Gras v. Subcontracting Concepts LLC

[1] 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE □ 3 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [4] ) 5 || SEATON GRAS, ) . ) CASE NO. 2:19-cv-00643-BJR 6 Plaintiff ) ) 7 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S V. ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 8 ) AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUBCONTRACTING CONCEPTS, LLC, ) ATTORNEYS’ FEES 9 || PETER FIDOPIASTIS, and RYAN WISE, ) ) 10 Defendants, ) ) [12] 1. INTRODUCTION [13] Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, Dkt. No. 22, of the Court’s ruling [14] 5 that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this matter, Dkt. No. 21. Plaintiff purports 16 to present new evidence, not previously available, to support its request for reconsideration. 17 || Defendants reply that not only does the new information not change the Court’s previous 18 || conclusion, but that Plaintiff's motion is frivolous and, therefore, warrants sanctions. Dkt. No. 26. 19 Having reviewed the motion, opposition thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will deny both Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and Defendants’ [21] request for sanctions. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. [22] IL. BACKGROUND The Court laid out the background of this case in depth in its recent order granting 45 || Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 21. In brief, the matter involves the souring of a business relationship to develop software for an application. The 4 of the case, however, revolves around Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants tapped into a 3, || teleconference in which he was attempting to market the application to third-party competitors of 4 || Defendants. 5 On September 17, 2019, the Court granted a motion to dismiss by Defendants finding that the Court did not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Dkt. No. 21. In essence, and based on the information before the Court at the time, Defendants had not purposefully directed their 9 actions towards Washington State because the teleconference line allegedly tapped, which Plaintiff 10 || using during his call, was owned by Defendants. As the Court stated, “[t]he relevant facts that 11 ||temain are that Plaintiff initiated the contact with the State of New York by dialing into the 12 teleconference equipment of a New York based company, whose equipment is located in New 13 York, and who did not appear to have knowledge of the call prior to, and during, its commission or give permission for such a call to take place.” Jd. at 8. Plaintiff responded to the Court’s opinion with a motion for reconsideration. Dkt. No. 22. 7 According to Plaintiff, he obtained new evidence, not available earlier, that the conference line 1g || utilized for the teleconference in question did not belong to Defendants, but instead was an 19 || independent, third-party service called Mikogo. Jd. at 3, 7-9. Thus, Plaintiff asserts, the facts of 20 case have dramatically changed to “Plaintiff having an independent private conversation in 21 Washington” where Defendants “found some way to access Plaintiff's private Mikogo conference 22 call and instructed their internal software to record it without the consent or knowledge of Plaintiff.” Jd. at 8 (emphasis in original). 25 Defendants reply that the Mikogo conference line referred to in Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration does, in fact, belong to them. Dkt. No. 26 at 1; Dkt. No. 26-1 at 95. Not only do they contest the appropriateness of reconsideration, Defendants also move for attorneys’ fees. Dkt. 3 26 at 8-11. As Defendants state, “Plaintiff made no attempt to contact Defendants once he 4 ||had obtained [the new evidence] to asked about phone number 855-809-1233, which is evident 5 because, if Plaintiff had asked, Defendants would have promptly informed Plaintiff that [it] was : an SCI toll-free number used by SCI’s conference line.” Jd. at 5-6. As such, Defendants claim, [m]otion for reconsideration based solely upon the erroneous theory that the toll-free number 9 used by Plaintiff on March 25, 2014 did not belong to Defendants cannot be supported by any 10 || tational argument on the laws or facts and is therefore frivolous.” Id. at 10 (internal quotations 11 removed). 12 Il. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A. Motion for Reconsideration 14 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(1); see IS also Doe v. Trump, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2018); Dkt. No. 11 at 3 (this Court’s standing order stating that “[m]otions for reconsideration are discouraged”). Ordinarily, the Court 18 will deny such motions “in the absence of a showing of (1) ‘manifest error in the prior ruling,’ or 19 || (2) ‘new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to [the court's] attention earlier 20 || with reasonable diligence.” Doe, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (quoting Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 21 7(h)(1)). 22 B. Sanctions = FRCP 11 provides that an attorney is subject to sanctions “when he [or she] presents to the court ‘claims, defenses, and other legal contentions’ . . . [not] warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.’” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. 3 || R. Civ. PRo. 11(6)(2)). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 First, as Defendants have averred that the conference line in question does in fact belong 6 to them, the Court finds that the facts of the case have not changed. As such, there is no manifest [7] error or new facts or legal authority warranting reconsideration. The Court will, therefore, deny [8] 9 Plaintiff's motion. Second, the Court finds that sanctions are not warranted in this situation. As 10 such, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion as well. 11 Vv. ' CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, 13 || Dkt. No. 22, and DENIES Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees, Dkt. No. 26. [15] DATED this /O day of Seko ber 2019. 16 / 17 ARTA 18 BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE