no further briefing is necessary. 15 B. Mejia, Norton, Strus, Sullivan, Williams, Anderson, Blake, Kehmeier, Pullom, Stewart, Carrigan, and Steiner [16] 17 Plaintiff has not responded to the motion for summary judgment as to 18 Defendants Mejia, Norton, Strus, Sullivan, Williams, Anderson, Blake, Kehmeier, 19 Pullom, Stewart, Carrigan, and Steiner. See ECF No. 376. Nor has Plaintiff 20 identified any facts that would support Plaintiff’s claim of negligence against these 1 Defendants.3 See ECF No. 375. As such, summary judgment is granted as to the 2 negligence claims against Defendants Mejia, Norton, Strus, Sullivan, Williams, 3 Anderson, Blake, Kehmeier, Pullom, Stewart, Carrigan, and Steiner. 4 C. Negligence claims against Sarah Oase and James Desmond 5 The Individual State Defendants assert Plaintiff “cannot establish that 6 Defendant Sarah Oase breached a duty owed” and that “[t]here is a complete lack 7 of evidence to support claims of negligence against James Desmond.” ECF No. 359 8 at 12, 14. Plaintiff argues that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment 9 as to these Defendants. ECF No. 376 at 2. 10 The elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach, causation, and damages. 11 Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483, 485 (Wash. 1992). Under Washington common 12 law, DSHS is subject to both a common law and statutory duty of care. See M.W. v. 13 Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 70 P.3d 954 , 95960 (Wash. 2003). “DSHS owes a 14 duty of reasonable care to protect foster children from abuse at the hands of their 15 foster parents.” H.B.H. v. State, 429 P.3d 484, 487 (Wash. 2018). [16] 17 3 Plaintiff notes that she does not dispute or has no knowledge of certain facts related to Carrigan, Anderson, and Stewart and raises hearsay and foundation objections to 18 fact in the Individual State Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute related to Carrigan. ECF No. 375 at 18, 2123. Plaintiff also mentions that Carrigan 19 found reports in a database Oase was able to access and that Steiner as the recipient of certain emails from Defendant Desmond. Id. at 10, 12, 13. However, none of 20 these facts support a finding that Carrigan, Anderson, Stewart, or Steiner acted negligently. 1 Washington courts also recognize that the obligation to investigate under 2 Revised Code of Washington § 26.44.050 “implies a cause of action for children 3 and parents for negligent investigation in certain circumstances.” M.W., 70 P.3d 4 at 957 (quoting Tyner v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 1 P.3d 1148 , 115455 5 (Wash. 2000)). This implied duty requires DSHS to act reasonably when 6 investigating reports of child abuse or neglect. Tyner, 1 P.3d at 1155 . The duty is 7 triggered when DSHS receives a report of previous or existing abuse or neglect, but 8 not on receipt of allegations of potential future neglect. Wrigley v. State, 455 9 P.3d 1138 , 1144 (Wash. 2020). 10 Thus, a child, parent, or guardian may assert a claim for negligent 11 investigation where “DSHS has gathered incomplete or biased information that 12 results in a harmful placement decision, such as removing a child from a nonabusive 13 home, placing a child in an abusive home, or letting a child remain in an abusive 14 home.” M.W., 70 P.3d at 960 . 15 There are two elements of proximate cause: cause in fact and legal causation. 16 Tyner, 1 P.3d at 115556. Cause in fact exists when “but for” the defendant’s 17 actions, the Plaintiff would not have been injured. Id. at 1156. This is typically a 18 factual question presented to a jury, but it may be resolved as a matter law where a 19 reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion. H.B.H., 387 P.3d 1093 , (Wash. 20 Ct. App. 2016) aff’d 429 P.3d 484, 487 (Wash. 2018). “Mere speculation or 1 argumentative assertion of possible counterfactual events is insufficient to prove 2 that but for the defendant’s breach of duty, the plaintiff would not have been 3 injured.” Id. 4 The Individual State Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot “present sufficient 5 competent evidence that (1) Oase personally committed a negligent act or omission 6 with regard to the investigation of allegations of abuse or neglect, or G.B.’s 7 placement with Kahleel, and (2) that any alleged negligent act or omission by Oase 8 was a proximate cause of the injuries being claimed by the Estate.” ECF No. 359 9 at 1213. As to Desmond, the Individual State Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot 10 “present sufficient competent evidence that (1) Desmond personally committed a 11 negligent act or omission with regard to the investigation of allegations of abuse or 12 neglect, or G.B.’s placement with Kahleel, and (2) that any alleged negligent act or 13 omission by Desmond was a proximate cause of the injuries being claimed by the 14 Estate.” ECF No. 359 at 15. 15 1. Duty of Care 16 As to whether Oase or Desmond owed G.B. a duty of care, the Individual 17 State Defendants presented no particularized argument asserting that no duty of care 18 arose under statutory or common law. See ECF No. 359 at 1213, 1415. In their 19 reply, the Individual State Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to “bring forth 20 sufficient, competent evidence to establish either Ms. Oase or Mr. Desmond 1 individually became legal custodians of G.B. or personally assumed the 2 responsibility to ensure his safety.” ECF No. 379 at 5. However, the Individual State 3 Defendants have not briefed the legal issue of whether individual employees must 4 take specific steps to become legal custodians in order to trigger their duties under 5 statutory or common law.4 The Court declines to make such a legal determination 6 where the issue has not properly been presented to the Court. 