Abu Seleh v. Washington State Department of Transportation

[1] HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES [7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [9] 10 ADNAN ABU SELEH, a resident of the 11 State of Washington, on behalf of himself CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00457-RAJ and his marital community, 12 ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff, DEFENDANT’S MOTION [13] FOR JUDGMENT ON THE v. 14 PLEADINGS 15 WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF [16] TRANSPORTATION, [17] Defendants. [19] I. INTRODUCTION [20] This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the [21] Pleadings (“Motion”). Dkt. # 17. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Dkt. # 19. For the [22] reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s amended [23] complaint with prejudice. [24] II. BACKGROUND [25] In November 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Washington state court for claims [26] arising out of his employment at the Washington State Department of Transportation [27] 1 (“WSDOT”). Dkt. # 17-1. Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to discrimination, a 2 hostile work environment, and retaliation based upon race, national origin, religion and 3 disability. Id. at 2. He complained that he was denied promotions, experienced 4 unwarranted discipline and negative performance reviews, and was subjected to 5 harassment, theft, investigation, and a lack of meaningful work. Id. at 3. About a year 6 after the complaint was filed, in October 2019, WSDOT terminated Plaintiff from his 7 employment. Dkt. # 17-2 at 5. In April 2020, Plaintiff amended his complaint to include 8 allegations for wrongful termination. Id. In May 2020, the parties settled the action with a 9 Stipulated Judgment under Civil Rule 68. Dkt. # 17-4. In June 2020, the court approved 10 and entered the Stipulated Judgment. Id. 11 In April 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging that he was subject 12 to discrimination, a hostile work environment and retaliation based upon race, national 13 origin, age and sex. See Dkt. # 1. He alleged that WSDOT denied him promotions and 14 training, and then wrongfully terminated him. Id. In August 2021, Plaintiff amended his 15 complaint. Dkt. # 9. The amended complaint includes claims under Title VI and Title VII 16 of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . Id. In June 2022, Defendant moved for 17 judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. # 17. 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A. FRCP 12(c) 20 Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 12(c). In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must accept all factual 22 allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 23 non-moving party. Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004). Judgment on the 24 pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the 25 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. 26 v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526 , 528 (9th Cir. 1997). 27 Generally, a court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on 1 a Rule 12(c) motion, but a “court may consider facts that are contained in materials of 2 which the court may take judicial notice.” Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [3] 189 F.3d 971 , 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the 4 preclusion context, a federal court may take judicial notice of the record in a earlier 5 proceeding. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022 , 1037 6 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the 7 Court takes judicial notice of documents within the parties’ state court case. Dkt. ## 178 1–17-5. 9 IV. DISCUSSION 10 A. Claim preclusion bars Plaintiff’s Title VI and Title VII claims 11 In its motion, WSDOT argues that claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars 12 Plaintiff’s Title VI and Title VII claims. Dkt. # 17 at 2-3. Plaintiff argues that claim 13 preclusion does not apply here because his federal discrimination claims are both 14 factually and legally distinct from his prior state law claims. Dkt. # 19 at 2. Additionally, 15 Plaintiff contends that a stipulated judgment is not a judgment “on the merits,” and thus 16 has no preclusive effect. Id. For the reasons below, the Court agrees with Defendant. 17 Federal courts “determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment by 18 applying that state’s preclusion principles.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. 19 Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Washington law, claim preclusion 20 “prohibits the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated, or could have been 21 litigated, in a prior action.” Karlberg v. Otten, 167 Wash.App. 522, 535 (2012). “The 22 threshold requirement of [claim preclusion] is a final judgment on the merits in the prior 23 suit.” Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash.2d 853, 865 (2004). After 24 establishing that requirement, the moving party must show that the subsequent action is 25 identical with the prior action in four respects: “(1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) 26 persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is 27 made.” Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 663 (1983). 1 1. Final judgment on the merits. 2 The parties disagree on whether the Rule 68 judgment in the first action 3 constitutes a final judgment. Washington case law does not squarely address the issue, 4 noting only that a stipulated dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment for purposes of 5 claim preclusion. Berschauer Phillips Const. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 175 Wn. 6 App. 222, 228 n.11 (2013). 7 However, Washington’s Civil Rule 68 is virtually identical to Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 68. Lietz v. Hansen L. Offs., P.S.C., 271 P.3d 899, 904 (2012). Thus, in 9 the absence of state authority, Washington courts look to federal interpretation of the 10 equivalent rule. Id. Federal courts have generally concluded that an accepted Rule 68 11 offer constitutes a final judgment for purposes of claim preclusion. See, e.g., California 12 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 691 Fed.Appx. 433 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (affirming 13 district court’s finding of res judicata where first lawsuit resulted in a Rule 68 judgment); 14 Wilkes v. Wyoming Dept. of Employment Division of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501 , 504 15 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding judgment entered pursuant to Rule 68 Offer of Judgment 16 constitutes final judgment for purposes of res judicata). Given this authority, the Court 17 finds that the parties’ Rule 68 judgment in the prior action constitutes a final judgment 18 for purposes of claim preclusion. 19 2. Identity in subject matter. 20 The subject matter between the two actions is identical. Washington courts have 21 not articulated a precise test to determine whether subject matter is identical, but the 22 critical factors are “the nature of the claim or cause of action” and “the nature of the 23 parties.” Eugster v. Washington State Bar Ass’n, 397 P.3d 131, 147 (2017); Marshall v. 24 Thurston Cty., 267 P.3d 491 (2011). In both suits, Plaintiff alleges that WSDOT 25 discriminated and retaliated against him in the conditions of his employment. The subject 26 matter in both actions is identical and the first requirement for application of res judicata 27 is met. 1 3. Identity in cause of action. 2 The cause of action between the two actions is identical. Washington courts use a 3 four-factor test for determining whether there is an identity in the causes of action. 4 Emeson v. Dep’t of Corr., 376 P.3d 430, 437 (2016). Courts evaluate (1) whether the 5 rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be impaired by prosecution of 6 the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two 7 actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether 8 the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Id. 9 Plaintiff argues that the WLAD confers “independent statutory rights” and so there 10 cannot be an identity in the cause of action. Dkt. # 19 at 6. But as Defendant correctly 11 points out, Washington law makes clear that federal employment discrimination claims 12 (such as claims under Title VI and Title VII) and claims under Washington’s 13 discrimination statute have an identity in the causes of action where the claims rely on the 14 same facts. See Dkt. # 17 at 12. In Emeson v. Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Wash.App. 617 15 (2016), a Washington appeals court held that two suits, one under Title VII and another 16 under Washington state law, met this requirement. Both suits alleged claims regarding the 17 defendant’s failure to reasonably accommodate plaintiff’s disabilities, a hostile 18 environment based on race/national origin and disability, and wrongful termination. Id. at 19 624. Both suits stemmed from the same nucleus of operative facts and would require 20 proof by substantially similar evidence. Id. at 629, 635. The rights established in the 21 previous judgment would thus be impaired by a subsequent judgment. Id. at 629. 22 This case is no different. Plaintiff brings claims for employment discrimination 23 and retaliation based on the same operative events of the first action—i.e., his lack of 24 promotion and opportunities, and then the termination of his employment.1 Both suits [26] 1 Plaintiff states that res judicata cannot apply because his termination of employment 27 followed the filing of the initial complaint in state court. Dkt. # 19 at 7. This argument is 1 would require proof by substantially similar evidence. The rights established in the 2 previous judgment would be undone by a judgment in this action. 3 4. Identity in persons and parties; and the quality of the persons for or 4 against whom the claim is made. 5 The third and fourth elements are also satisfied here. The third and fourth 6 factors—identity of the parties and persons against whom the claims are made—are 7 satisfied where the parties are identical. DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 1 P.3d 587 (2000). The 8 parties are the same in this suit as they were in the state court lawsuit. Although Plaintiff 9 adds his marital party to this suit, there is no question as to the privity between the parties 10 to the first suit and the parties to the second suit. Landry v. Luscher, 976 P.2d 1274 , 1278 11 (1999). 12 *** 13 Because all of the claim preclusion factors are met, the Court concludes that 14 Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims under Title VI and Title VII are barred by res 15 judicata. 16 B. The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 17 WSDOT argues that the Eleventh Amendment shields it from claims under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1981 . The Court agrees. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]here is no doubt that 19 suit under either §§ 1981 or 1983 against [a state agency] is a suit against the state qua 20 state and is, therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 21 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 22 U.S. 89 , 101-103 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity extends to state [24] without merit. First, Plaintiff amended his state court complaint in June 2020, adding [25] allegations of wrongful termination. And in any event, a plaintiff’s federal claims are not 26 exempt from res judicata where they failed to obtain right to sue letter during pendency of the first action. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 27 2001). 1 agencies and to damage claims against state officials acting in their official capacity). 2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim must be dismissed with prejudice. 3 V. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and dismisses 5 Plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice. Dkt. # 17. [6] 7 Dated this 7th day of December, 2022. [8] A [10] The Honorable Richard A. Jones [11] United States District Judge