Carter v. University of Washington School of Dentistry

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 7 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 LEONARD CARTER, ) ) CASE NO. C22-551-RSM 10 Plaintiff, ) ) — 11 — v. ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 12 ) UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON ) 13 SCHOOL OF DENTISTRY, ) 14 ) Defendant. ) 15 ) — 16 — I. INTRODUCTION — 17 — Before the court are (1) pro se Plaintiff Leonard Carter’s complaint against the — 18 — 19 University of Washington School of Dentistry (the “School of Dentistry) (Dkt. # 5)); and (2) 20 Magistrate Michelle L. Peterson’s order granting Mr. Carter in forma pauperis — 21 — (“IFP”) status and recommending that the court review this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. — 22 — § 1915(e)(2)(B) (Dkt. # 4)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), courts have authority to review IFP — 23 — 24 complaints and must dismiss them if, “at any time,” a complaint is 25 determined to be frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be 26 granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). As discussed below, Mr. Carter’s complaint falls within the — 28 — category of pleadings that fail to state a claim. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Mr. — 1 — Carter’s complaint with leave to amend. — 2 — 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Mr. Carter brings this lawsuit against the School of Dentistry alleging that it denied him — 5 — previously promised dental services and as a result engaged in discriminatory conduct. Dkt. #5 — 6 — at 4–5. — 7 — 8 Mr. Carter alleges that in August 2015, the School of Dentistry informed him they 9 would straighten his teeth using Invisalign for two years and then provide him with teeth — 10 — implant services thereafter. Id. at 4 . Mr. Carter claims the School of Dentistry did in fact — 11 — provide him with two years of orthodontal work, but then denied him teeth implant services. — 12 — Id. He alleges that the School of Dentistry’s conduct was in violation of (1) “the Civil Rights — 13 — 14 Act of 1964 by U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson”; (2) RCW 9.91.010; 15 and (3) RCW 49.06.050. He asks the Court “for twenty thousand dollars for four teeth — 16 — implants” and “for nine-hundred and ninety-nine million dollars for both mental and emotional — 17 — distress.” Id. at 4–5. — 18 — III. ANALYSIS — 19 — 20 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) authorizes a district court to dismiss a claim filed IFP 21 “at any time” if it determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the action fails to — 22 — state a claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. — 23 — See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2) parallels the language of Federal Rules of — 24 — 25 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000). The 26 complaint therefore must allege facts that plausibly establish the defendant’s liability. See Bell — 27 — Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Because Mr. Carter is a pro se plaintiff, — 28 — the court must construe his pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 , 1055 — 1 — (9th Cir. 1992). But even liberally construed, Mr. Carter’s complaint fails to plausibly establish — 2 — 3 the Defendant’s liability or raise his “right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, — 4 — 550 U.S. at 555 . — 5 — Mr. Carter alleges three bases for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction of this case: — 6 — (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) RCW 9.91.010; and (3) RCW 49.06.050. 1 Both RCW — 7 — 8 9.91.010 and RCW 49.06.050 are Washington state statutes and cannot serve as a basis for 9 federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over — 10 — cases “arising under” federal law). The Court assumes Mr. Carter intended to assert a federal — 11 — claim for discrimination in public accommodations under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of — 12 — 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. While a Title II claim would support federal question jurisdiction — 13 — 14 over this case, Mr. Carter’s complaint does not plausibly establish Defendant’s liability. 15 First, the enforcement provision of Title II contains a notice requirement, which — 16 — prohibits a plaintiff from bringing a civil action “before the expiration of thirty days after — 17 — written notice of such alleged act or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local — 18 — authority,” if such state has a law “prohibiting such act or practice and establishing or — 19 — 20 authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 21 2000a-3(c). Washington has a law prohibiting discrimination based on race in places of public — 22 — accommodation, and the Washington Human Rights Commission (“HRC”) has authority to — 23 — grant relief from such discrimination. See RCW 49.60.030(1)(b); RCW 49.60.120(4); RCW — 24 — 25 49.60.215(1); RCW 49.60.230. Because there is a state law prohibiting racial discrimination in — 26 — 27 1 Because Mr. Carter and The School of Dentistry are citizens of Washington, this court cannot not have diversity jurisdiction over this case. See Dkt. #5. at 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over civil cases 28 where the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000 and where the dispute is between citizens of different states). places of public accommodation and an agency authorized to grant relief for such conduct, a — 1 — plaintiff bringing a civil action for a Title II claim of racial discrimination in Washington must — 2 — 3 first file written notice with the HRC at least thirty days before bringing any action in federal 4 court. See Ramirez v. Hart, No. C13-5873RJB, 2014 WL 2170376 , at *6 (W.D. Wash. May — 5 — 23, 2014). Here, Mr. Carter has not pleaded that he filed written notice with the HRC at least — 6 — thirty days before filing suit. (See Dkt. #5.) As a result, his claim is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 7 8 2000a-3(c). 9 Second, damages are not available for violations of Title II. See Pickern v. Holiday — 10 — Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park — 11 — Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). Rather, the sole private remedy is an injunction under — 12 — 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3. See id. Thus, because Mr. Carter seeks only damages as a remedy for the — 13 — 14 Defendant’s alleged discrimination, he cannot recover the relief he seeks under Title II. See 15 Dkt. #5 at 4–5. — 16 — Finally, Mr. Carter's claims are barred by the statute of limitations for a Title II claim. — 17 — Because Title II does not specify a time limit for bringing an action, courts look to the state — 18 — statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3; see also Soto v. — 19 — 20 Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not 21 specify a statute of limitations, courts borrow the statute of limitations for state-law personal — 22 — injury claims). Washington’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is three years. — 23 — See RCW 4.16.080(1). Here, the actions that form the basis of Mr. Carter’s claims took place — 24 — 25 in August 2015—more than three years before the April 25, 2022, filing date of his complaint. 26 See Dkt. #5. at 4. As a result, Mr. Carter’s Title II claims based on Defendant’s 2015 conduct — 27 — are barred by the statute of limitations. — 28 — For these reasons, the court concludes that Mr. Carter’s complaint fails to state a claim — 1 — against the School of Dentistry and dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2 3 1915(e)(2)(B). When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff's complaint, however, the court must 4 give the plaintiff leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that amendment could not cure the — 5 — defects. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the court grants — 6 — Mr. Carter fourteen (14) days to file an amended complaint that properly addresses the pleading — 7 — 8 deficiencies identified in this order. If Mr. Carter fails to timely comply with this order or fails 9 to file an amended complaint that corrects the identified deficiencies, the court will dismiss his — 10 — complaint without leave to amend. — 11 — IV. CONCLUSION — 12 — For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Mr. Carter’s complaint (Dkt. #5) for — 13 — 14 failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), with leave to amend within fourteen 15 (14) days of the filing of this order. — 16 — DATED this 22nd day of August, 2022. — 17 — 18 A — 19 — RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 20 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —