Puget Sound Electrical Workers Healthcare Trust v. Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication Inc

[7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [8] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [9] 10 PUGET SOUND ELECTRICAL CASE NO. C23-46 MJP WORKERS HEALTHCARE TRUST, 11 ORDER ON MOTION FOR Plaintiff, DEFAULT JUDGMENT [12] v. [13] PACIFIC SHIP & FABRICATION 14 INC., 15 Defendant. [16] 17 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. 18 (Dkt. No. 10.) Having reviewed the Motion and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the 19 Motion and ENTERS Default Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on the terms specified in this Order. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Puget Sound Electrical Workers Healthcare Trust is a joint labor-management 22 trust fund organized under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) that provides health 23 and welfare benefits under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). (Complaint 24 ¶ 1.1 (Dkt. No. 1).) Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendant Pacific Ship Repair and 1 Fabrication, Inc. to collect liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Pacific Ship is 2 bound by a labor agreement to make timely fringe benefit contributions to the Trust for hours 3 worked by Pacific Ship’s employees covered by the labor agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.5.) Pacific 4 Ship also agreed to timely submit remittance reports of covered work performed, submit to an 5 audit, pay liquidated damages of 20% on all delinquent contributions if a lawsuit was 6 commenced, pay interest on delinquencies at a rate of 12% per annum, and pay the Trust’s 7 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 3.1.)1 8 The Trust asserts that Pacific Ship did not provide timely monthly reporting of fringe 9 benefits due for August 2022 and made an untimely payment of the fringe benefits due for 10 August 2022 on November 7, 2022. (Declaration of Rose Pelletier ¶ 12 (Dkt. No. 11).) After this 11 lawsuit was filed in January 2023, Pacific Ship provided remittance reports and payment for 12 fringe benefits due in September and November 2022, as well as liquidated damages and interest 13 owed for the late August 2022 fringe benefits. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Trust asserts that Pacific Ship still 14 owes liquidated damages and interest arising from its late payment of contributions for 15 September through December 2022. (Id. ¶ 15.) The Trust asserts that this amounts to $1,087.06 16 in liquidated damages and $310.08 in accrued interest. (Id. ¶ 17.) The Trust also asserts that 17 Pacific Ship has not provided monthly remittance reports and fringe benefits contributions for 18 January through March 2023 and the sums due are presently unknown. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Trust also 19 seeks $6,028.10 in attorneys’ fees and $437.00 in costs incurred in preparing and prosecuting 20 this action. (Mot. at 7; Declaration of Jeffrey Maxwell ¶ 9 (noting that the attorneys’ fees are 21 limited to fees incurred from September 20, 2022 onward) (Dkt. No. 12).) [23] 1 The Court notes that the Complaint contains two paragraphs number 3.1. This cite refers to the second paragraph 3.1, which appears on page 3 of the Complaint. [24] 1 ANALYSIS 2 A court’s decision to enter a default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 3 F.2d 1089 , 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Default judgment is “ordinarily disfavored,” because courts 4 prefer to decide “cases on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 5 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering whether to exercise discretion in entering default 6 judgments, courts may consider a variety of factors, including: 7 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of a plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 8 (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure. 10 Id. at 1471-72. Courts reviewing motions for default judgment must accept the allegations in the 11 complaint as true, except facts related to the amount of damages. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., [12] 559 F.2d 557 , 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 13 As an initial matter, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 29 [14] 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (e)(1) & 1132(f). The Court also finds that venue is proper under 29 U.S.C. § 15 1132(e)(2) because the Trust is administered in this District. 16 The Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment. First, 17 without entry of default judgment, the Trust and its ultimate beneficiaries will be denied benefits 18 due. Second, the Trust has presented cogent allegations, which the Court accepts as true, that 19 Pacific Ship has failed to timely remit contributions due and therefore owes liquidated damages 20 and accrued interest. Third, the Complaint is adequately drafted and sets for the basis for relief. 21 Fourth, the amount of money at stake is clearly identifiable. Fifth, the current allegations do not 22 appear to be subject to a dispute of fact. Sixth, there does not appear to be any basis to find 23 excusable neglect given Pacific Ship’s decision not to participate in this action to date despite [24] 1 being properly served. Seventh, while the Federal Rules favor a decision on the merits, the Court 2 finds that absent a default judgment the Trust will be stymied in its efforts to vindicate its rights 3 and protect the rights of the covered workers to obtain benefits due. On balance, the Court finds 4 that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment. 5 Based on the allegations in the Complaint and the supporting evidence provided, the 6 Court finds that Pacific Ship failed to timely remit contributions due to the Trust from September 7 through December 2022 and that it owes $1,087.06 in liquidated damages and $310.08 in 8 accrued interest. (See Pelletier Decl. ¶ 17.) The Court directs entry of judgment in these amounts. 9 The Court also finds that the Trust is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to date. 10 The Court assesses this request under the relevant criteria outlined in Kerr v. Screen Extras 11 Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 , 70, abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 12 U.S. 557 (1992): 13 (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other 14 employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the 15 circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the 16 nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. [17] Id. Plaintiff has provided evidence (albeit sparse) to support each of these factors in an affidavit [18] from counsel and its supporting exhibits. (Dkt. No. 12.) The Court finds this evidence persuasive [19] that the hours expended, the costs incurred, and the hourly rates requested are reasonable. Given [20] the records provided, the Court awards Plaintiff $6,028.10 in attorneys’ fees and $437.00 in [21] costs. (See id.) [22] The Court directs the Clerk to enter a separate judgment in the amounts specified in this [23] Order. [24] 1 The Clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 2 Dated May 11, 2023. A [3] 4 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge