Shackelford v. West Coast Freightline LLC

[5] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA [7] JASON SHACKELFORD, CASE NO. C20-5492 BHS [8] Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION TO STRIKE 10 WEST COAST FREIGHTLINE, LLC, HARBAN SINGH, and JANE DOE 11 SINGH, 12 Defendants. [13] This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Jason Shackelford’s [14] (“Shackleford”) motion to strike affirmative defenses. Dkt. 14. The Court has considered [15] the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the [16] file and hereby denies the motion for the reasons stated herein. [17] I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY [18] Shackelford originally filed his complaint in Pierce County Superior Court against [19] West Coast Freightline, LLC, Harban Singh, and Jane Doe Singh (“Defendants”) on May [20] 1, 2020. Dkt. 1-1. On May 27, 2020, Defendants removed the case to federal court. Dkt. [22] 1 1. On July 8, 2020, Defendants filed an Answer asserting ten affirmative defenses. Dkt 2 13. 3 On July 29, 2020, Shackelford filed the instant motion requesting that the Court 4 strike six of the affirmative defenses. Dkt. 14. On August 10, 2020, Defendants 5 responded. Dkt. 15. On August 13, 2020, Shackelford replied. Dkt. 16. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a district court to “strike from a 8 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 9 matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid spending 10 time and money litigating spurious issues. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524 , 11 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). A defense is 12 insufficiently pled if it fails to give the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense. 13 See Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979). A matter is immaterial 14 if it has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief pleaded. See Fogerty, [15] 984 F.2d at 1527 . A matter is impertinent if it does not pertain and is not necessary to the 16 issues in question in the case. See id. 17 While a Rule 12(f) motion provides the means to excise improper materials from 18 pleadings, such motions are generally disfavored because the motions may be used as 19 delaying tactics and because of the strong policy favoring resolution on the merits. See 20 Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, once an 21 affirmative defense has been properly pled, a motion to strike which alleges the legal 22 insufficiency of an affirmative defense will not be granted “unless it appears to a 1 certainty that plaintiffs would succeed despite any state of the facts which could be 2 proved in support of the defense.” See William Z. Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v. Envicon 3 Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. North 4 River Insur. Co., 482 F. Supp. 910, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). 5 Here, Shackelford argues that a defendant must plead an affirmative defense with 6 enough factual specificity to give the plaintiff “fair notice” of the defense, citing to Fifth 7 Circuit case law. See Dkt. 14 at 2 (citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th 8 Cir. 1999)). However, the Ninth Circuit does not require such a detailed statement of 9 facts; rather, “[f]air notice generally requires that the defendant state the nature and 10 grounds for the affirmative defense.” Kohler v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 11 F.R.D. 464 , 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Indeed, an affirmative 12 defense is legally insufficient only if it lacks merit “under any set of facts the defendant 13 might allege.” McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1140 , 1149–50 (N.D. 14 Cal. 2009 ), rev’d on other grounds, 474 Fed. Appx. 515 (2012) (emphasis added). 15 The key, therefore, to determining the sufficiency of pleading for an affirmative 16 defense is whether it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the defense. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 86 . 17 Shackelford characterizes Defendants’ challenged affirmative defenses as “conclusory 18 allegations” and “boilerplate.” Dkt. 14 at 3, 5–8. While the Court notes that a mere list of 19 affirmative defenses may not be sufficient to provide notice to all plaintiffs in every case 20 and that each pleading is subject to individual review, the Court is unable to conclude 21 that, given a standard enumeration of common defenses against facts familiar to 22 Shackelford, Shackelford does not have fair notice of the general nature of the defenses. 1 See, e.g., Bushbeck v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. C08–0755JLR, 2010 WL 11442904 , at 2 *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2010) (finding under a notice pleading standard, defendant 3 need only state “estoppel” without further factual support to survive motion to strike). 4 The Court therefore denies Shackelford’s request to strike the six defenses. 5 III. ORDER 6 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Shackelford’s motion to strike, Dkt. 14, is 7 DENIED. 8 Dated this 2nd day of October, 2020. A [10] BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 11 United States District Judge