Parris v. Jacobs Engineering Group Inc

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR [6] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [7] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 COLLEEN PARRIS, CASE NO. C19-0128-JCC [10] Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC., 13 Defendant. [14] 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 16 No. 59). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court 17 finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion 18 for the reasons explained herein. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Defendant Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. is a “full service worldwide provider of 21 engineering, construction and project management services.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 2.) Plaintiff Colleen 22 Parris worked for Defendant from 2000 until she was terminated on September 15, 2017, except 23 for a two-year break while working for a company that was then acquired by Defendant. (Dkt. 24 Nos. 59 at 12; 66 at 8, 17.) Defendant asserts it terminated Plaintiff for lack of work. (Dkt. No. 25 59 at 2, 12.) Plaintiff, who suffers from severe post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), alleges 26 she was terminated because of her gender and disability. (Dkt. No. 66 at 15.) She filed suit in 1 King County Superior Court on January 10, 2019, (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 24), and Defendant removed 2 the matter to this Court, (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff asserts claims under the Washington Law Against 3 Discrimination (“WLAD”), Wash. Rev. Code Ch. 49.60, for disparate treatment based on her 4 gender and disability, hostile work environment based on her gender and disability, a failure to 5 accommodate her disability, and retaliation. (Dkt. No. 26 at 14–15.) Defendant moves for 6 summary judgment on all claims. (See Dkt. No. 59.)1 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 A. Legal Standard 9 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 10 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 11 Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 12 find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 13 dispute of fact is material if the fact “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 14 law.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 15 the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. 16 at 255. 17 B. Admissibility of Evidence 18 As a threshold matter, Defendant asks the Court to strike certain exhibits offered by [19] 1 Plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, chose to affirmatively “not address” [20] Defendant’s motion regarding the following claims: Plaintiff’s disability-based disparate 21 treatment claim and her gender-based retaliation claim. (Dkt. No. 66 at 7.) In reply, Defendant cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 7(b)(2) for the proposition that by 22 “not addressing these causes of action . . . [Plaintiff] has conceded summary judgment on these claims.” (Dkt. No. 70 at 2 n.1.) This misstates the respective rules. Federal Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that Defendant, as the party seeking summary judgment, still has the burden to make the Rule 56(a) showing for the claims upon which summary judgment is sought. [24] The Local Rules also do not absolve Defendant of this responsibility. See W.D. Wash Local Civ. 25 R. 7 (b)(2) (indicating that the rule regarding a failure to respond does not apply to summary judgment motions). [26] 1 Plaintiff in support of her opposition brief on the basis that the evidence is inadmissible because 2 it lacks foundation and authenticity. (Dkt. No. 70 at 2–3.) The Court declines Defendant’s 3 request. The evidence on which Plaintiff relies need only be presented in an admissible form at 4 trial—not at summary judgment. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 , 324 (9th Cir. 5 1991); see Clark v. Cnty. of Tulare, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Celotex 6 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)) (“A party must show that the evidence could be 7 rendered in an admissible form at trial.”). The Court is confident that Plaintiff could provide an 8 adequate foundation and support for the exhibits’ authenticity at trial. 9 C. Disability Discrimination Claims 10 Plaintiff indicates that she was diagnosed with “severe, complex PTSD in 2008 from a 11 childhood traumatic incident and relationship with abusive partners.” (Dkt. No. 66 at 8.) Her 12 disabling symptoms can be triggered by hostile interactions and threatening situations. (Id.) 13 Plaintiff alleges that she reported to Defendant that she was having triggering interactions and 14 situations with a supervisor, yet Defendant failed to adequately address the issue or provide 15 reasonable accommodations, and ultimately terminated her, in part, due to this disability. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff brings disability-based WLAD claims for disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, 17 and hostile work environment. (Dkt. No. 26 at 14–15.) 18 1. Disparate Treatment 19 Courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to analyze WLAD 20 discrimination claims. Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 404 P.3d 464 , 470 21 (Wash. 2017) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–04 (1973)). Under 22 this framework, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or disparate 23 treatment. Id. at 470–71. The burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, 24 nondiscriminatory reason for its action(s). Id. If Defendant carries its burden, Plaintiff must 25 finally prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason asserted for Defendant’s action 26 is pretextual. Id. 1 Defendant first argues that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff fails to 2 present evidence that she was replaced by someone not in her protected class. (Dkt. No. 59 at 3 14.) But to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on termination, Plaintiff 4 must only show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was terminated, and (3) she was 5 doing satisfactory work. Mikkelsen, 404 P.3d at 473. While “the attributes of a successor 6 employee may be relevant to the second or third steps under the McDonnell Douglas 7 framework,” it is not relevant to the first step. Mikkelsen, 404 P.3d at 473 (emphasis added). 8 Defendant next argues that, even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Defendant 9 has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination: client dissatisfaction 10 with her performance and a lack of available work for other clients. (Dkt. No. 59 at 15.) Under 11 McDonnell Douglas Corp., because Defendant did not move for summary judgment on the 12 prima facie elements that Plaintiff was actually required to support, for the Court to award 13 summary judgment, Defendant must present evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose 14 for Plaintiff’s termination, thereby requiring Plaintiff to make a showing that the purpose was 15 pretextual. 411 U.S. at 802–04. Defendant meets this requirement. Specifically, Defendant 16 presents evidence that the last client Plaintiff worked on for Defendant, the Washington State 17 Department of Transportation, asked that she be removed from the project. (Dkt. No. 60-2 at 23.) 18 Defendant also presents evidence that Plaintiff refused an offered replacement assignment. (Dkt. 19 No. 60-16 at 2.) At that point, Plaintiff was put on involuntary leave and, eventually, terminated 20 due to a lack of available work. (Dkt. No. 60-14 at 2.) 21 Plaintiff presents no evidence contradicting Defendant’s assertions, at least for purposes 22 of her disability-based disparate treatment claim. (See Dkt. No. 66 at 7 n.2 (indicating in her 23 response brief that she declines to address this cause of action).) Nor does Plaintiff present 24 evidence of pretext. (Id.) 25 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability-based 26 disparate treatment claim. 1 2. Failure to Accommodate 2 It is undisputed that, in response to Plaintiff’s request to avoid contact with her job-level3 supervisor, Jonathon Addison, Defendant tasked Jay Hueter with serving as an intermediary for 4 communications between Plaintiff and Mr. Addison, at least until she was transferred a few 5 months later to a project not involving Mr. Addison. (See Dkt. Nos. 59 at 15–18, 66 at 18–20, 70 6 at 4–7.) At issue for purposes of Defendant’s summary judgment motion is whether this 7 accommodation was legally required. Plaintiff argues that the sufficiency of any accommodation 8 is a question of fact for a jury,2 whereas Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for a new 9 supervisor was unreasonable as a matter of law. (Id.) Defendant has the better argument. 10 “[T]here is no duty under WLAD to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability 11 by providing her with a new supervisor.” Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp. of E. Washington, 35 P.3d 12 1158, 1163 (Wash. 2001); see Pulcino v. Fed. Express Corp., 9 P.3d 787 , 795 (Wash. 2000) 13 (noting that “whether an employer made reasonable accommodation” is generally a “question[] 14 of fact for the jury . . . [but] certain types of requests have been found unreasonable as a matter 15 of law” including “an employee’s request for a new supervisor or a position with a new 16 supervisor to accommodate her ‘emotional condition’”) (citing Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp. of E. 17 Wash., 988 P.2d 1023 (Wash. App. 1999)). Here, it is undisputed that Defendant attempted to 18 accommodate Plaintiff’s request. (Dkt. No. 59 at 6–9, 66 at 11.) But it was not required to as a 19 matter of law. 20 The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. 21 3. Hostile Work Environment 22 A plaintiff bringing a disability-based hostile work environment claim must show that (1) [23] 2 The cases Plaintiff cites for this proposition are distinguishable. In those cases, the 24 employer categorically denied the employee’s request for an accommodation. (See Dkt. No. 66 at 18–19 (citing Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 70 P.3d 126, 134 (Wash. 2003); Pulcino, 9 P.3d at 796; 25 Kries v. WA-SPOK Primary Care, LLC, 362 P.3d 974 , 995 (Wash. App. 2015); Johnson v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 244 P.3d 438, 445 (Wash. App. 2010); Huge v. Boeing Co., 2015 WL 26 6626568, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2015).) There is no such assertion here. 1 she was disabled within the meaning of the WLAD; (2) that the harassment was unwelcome; (3) 2 it was because of the disability; (4) it affected the terms or conditions of employment; and (5) it 3 was imputable to the employer. Balkenbush v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1115 , 4 1122 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 616 (2002)). Defendant 5 seeks summary judgment based upon Plaintiff’s inability to establish the third, fourth and fifth 6 elements. 7 Turning to the third element, Plaintiff must put forth some evidence “that supports a 8 reasonable inference that [her disability] was the motivating factor for [Mr. Addison’s allegedly] 9 harassing conduct.” Alonso v. Qwest Commun. Co., LLC, 315 P.3d 610, 618 (Wash. App. 2013). 10 The evidence Plaintiff puts forth only supports an inference that, due to her disability, Plaintiff 11 was negatively impacted by Mr. Addison’s allegedly intimidating and hostile behavior, not that 12 he behaved as he did because of her disability. (See Dkt. No. 68-1 at 51–62, 150–151.) Plaintiff 13 has not established a genuine issue of fact regarding the causal relationship between her 14 disability and the alleged harassment. Because this is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim, the Court need not 15 address Defendant’s argument regarding deficiencies in the other elements. 16 The Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability-based hostile work 17 environment claim. 18 D. Gender Discrimination Claims 19 Plaintiff alleges that she and her female colleagues were routinely subjected to sexual 20 harassment by a variety of supervisors. (Dkt. No. 66 at 12–13.) Plaintiff contends she did not 21 report the behavior3 because “[s]he had been working for [Defendant] long enough to observe [22] 3 The Second Amended Complaint contains an allegation that Plaintiff submitted a [23] statement on behalf of a female colleague who recently quit after finding the environment 24 untenable and that, after submitting the statement, “Plaintiff observed a sudden increase” in hostility towards her. (Dkt. No. 26 at 9.) But the allegation is not repeated in Plaintiff’s summary 25 judgment briefing, no evidence is presented regarding this statement, and Plaintiff indicates in her briefing that she will “not address” Defendant’s summary judgment motion on her gender26 based retaliation claim. (Dkt. No. 66 at 7.) 1 that male employees were permitted to engage in such behavior.” (Id. at 13–14.) She indicates 2 that instead she did her best to avoid contact with those supervisors, fearing retaliation for 3 reporting their behavior. (Id. at 14.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that the working conditions 4 remained difficult and that, when she was placed on involuntary leave and terminated, Defendant 5 immediately replaced her with a male counterpart. (Id. at 15–16.) She brings disability-based 6 WLAD claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, and hostile work environment. (Dkt. No. 26 at 7 14–15.) 8 1. Disparate Treatment 9 Plaintiff’s gender-based discrimination claim appears limited to her being placed on 10 involuntary leave in March 2017 and then terminated in September 2017. (Dkt. No. 66 at 25–26.) 11 Like with her disability-based discrimination claim, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 12 framework is appropriate to assess the adequacy of Plaintiff’s gender-based claim. Hegwine v. 13 Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 172 P.3d 688, 696 (Wash. 2007) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 14 411 U.S. at 802–04 (1973)). Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff established her prima facie 15 case, it presents uncontroverted evidence supporting its legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 16 terminating Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 70 at 8.) This may be true, but Plaintiff presents evidence of 17 pretext: she was immediately replaced by Kevin Rowland, a male employee. (Dkt. No. 68-1 at 18 257–64.) This evidence is sufficient to establish a material dispute on the issue of pretext. See 19 Mikkelsen, 404 P.3d at 473. Summary judgment is DENIED on Plaintiff’s gender-based 20 discrimination claim. 21 2. Retaliation 22 While Plaintiff included a retaliation claim in her complaint, she provides no evidence 23 with her summary judgment briefing to establish her required prima facie case. (See Dkt. No. 66 24 at 7 n.2.) Because the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is also the appropriate 25 framework to assess the adequacy of Plaintiff’s gender-based retaliation claim, she has failed to 26 establish a material issue of fact on this claim. Francom v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 991 P.2d 1 1182, 1191 (Wash. App. 2000). Summary judgment is GRANTED on Plaintiff’s gender-based 2 retaliation claim. 3 3. Hostile Work Environment 4 In addition to her general allegations regarding a toxic environment for women, Plaintiff 5 alleges that two supervisors in particular, Jim Pace and David Gunn, sexually harassed Plaintiff 6 from 2014 onward. (Dkt. No. 26 at 7–8.) Defendant suggests that any harassment occurring 7 before January 10, 2016 is barred by Washington’s statute of limitations. (Dkt. No. 70 at 12.) But 8 the earlier allegations are relevant in establishing a hostile work environment claim, so long as 9 they are “part of a unified whole comprising a hostile work environment” and at least some 10 component of that whole occurred within the period covered by the statute of limitations. 11 Antonius v. King County, 103 P.3d 729, 736 (Wash. 2004). Therefore, this is not a barrier for 12 Plaintiff’s claim as she provides evidence supporting her assertion that the harassing behavior 13 continued to occur well after January 10, 2016. (See Dkt. No. 68-1 at 27–41.) 14 To prevail on her gender-based hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show 15 harassment that (1) was unwelcome, (2) was because of her gender, (3) affected the terms or 16 conditions of her employment, and (4) is imputed to Defendant. Glasgow v. Georgia-P. Corp., [17] 693 P.2d 708, 712 (Wash. 1985). Defendant’s only remaining argument is that the allegedly 18 harassing activity is not imputable to Defendant because Plaintiff never reported it. (Dkt. No. 59 19 at 25.) But Plaintiff presents testimony that the alleged conduct occurred openly in front of others 20 and that Defendant was well aware of it and, in fact, if it was reported, “you just cut your career 21 short.” (Dkt. No. 68-1 at 84; see Dkt. No. 68-1 at 85, 88–93.) 22 Summary judgment is DENIED on Plaintiff’s gender-based hostile work environment 23 claim. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 59) is 26 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of 1 Defendant on all of Plaintiff’s disability-based claims and her gender-based retaliation claim. 2 The Court DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiff’s gender-based disparate treatment and 3 hostile work environment claims. [4] 5 DATED this 3rd day of May 2021. A [8] John C. Coughenour 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE