Robey v. City of Seattle

[7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [8] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [10] WILLIAM ROBEY, CASE NO. 22-CV-00685-LK [11] Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 12 v. COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 13 CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., 14 Defendants. [15] 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff William Robey’s Amended Complaint. 17 Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). On June 1, 2022, the 18 Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend because he 19 failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Dkt. No. 8 at 4–5; see 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because his amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies in his original 21 complaint, the Court dismisses this case with prejudice. See Dkt. No. 8 at 5. 22 In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, he advances two theories that he presented in his original 23 complaint and adds two new theories. As in his original complaint, his amended complaint asserts 24 that a biennial home inspection scheduled by the Seattle Housing Authority (“SHA”) violates the 1 Fourth Amendment and constitutes kidnapping. Dkt. No. 10 at 2–3. For the reasons stated in this 2 Court’s previous order, Dkt. No. 8, these assertions fail to state a claim and therefore must be 3 dismissed. The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s new legal theories. 4 First, Plaintiff suggests that the contract between his landlord and SHA pursuant to the 5 Housing Choice Voucher Program is illegal and thus void. Dkt. No. 10 at 1. But Plaintiff does not 6 explain his basis for asserting that the contract is illegal or otherwise supply the necessary factual 7 support to transform his allegations into plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 8 662, 678 (2009). Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. 9 Second, Plaintiff recasts his Fourth Amendment claim as one arising under Washington’s 10 analogous constitutional provision, which mandates that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his 11 private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7; see Dkt. 12 No. 10 at 2. This provision “is qualitatively different from the Fourth Amendment and provides 13 greater protections.” State v. Muhammed, 451 P.3d 1060, 1069 (Wash. 2019). But the Court need 14 not and does not opine on the substantive merits of this claim because the Court lacks jurisdiction 15 over it, even assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff has provided facts sufficient to state a claim 16 under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. 17 “[D]istrict courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Exxon Mobil 18 Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Their jurisdiction is generally confined 19 to (1) claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) claims 20 between citizens of different States when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 21 U.S.C. §§ 1331 , 1332(a). These types of claims are generally referred to as federal law claims. 22 Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that accompany 23 federal law claims in a complaint, the Supreme Court has cautioned against it in circumstances 24 like these. Specifically, if the plaintiff’s federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the factors 1 to be considered in determining whether to exercise such jurisdiction over state law claims— 2 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—usually “will point toward declining to 3 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 4 U.S. 343 , 350 n.7 (1988). That is the case here. Plaintiff’s legal theory under federal law fails to 5 state a claim, meaning his state constitutional claim is the only possibly viable claim before the 6 Court. Heeding the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be 7 avoided” by federal courts, the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state 8 constitutional claim. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]f the 9 federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). 10 Plaintiff has also embedded in his amended complaint motions for a preliminary injunction, 11 “continuance of this case,” and “transfer under FRCP 27.”1 Dkt. No. 10 at 5. The Court denies 12 these requests. For the reasons explained in the Court’s previous Order, Plaintiff is not entitled to 13 injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 8 at 4–5. Nor is he entitled to a continuance or transfer. The Court has 14 screened his amended complaint and found that it fails to state a claim. Therefore, pursuant to 15 section 1915(e)(2)(B), there is no case to transfer and there is no case schedule to continue.2 16 The Court stated that it would dismiss Plaintiff’s case with prejudice if he failed to “file an 17 amended complaint that correct[ed] the noted deficiencies and me[t] the required pleading 18 standards[.]” Dkt. No. 8 at 5. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES his amended complaint with 19 prejudice. The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to Plaintiff at his last 20 known address. [21] 22 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 relates to perpetuation of testimony. 2 Twenty-one days after Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, he filed a “Federal Criminal Complaint.” Dkt. No. 11. [23] The Court construes this as an improper second amended complaint and strikes it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (after first amended complaint, a party may amend its pleadings “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 24 court’s leave”). 1 Dated this 12th day of July, 2022. 2 A 3 Lauren King United States District Judge