Welch v. Crane Co

1 The Honorable Richard A. Jones [8] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [10] LINDA WELCH, individually and in her Case No. 2:22-cv-00302-RAJ [11] capacity as personal representative of the 12 ESTATE of DAVID J. WELCH, ORDER 13 Plaintiff, [14] v. [15] Crane Co. Individually and as successor16 in-interest to CHAPMAN VALVE CO. and DEMING PUMPS; and VELAN 17 VALVE CORPORATION, [18] Defendants. [20] This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Redco Corporation f/k/a Crane [21] Co.’s (“Crane”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 32) and Defendant Velan Valve [22] Corp.’s (“Velan”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 33). The Court has reviewed the [23] motions, each opposition filed by Plaintiff (Dkt. ## 39, 41), Defendants’ replies (Dkt. ## [24] 48, 49), and is fully advised. Oral argument is unnecessary to decide these motions. For [25] the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to [26] Crane and GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Velan. [28] 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Decedent David Welch served in the United States Navy from 1965 to 1969. 3 Declaration of Kevin J. Craig (“Craig Decl.”) ISO Velan MSJ, Dkt. # 34, Ex. 1 at 4 4 (Plaintiff’s Responses to Interrogatories). From 1966 to 1968, he worked on the USS 5 Carronade and from 1968 to 1969 aboard the USS Princeton. Id. at 6-7. At the time, both 6 the Carronade and the Princeton were “coming out of mothballs,” as they were being 7 recommissioned for active service after the Korean War. Dkt. # 1 (Complaint) ¶¶ 3.2, 3.3. 8 Mr. Welch worked as a fireman in the pipefitters’ welding shop on the ships. Deposition 9 of D. Welch (“Welch Dep.”) 47:18-22. As part of his responsibilities, Mr. Welch worked 10 alongside and supported the “yardbirds,” civilian personnel doing repair work for the 11 Navy in shipyards. Id. at 36:3-14. This entailed working on various valves and pumps, id. 12 at 73:24-74:3, and monitoring gauges, especially while assigned to the Carronade. Id. at 13 367:25-368:18. 14 The cleanup work created a “big mess” of asbestos packing that he and others were 15 required to clean up. Id. at 35:7-14, 36:18-37-1. When replacing packing on valves 16 onboard the Carronade, Mr. Welch would use wire-like tools to pull the old packing out, 17 using compressed air as an aid to “clear [it] out.” Id. at 37:9-39:23. During the six-month 18 long overhaul of the Princeton, valve repair was done by Mr. Welch and valve and pump 19 repair was conducted by yardbirds in his proximity. Id. at 68:1-16; 73:24-74:3. Mr. 20 Welch described this work as “regular maintenance,” as there were “thousands” of valves 21 on the ships requiring work. Id. at 42:6-16. In July 2021, Mr. Welch toured the USS 22 Lexington, the sister ship to the Princeton, during which he described his familiarity with 23 various valves that he worked on during his Naval career. See Dkt. # 42-1 (Notice of 24 Filing of Flash Drive Containing Ex. 5, Welch Video Clip). 25 After the conclusion of his military service, Mr. Welch worked as a welder in the 26 Fairhaven Shipyard in Bellingham and as a welder and pipefitter at the ARCO Refinery 27 in Ferndale, among other jobs. Dkt. # 34, Ex. 1 at 6-7. In May 2021, he was diagnosed 28 with mesothelioma. Dkt. # 1 ¶ 3.7. However, Plaintiff’s claims arise solely out of Mr. 1 Welch’s service on the Carronade and Princeton. See Dkt. # 1. 2 Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for Mr. Welch’s mesothelioma, which they 3 allege was caused by his exposure to asbestos during his time in the Navy. Id. at ¶ 3.7. 4 On March 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Crane Co. and Velan 5 Valve Corporation alleging that his mesothelioma was caused by asbestos-containing 6 components and insulation manufactured by the companies. Id. Plaintiff’s claims are 7 based on “negligence and strict product liability under Section 402A of the Restatement 8 of Torts as adopted by the State of Washington.” Dkt. # 1 (Complaint) ¶ 4.1. Plaintiff 9 alleges that: 10 “[t]he liability-creating conduct of defendants consisted, inter alia, of 11 negligent and unsafe design; failure to inspect, test, warn, instruct, monitor and/or recall; failure to substitute safe products; marketing or installing 12 unreasonably dangerous or extra-hazardous and/or defective products; marketing or installing products not reasonably safe as designed; marketing [13] or installing products not reasonably safe for lack of adequate warning and 14 marketing or installing products with misrepresentations of product safety. [15] Id. [16] Mr. Welch died on August 8, 2022 due to malignant mesothelioma, Dkt. ## 24, 26, [17] and his wife Linda Welch was thereafter substituted as plaintiff of record individually [18] and in her capacity as the personal representative of Mr. Welch’s estate. Dkt. # 27. On [19] May 9, 2023, Crane and Velan filed motions for summary judgment. Dkt. ## 32, 33. [20] In support of this suit, Plaintiff provides the opinion of Commander Andrew Ott, a [21] Navy veteran and maritime expert with experience working as an engineering plant Ship [22] Superintendent and Project Manager at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Dkt. # 42, Ex. 7 at 123 3 (“Ott Decl.”). After retiring from the military, Mr. Ott worked for a marine technical [24] services company providing support to the Navy until 2010. Id. Since 2007, Mr. Ott has [25] provided technical expertise to law firms representing parties involved in lawsuits related [26] to personnel exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing equipment. Id. Mr. Ott [27] provides the opinion that Mr. Welch was subjected to airborne asbestos fibers when he, [28] 1 and others in his vicinity, “maintained, repaired, and overhauled engineering plant 2 equipment and valves that were designed, manufactured, and sold by the various 3 equipment manufacturers” while serving on the Princeton and Carronade. Id. at 5. 