McGlown v. United States Department of Commerce

[8] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE [10] 11 MEREDITH MCGLOWN, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00049-TL 12 Plaintiff(s), ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. [13] UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 14 COMMERCE et al, 15 Defendant(s). [16] 17 This matter is before the Court on its own motion, Plaintiff’s motion “to practice pro hac 18 vice” (Dkt. No. 7), and Plaintiff’s motion “for an extreme protection order” (Dkt. No. 10). 19 Having considered the complaint and the relevant record, the Court DECLINES to issue summons, 20 DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), DENIES 21 Plaintiff’s motion to practice pro hac vice, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, 22 as explained below. [24] 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Meredith McGlown1 brings suit against the U.S. Department of Commerce, 3 “The Depository Trust Company,” and “Treasury Retail Services.” Dkt. No. 5 at 2. 4 Ms. McGlown’s allegations and claims are long and difficult to parse. It appears that she 5 primarily seeks damages from Defendants for loans, promissory notes, or other financial 6 agreements that she allegedly engaged in with the U.S. government. E.g., id. at 12 . However, 7 Ms. McGlown also alleges involvement with the CIA, identity theft, terrorism, and other violent 8 crime, as well as that she was enslaved in another country by former U.S. Presidents John F. 9 Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Ulysses S. Grant as well as former Vice President Al Gore, lived 10 on a spaceship, trained “as a mercenary for the Marines,” and participated in the apprehension of 11 notorious Latin American “mob figures” as a civilian. Id. at 10–12. Ms. McGlown’s causes of 12 action are listed as: “Title I, CR 32(cc)(1)(A), CR 32(E)(2), CR 32(F), CR 32(G), Title III GJ 13 Rule 6 Statute 440 + 443, Rule 395 & 420, Title 15 Chapter 2B.” Id. at 3 . She seeks damages in 14 the amount of “1 septvgint and two hundred fifty six zillion dollars.” Id. at 5–7. 15 Ms. McGlown proceeds pro se, or without legal representation. The Magistrate Judge 16 granted Ms. McGlown in forma pauperis status, permitting her to proceed without paying the 17 filing fee, with a recommendation that the complaint be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuance of summons. Dkt. No. 4. No summons has yet issued. 19 Ms. McGlown moves “to practice pro hac vice” (the “PHV Motion”). Dkt. No. 7. While 20 the motion is difficult to read, the Court liberally construes the motion as a request to admit 21 Ms. McGlown as a pro hac vice attorney before this Court and to permit her to submit 22 “evidence,” apparently portions of the Code of Federal Regulations, on a CD. Id. at 1. [23] 1 Ms. McGlown also appears to identify herself as “Emirates of Israel” and “CEEO of Ahmadayyia Foundation 24 Group, LLC [d/b/a] Khalifa’s Essential Choices Inc.” Dkt. No. 5 at 1 (caption in complaint). 1 Ms. McGlown also attaches various forms and statements that she has signed, including an “Oath 2 of Attorney,” “Certificate of Recommendation,” “Petition for Admission to Practice,” and 3 “Application for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice,” in which she represents that she is an attorney 4 who is admitted to the Washington state bar (Bar # 650564). Id. at 4–8. 5 Ms. McGlown also moves “for an extreme protection order” (the “Protective Order 6 Motion”). Dkt. No. 10. The Protective Order Motion is, again, difficult to comprehend. As 7 forgivingly construed as possible, the motion asserts a number of new allegations (similar in 8 nature, if not detail, to those asserted in the Complaint) and seemingly asks that the Court “grant 9 an Extreme Protection Order” against “the tenants of the building, it[s] administrative office 10 employees, the Al Gore administration victims, and the extremist community of religious 11 believers,” ordering that “the animals . . . be removed from the facility.” Id. at 1, 4. 12 No Defendant has appeared in this action. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it is “frivolous or malicious,” 15 “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 16 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 17 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis 18 complaints . . . .”). 19 This Court liberally construes pleadings filed by pro se litigants and holds them “to less 20 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 , 21 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Even so, a court should “not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.” E.g., Henderson v. Anderson, No. C19-789, 2019 WL 23 3996859, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bruns 24 v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251 , 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Khalid v. Microsoft 1 Corp., 409 F. Supp. 3d 1023 , 1031 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“[C]ourts should not have to serve as 2 advocates for pro se litigants.” (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 3 1987))). Also, “it is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, are subject to the 4 same procedural requirements as other litigants.” Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th 5 Cir. 2022). The Court is mindful that it ordinarily must grant leave to amend when it dismisses a 6 pro se complaint, unless the pleading cannot be cured by amendment. E.g., Yagman v. Garcetti, [7] 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming lack of leave to amend where amendment was 8 futile). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 11 A complaint is frivolous for the purposes of dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if “it lacks 12 an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see, 13 e.g., Marcos-Chavela v. Utah, C22-975, 2022 WL 3018242 , at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2022) 14 (dismissing undecipherable complaint against several States with prejudice). “[A] finding of 15 factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts rise to the level of the irrational or wholly 16 incredible,” such as allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. Denton v. Hernandez, [17] 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[W]e are confident that the district courts . . . are in the best position to 18 determine which cases fall into this category.”). In evaluating a complaint for frivolousness, a 19 court is not bound to accept the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, even if they are not clearly 20 rebutted by judicially noticeable facts. Id. at 32 . 21 Even construed liberally, the Complaint is frivolous and must be dismissed. The 22 Complaint offers no recognizable causes of action or relief that the Court can grant, as 23 exemplified by the requested damages amount (“1 septvgint and two hundred fifty six zillion 24 dollars,” see Dkt. No. 5 at 5). The Complaint’s allegations of enslavement by deceased former 1 U.S. Presidents (including former President Grant, who died in 1885), personal involvement in 2 large loans to the U.S. government, cloning, spaceships, and numerous other details are difficult 3 to decipher, seemingly unrelated to each other, unsupportable by logic and evidence, and far 4 from stating any legally cognizable claim of relief the Court can consider. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 5 at 5 18 (“My blood and my oxygen kills them. They tried to have a baby by me and altered 6 themselves by raping me and taking of my body fluids and they got sick. We are over 1 trillion 7 light years from their planet, and they still are dying.”). While the Court is sympathetic to any 8 distress that Ms. McGlown may be experiencing, the Complaint in this action must be dismissed 9 as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). 10 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Ms. McGlown’s complaint without prejudice. See 11 Denton, 504 U.S. at 34 (noting that dismissal under § 1915 for frivolousness should be without 12 prejudice). As the Complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured and any attempted amendment 13 would be futile, no leave to amend is permitted. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1128 14 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (dicta) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by 15 definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). 16 The Court also notes that Ms. McGlown has filed numerous cases before this District that 17 have been dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . See, e.g., McGlown v. Washington, No. C19-1658, 18 Dkt. No. 7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2019) (order of dismissal); McGlown v. Mellburg Fin. Grp., 19 Inc., No. C19-29, Dkt. No. 15 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2019) (same); McGlown v. Dep’t of 20 Homeland Security, No. C18-1403, Dkt. No. 11 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2018) (same); McGlown 21 v. Mellburg Fin. Grp., Inc., No. C17-1815, Dkt. No. 10 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2018) (same). 22 Ms. McGlown is cautioned that a continued pattern of non-meritorious litigation may result in a 23 bar order, limiting her ability to bring suit in this District. [24] 1 B. PHV Motion 2 Ms. McGlown’s PHV Motion is moot for two reasons: (1) the case is dismissed; and 3 (2) Ms. McGlown is entitled to represent herself (proceed pro se) in this action regardless of 4 whether she is an attorney or admitted to practice before this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all 5 courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally . . . .”). 6 In any case, Ms. McGlown does not appear to be an attorney who is eligible for 7 admission to the bar of this Court. Local Civil Rule 83.1 sets out the District’s rules for 8 admission to this Court. According to the public database maintained by the Washington State 9 Bar, there does not appear to be an attorney registered with the Washington State Bar with the 10 name “Meredith McGlown” (or a similar name) or with the purported Washington attorney bar 11 number provided by Ms. McGlown. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 7 at 7 (Washington State Bar Number 12 650564). Nor can Ms. McGlown be admitted pro hac vice, given that she is not represented by 13 local counsel. See Local Civil Rule 83.1 (requiring representation by local counsel for pro hac 14 vice admission); Dkt. No. 7 at 8 (“Statement of Local Counsel” signed by Ms. McGlown as local 15 counsel for herself). 16 Accordingly, the PHV Motion is DENIED as moot and as deficient. 17 C. Protective Order Motion 18 Ms. McGlown’s Protective Order Motion must also be denied as moot, given the 19 dismissal of this case. In any case, Ms. McGlown seeks a protective order from this Court but 20 fails to explain, in comprehensible terms, what protective action she requests, much less the 21 justification for such a request. 22 Accordingly, the Protective Order Motion is DENIED as moot and as deficient. [24] 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons above, the Court hereby ORDERS: 3 (1) The Court DECLINES to issue summons and DISMISSES the case without prejudice. 4 (2) Ms. McGlown’s PHV Motion (Dkt. No. 7) is DENIED. 5 (3) Ms. McGlown’s Protective Order Motion (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED. 6 (4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to issue judgment and close the case. 7 Dated this 6th day of February 2023. [8] A [9] Tana Lin United States District Judge