Grae-El v. City of Seattle

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON — 8 — AT SEATTLE — 9 — 10 ZION T. GRAE-EL, et al., CASE NO. C21-1678JLR 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER v. — 12 — CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., — 13 — Defendants. — 14 — 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is the portion of Defendants Seattle Children’s Hospital 17 (“Children’s”), Brenda Aguilar, Dr. Hannah Deming, and Dr. Stanford Ackley’s 18 (collectively, the “Children’s Defendants”) motion to dismiss that focuses on Plaintiffs 19 Zion T. Grae-El and Caprice Strange’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. (Mot. (Dkt. # 10) 20 at 5-7; Resp. (Dkt. # 16) at 8; Reply (Dkt. # 28) at 2-4.) The court deferred ruling on this 21 portion of the Children’s Defendants’ motion in order to receive supplemental briefing 22 from the parties addressing whether dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment 1 claims under the immunity provision contained in the Victims of Child Abuse 2 Reauthorization Act of 2018 (“VCARA” or the “Act”), 34 U.S.C. § 20342 (1), would give 3 that statute impermissible retroactive effect. (See 3/1/22 (Dkt. # 57) at 20.) After 4 reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefing, the court declined to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 5 Fourteenth Amendment claims on the basis of VCARA and requested a further 6 supplemental brief from Plaintiffs responding to the Children’s Defendants’ newly raised 7 argument that Plaintiffs had failed to allege conduct that would violate the Fourteenth 8 Amendment altogether. (See 4/4/22 Order (Dkt. # 71) at 11; Children’s Suppl. Br. (Dkt. 9 # 64) at 4-6; Pls. Suppl. Br. (Dkt. # 66).) Plaintiffs have responded and oppose dismissal 10 on that basis. (Pls. 2d Suppl. Br. (Dkt. # 72).) 11 The court has considered all of the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of 12 the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS the 13 Children’s Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim. 14 II. ANALYSIS 15 Plaintiffs allege that, in the course of conducting the medical evaluations of their 16 children, the Children’s Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights of 17 familial association. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1) at 47.) The Children’s Defendants now argue 18 that the court should dismiss this claim because Plaintiffs “cannot attribute any conduct 19 to the Moving Defendants that constitutes a violation of their federal rights.” (See 20 // — 21 — 1 Plaintiffs have requested oral argument (see Resp. at 1; Pls. Suppl. Br. at 1; Pls. 2d Suppl. Br. at 1), but the court concludes that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition — 22 — of the motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 1 Children’s Suppl. Br. at 5.) Specifically, the Children’s Defendants argue that the 2 examination of the children without their parents in attendance states a claim, if at all, 3 against the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) officers responsible for placing the 4 children in protective custody. (Id.) The Children’s Defendants further argue that, even 5 if they could be liable for separating the children from their parents, the subsequent 6 initiation of legal proceedings against Plaintiffs “severs the chain of liability” against 7 them, absent allegations that they exercised or interfered with the Washington 8 Department of Youth, Children & Families’ (“DCYF”) prosecutorial discretion. (See id. 9 at 5-6 (first citing Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008); and then 10 citing Capp v. Cty. of San Diego, F3d 1046, 1060 (9th Cir. 2019)).) 11 “The Supreme Court has stated that ‘the interest of parents in the care, custody, 12 and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 13 recognized by this Court.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2018) 14 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion)). “[T]he right to 15 familial association” has “both a substantive and a procedural component.” Id. Thus, 16 “[w]hile the right is a fundamental liberty interest, officials may interfere with the right if 17 they provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Id. (citations and quotation 18 marks omitted); Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121 , 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) 19 (“A parent’s interest in the custody and care of his or her children is a constitutionally 20 protected liberty interest, such that due process must be afforded prior to a termination of 21 parental status.”). However, only “[o]fficial conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in 22 // 1 depriving parents of [a relationship with their children] is cognizable as a violation of due 2 process.’” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). 3 Plaintiffs allege that the Children’s Defendants interfered with their familial 4 association rights when they examined their children using substandard interview tactics; 5 omitted information from their eventual report to DCYF that might have suggested an 6 innocent explanation for markings on the children; allowed inexperienced healthcare 7 providers to participate in medical evaluations without adequate supervision; and, 8 ultimately, arrived at incorrect findings that they relayed to DCYF. (See Compl. at 269 27, 45-47; see also Pls. 2d Suppl. Br. at 2 (emphasizing same).) Even if these allegations 10 suggest that the Children’s Defendants were negligent (3/1/22 Order at 12), “[m]ere 11 negligence or lack of due care by . . . officials in the conduct of their duties” is not 12 sufficient to “trigger the substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth 13 Amendment.” Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126 (dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where 14 officials were alleged to have negligently, and in violation of state law, removed a child 15 from their home). And notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Children’s 16 Defendants engaged in “gross medical negligence” or “intentional malice” (Pls. 2d Suppl. 17 Br. at 2), none of the facts Plaintiffs allege in their complaint suggests that the Children’s 18 Defendants engaged in “conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’” during their evaluation of 19 the children, Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554 . (See Compl. at 26-27, 45-47.) 20 Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that the Children’s Defendants were responsible 21 for removing the children and placing them into protective custody. (See Compl. at 2622 27, 45-47; see also Pls. 2d Suppl. Br. at 4 (arguing that “SPD remov[ed] the children 1 unconstitutionally and DCYF [brought] them to the [emergency room] without 2 emergency needs”).) Rather, all they allege the Children’s Defendants did was relay their 3 examination findings to DCYF, which opened “[a]n additional [i]nvestigation,” and to 4 SPD, which “utilized photos, statements, and findings from [the Children’s Defendants]” 5 in their prosecution of Plaintiffs. (See Compl. at 46.) But Plaintiffs do not allege that the 6 Children’s Defendants exercised any control over whether DCYF and SPD took these 7 steps and being “subjected to an investigation” is not, on its own, “cognizable as a 8 violation of the liberty interest in familial relations.” See Capp v. Cty. of San Diego, 940 9 F.3d 1046, 1060 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of Fourteenth Amendment claim 10 where the plaintiff failed to allege that he “actually lost custody of his children as a result 11 of Defendants’ alleged misconduct”). 12 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for a deprivation of their 13 familial association rights without due process is DISMISSED without prejudice. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Children’s Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 16 Fourteenth Amendment claim (Dkt. # 10) is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED 17 without prejudice. Further, because the court has fully addressed each of the dispositive 18 motions filed against the original complaint, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to file an amended 19 complaint, if any, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. 20 Plaintiffs may amend any claims against any defendant that have been dismissed 21 without prejudice. In doing so, Plaintiffs should be mindful of the deficiencies identified 22 by the court and should focus on alleging non-conclusory factual statements that will 1 support each element of their claims. A longer complaint will not necessarily be a 2 successful one; indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only “a short and 3 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. 4 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs must also comply with the court’s local rules, including its 5 rules for formatting pleadings and other filings. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 10(e). 6 Finally, while the names of minor children must be reduced “to the initials,” see id. LCR 7 5.2(a)(2), Plaintiffs should otherwise use initials or other abbreviations only sparingly in 8 order to enhance the clarity of their submissions to the court. 9 Dated this 22nd day of April, 2022. — 10 — A — 11 — 12 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 —