7 It is uncontested that Oase served as a social worker supervisor and directly 8 supervised Heidi Kaas between 2012 and August 30, 2014. ECF No. 382 at 2. It is 9 also undisputed that Desmond was a social worker and was assigned to complete a 10 home study of Khaleel’s home in January 2015. Id. The Individual State Defendants 11 also do not contest that “the State of Washington, through DSHS, owes a duty to 12 dependent foster children.” ECF No. 379 at 6. The Individual Defendants cite 13 evidence supporting their statement that Oase had no direct involvement in G.B.’s 14 dependency or the decision to place him in Khaleel’s home. ECF No. 360 at 6. [15] 16 4 The Individual State Defendants cite H.B.H. v. State, 429 P.3d 484, 496 (Wash. 2018), and C.L. v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 402 P.3d 346 , 350 17 (Wash. 2017), to support the proposition that “[w]hile the State of Washington, through DSHS, may owe dependent foster children a duty in tort neither decision 18 supports the imposition of either duty on an individual DSHS employee that has not individually assumed the legal custody or the responsibility for the safety of a 19 dependent child.” ECF No. 379 at 5. However, these cases indicate that the special relationship between DSHS and dependent children as the basis for a duty in tort, 20 neither case directly addresses the issue of when such a duty arises for individual DSHS employees. See H.B.H., 429 P.3d at 496 ; C.L., 402 P.3d at 350. 1 However, Plaintiff cites evidence showing that Oase endorsed G.B.’s placement in 2 the Khaleel home without a home study. ECF No. 375 at 20. Thus, the Individual 3 State Defendants have failed to show there is no dispute over material fact as to 4 whether Defendants Oase and Desmond owed G.B. a duty of care. 5 2. Breach of Duty and Causation 6 As to Oase, the Individual State Defendants assert that “Oase served as a 7 social worker supervisor for the Department and was assigned to supervise social 8 worker Heidi Kaas starting in 2012, but ending in August 2014” and that “Oase 9 conducted her supervisory reviews with Kaas and had no reason to question Kaas’s 10 representations and documentation of the services being provided by Kaas.” ECF 11 No. 359 at 12. As to Desmond, the Individual State Defendants assert that 12 “Desmond served as a social worker and was assigned to conduct a home study of 13 Kahleel’s home in January 2015” and that “he immediately started the home study, 14 gathered relevant information, raised concerns as they arose, and participated in 15 staffings regarding the on-going home study until the time of G.B.’s death.” ECF 16 No. 359 at 14. 17 However, Plaintiff’s claim against Oase is grounded in Oase’s failure to 18 ensure a home study was conducted before G.B. was placed in the Khaleel home, 19 her failure to inform the Spokane DSHS office that G.B. was being placed in the 20 Spokane DSHS’s geographic area, her failure to request courtesy supervision, and 1 that there was no basis to place G.B. with Khaleel as an urgent placement. ECF 2 No. 376 at 34. Plaintiff has identified evidence that Oase, as Kaas’s supervisor, 3 was responsible for arranging for a social worker to conduct a home visit and did 4 not do so and that Oase failed to contact the Spokane office of DSHS as required to 5 notify them of G.B.’s placement in their area or establish courtesy supervision. ECF 6 No. 375 at 3, 67, 11, 20. 7 Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims against Desmond are grounded in his alleged 8 failure to complete the home study on an expedited basis despite the fact that he 9 knew of concerns about G.B.’s welfare and the fact that a home study should have 10 been completed prior to his assignment to the case. ECF No. 376 at 4. Plaintiff has 11 identified evidence that, even with an urgent placement, DSHS policy required a 12 home study to have been completed within 120 days of G.B.’s placement. ECF 13 No. 240-25 at 19. The parties do not dispute that Desmond was assigned to 14 complete the home study in January 2015. ECF No. 382 at 2. Because G.B. was 15 legally placed with Khaleel on September 3, 2014, Desmond’s assignment was 16 necessarily at least 120 days after G.B.’s placement. See ECF No. 241 at 14. 17 Plaintiff has also shown evidence that the Khaleel home study was not likely 18 to be approved, even excepting her failure to submit required paperwork. ECF 19 No. 240-15 at 4; ECF No. 240-12 at 79. Thus, there are material facts in dispute 20 as to whether the failure to conduct an earlier home study, or to expedite the home 1 study that was conducted, caused G.B. to be in the Khaleel home at the time he was 2 allegedly killed. The Individual State Defendants accordingly have failed to show 3 there is no dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants Oase and Desmond 4 breached a duty of care owed to G.B. and whether that breach caused his death. 5 CONCLUSION 6 The Individual State Defendants have failed to show there is no dispute of 7 material fact as to any of the elements of Plaintiff’s negligence claims against 8 Defendants Oase and Desmond. As such, summary judgment is not appropriate, and 9 the motion is denied as to these Defendants. Because Plaintiff has not cited any facts 10 that would support Plaintiff’s claim of negligence against the remaining Individual 11 State Defendants, the motion is granted as to these Defendants. 12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 1. The Individual State Defendants’ Motion for and Memorandum in 14 Support of Summary Judgment, ECF No. 359, is GRANTED IN 15 PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 16 A. Plaintiff’s claims for negligence against Defendants Mejia, 17 Norton, Strus, Sullivan, Williams, Anderson, Blake, Kehmeier, 18 Pullom, Stewart, Carrigan, and Steiner are DISMISSED WITH 19 PREJUDICE. 20 // 1 B. The motion is denied as to Plaintiff’ claims for negligence 2 against Defendants Oase and Desmond. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and 4 || provide copies to counsel for all parties. 5 DATED this 29th day of July 2020. 6 ocak SALVADOR MEND@z\A, JR. 7 United States District Judge [20] ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART INDIVIDUAL