Chakravarty v. Peterson

[7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [8] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [9] 10 SANJAY CHAKRAVARTY, et al., CASE NO. C20-1576 MJP 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 v. 13 ERIC PETERSON, et al., 14 Defendants. [15] 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of Burlington’s Motion for 17 Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 46) and Plaintiff Sanjay Chakravarty’s Cross-Motion for 18 Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 47). Having reviewed the Motions, the Oppositions and Replies 19 (Dkt. Nos. 47, 48, 50), and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and 20 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Sanjay Chakravarty brings one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of 23 Burlington “for the acts and omissions of Mayor Steve Sexton and the City Council of the City [24] 1 of Burlington.” (Second Amended Complaint (SAC) ¶ 67.) Chakravarty alleges that Sexton 2 “willfully disregarded” his complaints of “racial discrimination” related to the treatment he 3 received from Eric Peterson, Burlington’s Facilities Maintenance Supervisor. (SAC ¶ 69.) He 4 also alleges that Sexton interfered with Chakravarty’s ability to participate in a bid from 5 Burlington for cleaning supplies by failing to inform Chakravarty of the bid “despite earlier 6 assurances to . . . Chakravarty by . . . Sexton that he would.” (SAC ¶ 70.) And Chakravarty 7 alleges Sexton acquiesced to the racial discrimination he suffered from Peterson, “by simply 8 ignoring it and/or refusing to investigate and/or refusing to rescind the bid.” (SAC ¶ 72.) 9 According to Chakravarty, Sexton’s failure to investigate the alleged racial discrimination 10 amounts to deliberate indifference. (SAC ¶ 73.) 11 Sexton acknowledges that Chakravarty made allegations of racial discrimination and that 12 he “took Mr. Chakravarty’s allegations very seriously.” (Declaration of Steve Sexton ¶ 5 (Dkt. 13 No. 49).) Sexton met with Chakravarty, Chakravarty’ wife Nupur Kohli, the City Administrator 14 and the Mayor Pro Tem. (Id.) Sexton avers that he told Chakravarty both that he took his 15 allegations seriously and that he believed Peterson’s failure to respond was because he simply 16 busy, and not because he was discriminating against Chakravarty. (Id.) Sexton also let 17 Chakravarty know that a new public bid for janitorial supplies was soon to be announced, and 18 that he could bid on it. (Id. ¶ 6.) Sexton denies stating that he would directly contact Chakravarty 19 when the bid was open because doing so would violate the City Code. (Id.) The bid request for 20 janitorial supplies was made public through a notice in the Skagit Valley Herald. (Id. ¶ 7.) 21 Shortly after the new bid went out, Peterson’s job was eliminated. (See Declaration of 22 Eric Peterson ¶ 16 (Dkt. No. 28).) Chakravarty states that he believed Sexton “impl[ied] to [him] 23 in a private conversation that [Peterson] was being let go due to his conduct” including the racial [24] 1 discrimination Chakravarty alleged. (Declaration of Sanjay Chakravarty ¶¶ 23-25 (Dkt. No. 472 1).) Sexton denies this, stating that “[a]t no point did [I] tell Mr. Chakravarty the reason that Mr. 3 Peterson was no longer employed with the City” and that “[e]mployment status and termination 4 of City employees is not something I discuss with the public or even staff that is not directly 5 involved in those decisions.” (Sexton Decl. ¶ 8.) Sexton’s statement appears consistent with 6 Chakravarty’s own declaration in which Chakravarty states that Sexton only told him that 7 “Peterson was gone” without saying anything more specific. (Chakravarty Decl. ¶ 25.) 8 ANALYSIS 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 11 file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 12 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether 13 an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 14 nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty 15 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is 16 sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248 . The 17 moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence which supports an 18 element essential to the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 19 Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show that there is a 20 genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 . If the nonmoving party fails to establish the 21 existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 22 matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 . [24] 1 B. Chakravarty’s Section 1983 Claim 2 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., “a local 3 government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or 4 agents.” 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, a local government can only be sued “when execution 5 of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 6 acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. The plaintiff must 7 therefore “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of 8 Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citation and quotation omitted). “A policy 9 is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by 10 the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter 11 in question.” Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quotation and 12 citation omitted). A policy can apply to both action and inaction. See Brown v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 13 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016). And as to customs, the Supreme Court has stated that “an act 14 performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate 15 decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant 16 practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 403 . The Ninth Circuit 17 has also recognized, “a custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence 18 of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged 19 or reprimanded.” Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 20 and quotation omitted). 21 Chakravarty also suggests that he is bringing a claim for deliberate indifference against 22 the City of Burlington. To state a claim for deliberate indifference, Chakravarty must make: “(1) 23 a showing of an objectively substantial risk of harm; and (2) a showing that the officials were [24] 1 subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 2 serious harm existed and (a) the official actually drew that inference or (b) that a reasonable 3 official would have been compelled to draw that inference.” Brown v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1146 , 4 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted). 5 Chakravarty has failed to identify any facts to support his claim. Critically, Chakravarty 6 offers no evidence of a widespread policy or custom that was the moving force of his claimed 7 constitutional injury. Chakravarty claims that Sexton did not thoroughly investigate his 8 allegations that Peterson was engaged in discrimination in the bidding process. But he identifies 9 no custom or policy related to this assertion, even if the Court assumes as true that Sexton 10 conducted no investigation. Nor has Chakravarty identified any way in which Sexton interfered 11 with his ability to participate in the bid for janitorial supplies. Even if Chakravarty is correct that 12 Sexton promised to call him when the bid was put out, Sexton has provided uncontroverted 13 evidence that the bid was made public through newspaper publication available to Chakravarty. 14 And, finally, Chakravarty offers no evidence or argument to support his theory that Sexton was 15 deliberately indifferent. 16 CONCLUSION 17 Burlington has put Chakravarty’s allegations of municipal liability to the test. 18 Chakravarty has failed to meet the challenge. He fails to identify any facts in dispute that could 19 support a claim that any municipal policy or custom was the driving force for his alleged 20 constitutional violations. The Court therefore GRANTS Burlington’s Motion and DENIES 21 Chakravarty’s Motion. This Order therefore terminates this matter and judgment shall be 22 separately entered. 23 \\ [24] 1 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 2 Dated October 8, 2021. A [3] 4 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge