Seabourn Cruise Line Limited v. Goldring

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 8 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA — 9 — — 10 — SEABOURNE CRUISE LINE LIMITED, a CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00999-DGE11 Bermuda corporation; and HOLLAND AMERICA LINE N.V., a Curacao BAT 12 corporation, ORDER DENYING 13 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO v. WITHDRAW CONSENT (DKT. 14 NO. 90) ERIC J. GOLDRING an individual; and 15 GOLDRING TRAVEL, LLC, a California limited liability company, — 16 — Defendants. — 17 — — 18 — I INTRODUCTION — 19 — This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Eric J. Goldring and Goldring Travel, — 20 — LLC’s motion to withdraw consent and vacate the reference of this matter to United States — 21 — Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida (Dkt. No. 90). For the reasons articulated, the Court — 22 — DENIES Defendants’ motion. — 23 — — 24 — 1 II BACKGROUND 2 The procedural and factual background of this case has been discussed at length in prior 3 orders. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 42 at 2–3; 64 at 2–4.) The Court thus briefly recounts the 4 procedural background relevant to this motion. 5 Defendants removed this case to federal court on July 19, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) Upon 6 removal, the matter was referred to Judge Tsuchida pursuant to Second Amended General Order 7 02−19. (See Dkt. No. 5.) Neither party declined consent to Judge Tsuchida, and the parties were 8 deemed to have consented to the referral on August 12, 2022. (Dkt. No. 19.) On November 10, 9 2022, Defendants filed a motion to withdraw their consent and vacate the referral to Judge 10 Tsuchida. (Dkt. No. 90.) Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to the referral on December 11 6, 2022. (Dkt. No. 101.) 12 III DISCUSSION 13 A. Legal Standard — 14 — 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) permits a magistrate judge, with the parties’ consent, to “conduct 15 any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the 16 case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he 17 serves.” Id. Once the parties consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, the parties do not 18 possess a unilateral right to revoke consent and a district court may only revoke the referral to 19 the magistrate judge “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary 20 circumstances shown by any party.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(4) (emphasis added); see also Savoca 21 v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 3d 716, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Once a party moves to withdraw 22 consent from the magistrate judge, only a district court may rule on the motion. Branch v. 23 Umphenour, 936 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Branch I”). — 24 — — 1 — 28 U.S.C. § 636 does not define “good cause” or “extraordinary circumstances,” but the 2 Ninth Circuit has held that these terms constitute a ‘“a high bar that is difficult to satisfy,’ and is 3 intended to ‘prevent[ ] gamesmanship.’ Neither mere dissatisfaction with a magistrate judge's 4 decision, nor unadorned accusations that such decisions reflect judicial bias, will suffice.” 5 Branch I, 936 F.3d at 1004 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Savoca, 6 199 F. Supp. at 721). Factual and legal errors alone are not sufficient to indicate bias nor are 7 allegations that the magistrate judge “exhibited bias by accepting . . . [another party’s] allegedly 8 erroneous legal arguments.” Branch v. Umphenour, 851 F. App’x 732 , 733 (9th Cir. 2021) 9 (“Branch II”); see also Branch v. Umphenour, No. 108CV1655SABPC, 2020 WL 417534 , at *5 10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) (“even if there are some errors . . . there is always a risk that any judge, 11 be it a magistrate judge, a district judge, or an appellate justice, will make an error.”). Some 12 factors that courts may consider in determining whether to revoke consent to the magistrate 13 judge include: 14 undue delay, inconvenience to the court and witnesses, prejudice to the parties, whether the movant is acting pro se, whether consent was voluntary and 15 uncoerced, whether the motion is made in good faith or is dilatory and contrived, possibility of bias or prejudice on the part of the magistrate, and whether 16 the interests of justice would best be served by holding a party to his consent. 17 Carter v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). 18 B. Defendants’ Assertions of Bias are Unfounded 19 Defendants argue that vacatur of the referral is warranted not “simply because the 20 magistrate has consistently ruled against Goldring/Goldring Travel, but rather the manner and 21 basis upon which he has.” (Dkt. No. 90 at 12.) Defendants offer no external evidence to indicate 22 that Judge Tsuchida is biased. Rather, they rely on conclusory statements and point to the merits — 23 — — 24 — 1 of Judge Tsuchida’s rulings to argue that alleged factual and legal errors indicate that “the 2 magistrate has ‘pre-judged’ this case.” (Id.) 3 The case law is clear that dissatisfaction with a magistrate judge’s rulings, absent other 4 evidence, is not sufficient to vacate consent. See, e.g., Branch II, 851 F. App’x at 733; Milhous 5 v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 221 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It is equally 6 clear that no ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were shown here but, rather, the plaintiff simply was 7 displeased with the magistrate's rulings on the motions to dismiss.”); Ball v. Colvin, No. CV-128 01574-PHX-SMM, 2014 WL 2569059 , at *2 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2014) (“Plaintiff's disagreement 9 with Magistrate Judge Bade’s ruling does not constitute good cause or extraordinary 10 circumstances.”); M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. McGill, No. 10-CV-1436-PHX-ECV, 2011 11 WL 2464184 , at *2 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2011) (“Dissatisfaction with the magistrate judge's rulings 12 does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”); Montano v. Solomon, No. 2:07-CV-0800 13 KJN P, 2010 WL 2403389 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2010) (“A party’s disagreement with a 14 reasonable court ruling constitutes neither good cause nor extraordinary circumstance for 15 withdrawing consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.”). 16 The Court has reviewed the record and Judge Tsuchida’s rulings and sees no indication of 17 bias nor prejudice. Defendants knowingly consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. 18 (Dkt. No. 19). Though the Defendants are acting pro se, Defendant Goldring, who represents 19 both parties, is “is an attorney at law licensed, and in good standing, in both New Jersey and 20 Florida, and . . . has successfully litigated . . . cases” in various federal district and appellate 21 courts. (Dkt. No. 17 at 1.) Given Defendant Goldring’s significant federal court experience, 22 Defendants should be well aware of the consequences of consenting to a referral to a magistrate 23 judge. — 24 — 1 Weighing the factors enumerated in Carter, the Court concludes that Defendants’ 2 conclusory allegations of bias do not meet the high bar posed by the “good cause” and 3 “extraordinary circumstances” requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(4). The law does not permit 4 the Defendants to forum shop for more favorable rulings simply because they disagree with a 5 judge’s rulings. Allowing Defendants to “withdraw consent at will would undermine the role 6 played by magistrate judges in our judicial system” and would prejudice Plaintiffs. See United 7 States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 1993). Justice is best served by holding the 8 Defendants to their decision to consent to Judge Tsuchida’s jurisdiction. 9 IV CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, and having considered Defendants’ motion (Dkt. No. 90), the briefing of 11 the parties, and the remainder of the record, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 12 Dated this 12th day of December, 2022. — 13 — A — 14 — David G. Estudillo 15 United States District Judge — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 —