Beuca v. Washington State University

[2] FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 3 May 19, 2023 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON [6] 7 TIMOTHY P. BEUCA, NO. 2:23-CV-0069-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 10 WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY and JOHN and JANE 11 1-10, 12 Defendants. [13] 14 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Washington State University’s Motion 15 to Dismiss. ECF No. 2. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral 16 argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully 17 informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 18 No. 2) is GRANTED. [20] 1 BACKGROUND 2 This matter arises from Plaintiff’s termination of employment from 3 Defendant Washington State University following Plaintiff’s decision not to 4 receive a COVID-19 vaccine. The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s 5 Amended Complaint and construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. Schwarz 6 v. United States, 234 F.3d 428 , 436 (9th Cir. 2000). 7 On or about August 9, 2021, Governor Inslee issued Proclamation 21-14, 8 mandating that certain state employees become vaccinated against COVID-19. 9 ECF No. 1-5 at 5, ¶ 23. At that time, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a 10 medical student doing his residency with Providence Regional Medical Center 11 (“Providence”). Id. at 2, ¶ 1. As a state employer, Defendant was required to 12 comply with the Proclamation by ensuring its employees were vaccinated. Id. at 4, 13 ¶ 10. The Proclamation allowed for religious exemptions as permitted under Title 14 VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Id. at 5, ¶ 25. Plaintiff has sincerely held religious beliefs 15 that prevent him from taking a COVID-19 vaccine. Id., ¶ 27. Accordingly, 16 Plaintiff submitted a religious exemption request, although it is unclear to whom 17 the request was submitted. See id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff was granted an exemption by 18 Providence but not by Defendant. Id. Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff’s 19 employment with Defendant was terminated; it is unclear when. Id. at 6, ¶ 31. [20] 1 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 2 Commission and received a right to sue letter on September 5, 2022. Id., ¶ 32. 3 Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages in the Superior Court of Whitman County 4 on December 2, 2022, alleging a single cause of action for failure to accommodate 5 in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ECF No. 1-3. On February 22, 2023, 6 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding a cause of action for failure to 7 accommodate in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination 8 (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.180. ECF No. 1-5. Defendant removed the action to 9 federal court on March 15, 2023. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff did not oppose the removal. 10 Defendant filed the present motion on March 22, 2023, seeking dismissal of the 11 two counts asserted against it. ECF No. 2. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A. Motion to Dismiss 14 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on the grounds 15 that Plaintiff has failed to state plausible claims for relief under Title VII and the 16 WLAD and because Plaintiff’s requested accommodation would have created an 17 undue hardship. ECF No. 2 at 15. 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may 19 move to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 20 granted.” “The burden of demonstrating that no claim has been stated is upon the 1 movant.” Glanville v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 845 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be denied if the plaintiff alleges 3 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 4 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 5 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 6 While the plaintiff's “allegations of material fact are taken as true and 7 construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[,]” the plaintiff cannot rely on 8 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences to defeat a motion to 9 dismiss for failure to state a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399 , 10 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and brackets omitted). That is, the plaintiff must 11 provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 12 elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . When deciding, the Court’s review is 13 limited to the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint, and judicial 14 notice. Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th 15 Cir. 2008) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 , 322 16 (2007)). 17 To state a claim for failure to accommodate under Title VII and the WLAD, 18 a plaintiff must allege (1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which 19 conflicts with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and 20 conflict; and (3) the employer discharged him because of his inability to fulfill the 1 job requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2 2004); Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wash. 2d 481 , 500–01 (2014). 3 As to the first element, Plaintiff asserts he “holds sincere religious beliefs 4 and convictions that prevent him from taking the [COVID-19] vaccination.” ECF 5 No. 1-5 at 5, ¶ 26. He does not provide any additional details about his beliefs. 6 Defendant argues the failure to articulate his particular religious beliefs and why 7 they preclude him from receiving a vaccine are fatal to Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 8 2 at 16. While a court need not accept at face value a plaintiff’s conclusory 9 assertions of violations of religious beliefs, “the burden to allege a conflict with 10 religious beliefs is fairly minimal.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State 11 Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023). Additionally, both the Ninth 12 Circuit and the Supreme Court have cautioned against second-guessing the 13 reasonableness of an individual’s asserted religious beliefs. Id.; Burwell v. Hobby 14 Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 , 725 (2014) (citation omitted). The Court 15 declines to scrutinize Plaintiff’s particular beliefs merely because he has failed to 16 articulate them with greater clarity and precision. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of 17 Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). In any event, Plaintiff’s claims 18 fail for additional reasons unrelated to any particular set of religious beliefs. 19 As to the second element, Plaintiff asserts, “[u]pon submission of his request 20 for an exemption, the plaintiff was granted an exemption from receiving the 1 vaccination by Providence but not from the Defendant, WSU.” ECF No. 1-5 at 5, 2 ¶ 28. It is not clear from this assertion whether Plaintiff submitted an exemption 3 request to Defendant. Plaintiff further alleges he “apprised the Defendants of his 4 sincerely held religious belief” but does not elaborate as to how he informed 5 Defendants. Id. at 6, ¶ 34–35. Defendant argues these vague statements fail to 6 provide the Court with sufficient facts from which it could infer Defendant could 7 be liable for the alleged misconduct. ECF No. 2 at 17. The Court agrees. 8 Plaintiff’s Response does not provide any clarification. See generally, ECF No. 3. 9 Instead, Plaintiff simply quotes verbatim the relevant paragraphs from the 10 Amended Complaint. Notably, Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend to clarify his 11 factual assertions or causes of action. 12 Finally, Plaintiff claims he “lost this job due to his sincerely held religious 13 beliefs.” ECF No. 1-5 at 6, ¶ 36. However, Plaintiff does not provide any 14 additional facts connecting his discharge to his religious beliefs. Such conclusory 15 allegations are insufficient to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . 17 Although Plaintiff has failed to plead the elements of a prima facie case for a 18 failure to accommodate claim, the Court will consider Defendant’s claim of undue 19 hardship to determine whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. Undue 20 hardship is an affirmative defense. Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1224 . “What 1 constitutes an undue hardship must be determined within the particular factual 2 context of each case.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 3 1999). An accommodation may result in an undue hardship if there is “more than 4 a de minimis cost to the employer . . . [or] more than a de minimis impact on 5 coworkers.” Balint, 180 F.3d at 1054 . The assertion of an undue hardship may not 6 be premised on hypothetical or speculative hardships; there must be actual 7 imposition or disruption. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 , 1243 8 (9th Cir. 1981). Dismissal premised on undue hardship is proper “only if the 9 defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint 10 or in any judicially noticeable materials.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1224 11 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 12 Plaintiff plead that he was a medical student doing his residency with 13 Providence Regional Medical Center. Defendant asserts having unvaccinated 14 internal medicine physicians would have imposed an undue hardship because it 15 would have increased the risk of exposure to COVID-19 to patients and other 16 healthcare workers. ECF No. 2 at 19. Other courts have determined unvaccinated 17 healthcare workers impose an undue hardship on employers due to the increased 18 risk of infection. See, e.g., Together Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 573 F. 19 Supp. 3d 412, 441 (D. Mass. 2021), aff'd, 32 F.4th 82 (1st Cir. 2022) (denying 20 injunctive relief after determining that unvaccinated healthcare workers materially 1 increased the risk of spreading COVID-19); Does 1-2 v. Hochul, No. 2 21CV5067AMDTAM, 2022 WL 4637843 , at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). The 3 Court concludes Defendant’s proffered reason for not accommodating Plaintiff’s 4 request is sufficient to establish an undue hardship, particularly given the increased 5 risk of COVID-19 infection during the time of Plaintiff’s termination. 6 Plaintiff contends this issue cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss. 7 However, the facts, as plead by Plaintiff show that he was working in a hospital 8 and would have increased the risk of exposure to COVID-19 to patients and other 9 healthcare workers. No accommodation was possible. 10 In light of Defendant’s successful assertion of an undue hardship, the Court 11 further determines amendment would be futile. See United States v. Corinthian 12 Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (identifying factors courts should 13 consider in assessing the propriety of leave to amend, including futility). The 14 Court cannot conceive of any facts that would render Plaintiff’s claims viable in 15 the context of his employment setting. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 16 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, Plaintiff initiated this action in 17 December 2022 and has amended the complaint once already. Plaintiff has had 18 ample opportunity to identify any facts and causes of action that he could plausibly 19 allege in this matter. Amendment would be futile and granting Plaintiff additional 20 time to amend for a second time would create undue delay and prejudice to 1 Defendant. Therefore, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. 2 B. Unnamed Defendants 3 The Court must address the unidentified defendants that remain in the 4 caption of this action. A plaintiff must name all intended defendants in the caption 5 of his complaint or any superseding amended complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, [6] 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Failing to name and serve all defendants in 7 the complaint denies a court jurisdiction over the unnamed defendants. Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 4(m); see e.g., Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967 , 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013) 9 (“A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the 10 defendant has been served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”) (internal 11 quotation marks and citations omitted). 12 The use of “John or Jane Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored in the 13 Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 14 However, a plaintiff may initially rely on the use of “John or Jane Doe” in his 15 pleading when the identity of a party is unknown prior to filing a complaint but 16 will eventually be made known through discovery. Id. 17 Here, Plaintiff named John and Jane 1–10 as defendants in the initial and 18 Amended Complaint without providing any information as to what role they 19 played in Plaintiff’s claim. Absent any allegations against these unnamed parties, 20 the Amended Complaint cannot survive the motion to dismiss. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Defendant Washington State University’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3 2) is GRANTED. The claims asserted against Washington State 4 University are DISMISSED with prejudice. 5 2. The claims against the remaining unnamed John and Jane 1-10 6 defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice for failing to provide any 7 information as to what role they played in Plaintiff's claim. 8 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and Judgment of 9|| Dismissal with prejudice, furnish copies to counsel, and CLOSE the file. 10 DATED May 19, 2023. | Q hue MS Mg 11 ee UL 12 Sane THOMAS 0. RICE <> United States District Judge