Wright v. Pierce County Jail

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA — 6 — JOSEPH SCOTT WRIGHT , Case No. 3:22-cv-5672-JCC-TLF 7 Petitioner, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE — 8 — PIERCE COUNTY, — 9 — Respondent. — 10 — 11 This matter comes before the Court on petitioner’s application to proceed in 12 forma pauperis and proposed habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Dkt. 1. 13 Petitioner is proceeding pro se, and the petition has not been served on respondents. 14 Under Rule 4 of the rules governing § 2254 cases, the Court must promptly 15 examine a habeas corpus petition when it is filed, and if it plainly appears from the 16 petition and its attachments the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court must dismiss 17 the petition. 18 It appears that the petition – on its face – is subject to dismissal. The Court will 19 provide petitioner the opportunity, by November 11, 2022, to show cause why the 20 federal habeas corpus petition should not be dismissed. 21 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner appears to be a pretrial detainee at Pierce County Jail. Dkt. 1-1. 23 Petitioner alleges that in 2016 he pled guilty to one count of unlawful solicitation to — 24 — 1 possess a controlled substance. Dkt. 1-1 at 1-2. The petition states that petitioner has 2 not sought to appeal this conviction to a higher state court and has not filed a petition for 3 certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Dkt. 1-1 at 2-3. Petitioner contends that 4 intervening authority from the Washington State Supreme Court has invalidated 5 petitioner’s conviction. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. 6 Petitioner states that the Pierce County Superior granted a motion to vacate 7 based on the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 8 (2021). Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Further, petitioner contends that the prior sentence violated 9 petitioner’s rights, and petitioner did not previously appeal the sentence because 10 petitioner had not been aware of the relevant authority. Dkt. 1-1 at 5-12. Petitioner 11 seeks as a remedy the dismissal of three criminal cases pending before the Pierce 12 County Superior Court and monetary damages. Dkt. 1-1 at 15. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A prisoner may only use habeas corpus “when they seek to invalidate the 15 duration of their confinement – either directly through an injunction compelling speedier 16 release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the 17 unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) 18 (emphasis in original). Additionally, when a prisoner seeks to challenge the very fact or 19 duration of their physical imprisonment, and seeks immediate or speedier release, their 20 sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 500 21 (1973). “A civil rights action, in contrast, is the proper method of challenging conditions 22 of confinement.” Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations 23 and citations omitted). — 24 — — 1 — 2 A. In Custody Requirement 3 Based on the proposed petition, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over 4 this petition because petitioner is no longer in custody pursuant to the challenged 5 judgment. 6 As a threshold matter, a § 2254 petitioner must show that they are in custody 7 pursuant to a state court judgment. Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 , 8 401 (2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a)). A petitioner is “in custody” when the 9 petitioner suffers “present restraint from a conviction” at the time the petition is filed. 10 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1989). If a petitioner is not in custody pursuant 11 to the challenged judgment, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. 12 Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). When the conviction or sentence 13 under attack has fully expired at the time of the petition is filed, the petition does not 14 meet the “in custody” requirement. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 . 15 A petitioner is “in custody” if he is subject to a significant restraint on his liberty 16 that is not generally shared by the public. Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 17 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Being “in custody” thus includes being on 18 probation (Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005)) and other situations 19 in which one’s freedom is “significantly confine[d] and restrain[ed].” Jones v. 20 Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 21 It appears from the petition that petitioner is no longer in custody pursuant to the 22 challenged judgment. The petition indicates that petitioner is challenging a 2016 — 23 — — 24 — 1 conviction under the case number 16-1-00326-7. Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Petitioner states that the 2 Pierce County Superior Court vacated this conviction. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. 3 If the state court has in fact vacated the conviction and petitioner is no longer 4 incarcerated based on the vacated judgment, petitioner is not in custody for purpose of 5 a habeas petition. 6 Based on the foregoing, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this 7 petition because petitioner is not in custody based on the challenged conviction. 8 B. Exhaustion 9 To the extent that petitioner is still in custody pursuant to the 2016 conviction, it 10 appears that the petitioner is also subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust all state 11 court remedies. 12 A state prisoner is required to exhaust all state court remedies, by fairly presenting 13 claims of violation of federal rights before the state courts, before seeking a writ of federal 14 habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is a matter of comity, 15 intended to afford the state courts the “initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 16 violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) 17 (emphasis added). This is appropriate, because “state courts, like federal courts, are 18 obliged to enforce federal law.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). To 19 properly exhaust federal claims, a would-be federal habeas corpus petitioner must finish 20 “one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,” up to the 21 highest state court with powers of discretionary review. Id., at 845 . 22 A federal court must dismiss a federal habeas corpus petition if its claims are 23 unexhausted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). This Court has the sua — 24 — 1 sponte authority to examine the question of exhaustion at this stage of review. Campbell 2 v. Crist, 647 F.2d 956, 957 (9th Cir. 1981) (“This court may consider whether state 3 remedies have been exhausted even if the state does not raise the issue”). 4 Petitioner acknowledges that he has not appealed his underlying criminal 5 conviction. Petitioner must raise the grounds for relief contained in his habeas petition to 6 the Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court before his petition is 7 eligible for federal habeas review. 8 C. Younger Abstention 9 The pending petition also appears to be subject to dismissal under the Younger 10 Doctrine because petitioner is requesting that the Court intervene in pending criminal 11 proceedings before the Pierce County Superior Court. 12 Federal courts must abstain from interfering in pending state criminal 13 prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 , 45 14 (1971). This applies when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the 15 proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in 16 the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief 17 seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial 18 proceeding. Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128 , 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Page v. 19 King, 932 F.3d 898, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2019)). 20 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that even if all the Younger factors are satisfied, 21 a federal court will not invoke Younger if the petitioner can make a showing of bad faith, 22 harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstances making abstention 23 inappropriate. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133; Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th — 24 — 1 Cir. 2018) (acknowledging an irreparable harm exception to the Younger abstention 2 doctrine when the danger of irreparable loss is great and immediate.); see also, 3 MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1970) (Ninth Circuit reversed the 4 District Court and directed that a habeas corpus petition be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 5 2241 pre-trial, because petitioner’s due process rights were violated by a deputy 6 prosecutor’s revival of a charge that was “[an] attempt. . .to hamper [petitioner] in 7 asserting, by civil action, both state and federal civil rights”.). 8 The Ninth Circuit has applied the irreparable harm exception to claims raised by 9 pretrial detainees: 10 (1) where a pretrial detainee presents “[a] colorable claim that a state prosecution [would] violate the Double Jeopardy Clause” Dominguez v. 11 Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127 , 1131 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2018) 12 (2) where a petitioner raises a due process challenge to their pretrial detention in the context of a state civil sexually violent predator 13 proceeding. Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901-902 (9th Cir. 2019). 14 (3) where a petitioner raises a due process claim based on the forcible injection of antipsychotic medications during trial. Bean, 986 F.3d at 113515 36 16 The courts have refused to apply this exception to speedy trial claims because this right 17 can be vindicated by the reversal of the improper conviction, while unlawful pretrial 18 detention cannot be vindicated post-trial. Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128 , 1134 (9th 19 Cir. 2021). 20 This action satisfies the factors for the Court to abstain from considering 21 petitioner’s claims under the Younger doctrine. Petitioner requests that the Court 22 dismiss three pending criminal cases currently before the Pierce County Superior Court. 23 Dkt. 1-1 at 15. The proposed petition does not explain whether these pending cases are — 24 — 1 related to challenged 2016 state judgment. The pending criminal proceedings implicate 2 an important state interest – enforcing and prosecuting state laws. There is no indication 3 that petitioner would be unable to raise in state court any constitutional challenges 4 during the pending criminal trials. The requested relief would have the practical effect of 5 enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding. 6 Accordingly, the Court must abstain from considering this action -- unless 7 petitioner can make a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and the 8 irreparable harm exception applies to this case. Petitioner has not made a showing of 9 extraordinary circumstances such that the Younger doctrine should not be applied. 10 D. Monetary Damages 11 It also appears that petitioner seeks to obtain monetary relief as remedies for 12 allegations that may be related to assertions of civil rights violations or tortious acts 13 under state law alleged in this petition. Dkt. 1-1, at 15. The District Court’s habeas 14 corpus jurisdiction is limited to a challenge to the legality of petitioner’s custody – and 15 the remedy is limited to the fact or duration of confinement; therefore, remedies such as 16 damages, or an injunction, are not available. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 49917 500 (1973). The petitioner is required to remove those allegations of harm that are not 18 related to the fact of, or the duration of, his confinement -- and is required to remove the 19 requests for damages or injunctive relief -- if he decides to file an amended habeas 20 corpus petition. 21 If petitioner wishes to pursue damages or injunctive relief as remedies for alleged 22 civil rights violations or state law torts, a different cause of action might be appropriate, — 23 — — 24 — 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or other federal or state laws. Those remedies are not 2 cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition. — 3 — — 4 — 5 CONCLUSION 6 Based on the foregoing discussion, the petition appears to be facially deficient 7 and subject to dismissal. The Court orders petitioner to file an amended petition 8 correcting – if possible – the deficiencies identified herein, or show cause in writing why 9 this petition should not be dismissed. Petitioner must file an amended petition or show 10 cause by November 11, 2022. 11 If petitioner intends to file a civil rights complaint (rather than challenging the 12 validity of his conviction and sentence, and the fact or duration of custody), petitioner 13 must bring an independent lawsuit and a different complaint; he cannot amend the 14 current habeas petition to include civil rights allegations. 15 Dated this 17th day of October, 2022. — 16 — — 17 — a — 18 — Theresa L. Fricke United States Magistrate Judge — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 —