4 Mr. Ott opines that Mr. Welch was subjected to asbestos fibers and dust on the 5 various ships on which he worked when: 1) Mr. Welch performed routine activities and 6 duties of his trade related to the manufacturers’ equipment and valves that contained 7 asbestos insulation, gasket materials and packing materials; and 2) when he was in the 8 vicinity of work performed by others when they overhauled equipment and valves 9 containing asbestos insulation, gaskets and packings. Id. at 6. As to the presence of Velan 10 and Crane equipment onboard the Princeton and Carronade, Mr. Ott will opine that he 11 observed evidence of Velan steam traps onboard the USS Lexington, a vessel similar to 12 the Princeton, and that Crane supplied dozens to hundreds of valves for the construction 13 of both ships. Id. at 147. 14 Additionally, Plaintiff provides the opinion of Dr. Steven Haber, a pulmonologist 15 who reviewed Mr. Welch’s medical and radiology records and export reports, and 16 interviewed Mr. Welch. Dkt. # 42, Ex. 8 at 2. Dr. Haber offers the opinion that “Mr. 17 Welch had frequent, regular, and/or repetitive asbestos exposures related to Crane valves 18 while in the Navy. Even if not his sole source of exposure, this was a significant and 19 substantial exposure source and therefore was a substantial contributing factor in causing 20 Mr. Welch’s mesothelioma.” Id. at 4. He offers the same opinion as to Velan. Id. [21] 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material 24 fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 25 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 26 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 27 party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 28 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty 1 Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party 2 will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out 3 to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s 4 case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325 . If the moving party meets the initial burden, the 5 opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact 6 for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 250 7 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 8 party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Reeves v. Sanderson 9 Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). 10 However, the court need not, and will not, “scour the record in search of a genuine 11 issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also White 12 v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1990) (the court need not 13 “speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obliged to 14 wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the 15 nonmoving party’s claim”). The opposing party must present significant and probative 16 evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., [17] 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 18 As to the choice of law, Velan argues that maritime law governs this case and 19 Crane similarly cites to asbestos cases analyzed under maritime law. Plaintiff does not 20 dispute the application of this standard. See McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 21 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2016)) (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., [22] 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1086)). Although Plaintiff invokes this Court’s diversity jurisdiction 23 in her complaint, Dkt. # 1 at 2, this “does not preclude the application of maritime law.” 24 Nelson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., No. C14-0162-JLR, 2014 WL 6982476 , at *8 25 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 2014) (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201 , 206 26 (1st Cir. 1988)) (citations omitted). 27 III. DISCUSSION 28 A.) Velan’s Motion for Summary Judgment 1 Velan moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to show that 2 Mr. Welch was exposed to any asbestos-containing equipment or products that were 3 manufactured or supplied by Velan. Dkt. # 33 at 2-3. Further, Velan argues, Plaintiff 4 lacks evidence that Mr. Welch experienced substantial exposure to the relevant asbestos 5 for a substantial period of time, such that the exposure was a “substantial contributing 6 factor in causing his injuries.” Id. at 15-16 (citing McIndoe, 817 F.3d at 1174 . According 7 to Velan, Plaintiff’s case is indistinguishable from recent decisions in which the Court 8 found that the “mere presence” of the defendant’s products or equipment on board the 9 Plaintiff’s vessel was insufficient to support summary judgment. Dkt. # 33 at 10 (citing 10 Yaw v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. C18-5405-BHS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140152 , at 11 *9-11 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2019); Deem v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. C17-596512 BHS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203608 , at *17-19 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2019); Wineland 13 v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. C19-0793-RSM, 2021 WL 3423950 , at *2-3 (W.D. 14 Wash. Aug. 5, 2021)). 15 Under maritime law, to prevail on a strict liability or negligence claim, Plaintiff 16 must show that Mr. Welch “was actually exposed to asbestos-containing materials that 17 were installed by [Velan] and that such exposure was a substantial contributing factor in 18 causing his injuries.” McIndoe, 817 F.3d at 1173 (noting that the Supreme Court has 19 recognized that federal maritime law incorporates actions for products liability, including 20 those that sounds in strict liability). Similarly, under Washington law, ‘the plaintiff must 21 establish a reasonable connection between the injury, the product causing the injury, and 22 the manufacturer of that product. In order to have a cause of action, the plaintiff must 23 identify the particular manufacturer of the product that caused the injury.” Klopman24 Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:18-cv-05536-RJB, 2019 WL 5064765 , at 25 *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2019). “Regardless, causation is an essential element under either 26 Washington product liability or maritime-based tort law.” Id. at *16. The Court agrees 27 with Velan that Plaintiff has not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could 28 conclude that Mr. Welch suffered substantial exposure to asbestos dust from Velan 1 products while on the Princeton and Carronade. 2 Much like the plaintiff in Yaw, Plaintiff here fails to submit evidence to establish a 3 connection between Velan products and Mr. Welch’s mesothelioma. Yaw, 2019 WL 4 3531232 at *4. Mr. Welch testified that he learned a great deal about valves during his 5 service, Welch Dep. 32:10-14, and that the debris-creating work of ripping out old valve 6 packing was conducted by yardbirds within his vicinity on the Carronade. Id. 68:11-16. 7 Indeed, one of Mr. Welch’s responsibilities was cleaning up after the yardbirds’ work. Id. 8 36:18-37:1. However, Plaintiff produces no fact witness placing Mr. Welch within 9 proximity of any Velan valves or gaskets (or other equipment, for that matter) during the 10 relevant time frame. Here, Plaintiff’s argument that his exposure to asbestos was due to 11 Mr. Welch’s work on or near Velan valves in particular is not “more than conjectural.” 12 McIndoe, 817 F.3d at 1176 . 13 Testimony from Plaintiff’s expert witness, Mr. Ott, fails to shore up Plaintiff’s 14 allegations. According to Mr. Ott, Velan supplied approximately 20 steam traps and 60 15 high-pressure steam valves associated with those traps for the Carronade and 250 steam 16 traps and 1000 high-pressure steam valves on the Princeton. Ott Decl. at 154. According 17 to Mr. Ott, onboard the USS Lexington, a vessel similar to the Princeton, he observed 18 “clear evidence of retrofitting with Velan steam traps” most likely during the 1950’s and 19 “a very large number of the Velan valves associated with such steam traps.” Ott Decl. at 20 158. He therefore opines that Mr. Welch “was exposed to asbestos dust and debris 21 created during maintenance and repair work of Velan steam traps and valves onboard the 22 USS Carronade and USS Princeton.” However, this does not establish that Mr. Welch 23 suffered from substantial exposure from asbestos dust due to Velan equipment onboard 24 either ship, and Mr. Ott’s testimony as to the existence of Velan steam traps on the 25 Lexington do not bridge this factual gap. Further, even if the evidence suggests that 26 Velan-branded equipment was installed on both vessels, no evidence places Mr. Welch 27 within the vicinity of that equipment and Mr. Welch, in his testimony, did not identify 28 Velan as a specific brand on which he made repairs. “More is needed than simply placing 1 a defendant’s products in the workplace and showing that the decedent was occasionally 2 exposed to asbestos dust from those products.” Wineland, 2021 WL 3423950 , at *3 3 (citing Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 1176-77). 4 Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a material question of fact as to whether Mr. 5 Welch experienced substantial exposure to Velan products, the Court may end its inquiry 6 there. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient factual 7 evidence to create material questions of fact as to Velan’s liability under the theories 8 asserted by Plaintiff. 9 B.) Crane Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment 10 Crane similarly moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff “has set forth 11 no evidence or testimony indicating that Mr. Welch substantially worked with or around 12 Crane Co. products at any time,” including in a way that would have exposed him to 13 asbestos, and therefore cannot show that asbestos exposure from Crane products was a 14 substantial factor in the development of Mr. Welch’s alleged disease. Dkt. # 32 at 1, 4. 15 Further, Crane argues, even if Plaintiff could show that Mr. Welch worked around Crane 16 products, she “cannot demonstrate that such products contained asbestos-containing 17 original component parts for which” Crane is responsible. Id. Plaintiff points to expert 18 testimony provided by Mr. Ott and Dr. Haber that place Crane-branded valves on the 19 Princeton and Carronade1, and identify Mr. Welch’s work on Crane valves as a source of 20 “significant and substantial exposure2.” 21 Crane also cites to recent cases from this District addressing asbestos exposure— 22 Deem, Yaw, and Klopman-Baerselman— in support of its argument that Plaintiff’s 23 evidence is insufficient to meet the standard set forth in the Ninth Circuit. The Court, 24 however, finds each case to be distinguishable from the facts presented vis-à-vis Crane. 25 In Deem, the plaintiff presented the testimony of two individuals who worked with the [27] 1 Ott Decl. at 147. [28] 1 deceased plaintiff on board several ships in the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Deem, 2020 2 WL 419453 , at *1-2. The Court found that Plaintiff’s evidence of exposure, advanced via 3 Mr. Deem’s co-workers, only put him “aboard ships during the period that they worked 4 with Mr. Deem and declare[s] that machinist sometimes worked on specific products that 5 could have obtained asbestos.” Id. at *4. Additionally, plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was 6 based primarily on the testimony of the co-workers, and the Court found it to be 7 “speculation.” Id. Here, Mr. Welch’s own testimony puts him onboard the Princeton and 8 Carronade and details his own work on valves, gaskets, and packing on both ships. 9 Welch Decl. 67:22-68:4. 10 Yaw concerns a plaintiff who also worked at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard on 11 numerous ships as a shipfitter. Yaw, 2019 WL 3891792 , at *1. In testifying about his 12 work on various ships, Mr. Yaw failed to remember working on any particular product on 13 any particular ship. Id. At most, the Court held, plaintiff submitted evidence establishing 14 that Mr. Yaw was in engine and boiler rooms that contained dust, but did not identify any 15 particular product that created the dust or if other workers worked on a particular product 16 that created dust. Id. at 3. Notably, plaintiff’s expert “fail[ed] to connect Mr. Yaw’s 17 presence at any specific time to any specific defendant’s product or activity.” Id. In 18 contrast, here Mr. Welch testified to working on valves during his tenure as a yardbird 19 and how the Carronade’s valves were “encased in asbestos.” Olson Decl., Ex. 4; Welch 20 Dep. 43:20-44:5. Indeed, while looking at a photo of a Crane valve, he recognized it and 21 testified that it “would have been covered in asbestos.” Welch Dep. at 80:18-81:4. Mr. 22 Welch’s testimony regarding his work on valves and Crane products is bolstered by Mr. 23 Ott’s testimony as to his responsibilities (based on the Navy’s Bluejackets’ Manual 24 describing the training and work of a Fireman). Ott Decl. at 72. Further, Mr. Ott’s 25 opinion that Crane supplied valves containing asbestos gaskets and packing to both ships 26 is at least partially based on his review of Navy and Crane Co. purchase documents—not 27 speculation. Ott Decl. at 144-147. 28 Finally, the plaintiff in Klopman-Baerselman “offered no testimony of witnesses 1 with personal knowledge of Decedent using or otherwise being exposed to an asbestos2 containing product for which [Defendant was] responsible.” 2019 WL 5064765 , at *4. 3 That is in contrast to the facts before the Court, where Mr. Welch’s testimony placed 4 Crane products in his vicinity. Indeed, he testified to the asbestos that he personally 5 observed blanketing the Crane product. And the testimony of Dr. Haber identifies this 6 asbestos exposure as a substantial contributing factor in causing Mr. Welch’s 7 mesothelioma. 8 Ultimately, “the determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close 9 question.” Yaw, 2019 WL 3891792 , at *3. However, Plaintiff “may raise a genuine issue 10 of material fact concerning exposure by presenting either direct or circumstantial 11 evidence that [plaintiff] worked on a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing product 12 (or near it while others worked on it) and that such work would create the conditions 13 necessary for asbestos exposure,” Nelson, 2014 WL 6982476 , at *12, and Plaintiff makes 14 such a showing. While Crane argues that Mr. Ott’s opinions cannot place Mr. Welch near 15 any Crane valve, Dkt. # 48 at 3, this argument ignores that Mr. Ott’s testimony tends to 16 corroborate Mr. Welch’s recollections of his work as a yardbird. Further, this goes to the 17 weight—not admissibility—of Ott’s opinions. Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, [18] 648 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (9th. Cir. 2011); see also Hangarter v. Provident Life and 19 Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1017, n. 14 , (9th. Cir. 2004) (questions regarding the 20 nature of an expert’s evidence go more towards the weight of the testimony and are 21 properly explored during direct and cross-examination). Because the Court must resolve 22 any factual issues of controversy in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 23 raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding Mr. Welch’s exposure to Crane products 24 while working aboard the Princeton and Carronade, and whether such exposures were a 25 substantial factor in his development of mesothelioma. See McIndoe, 817 F.3d at 1176 . 26 C.) Defendants’ Duty to Warn 27 Both Velan and Crane argue that neither defendant had a duty to warn about defects 28 or hazards posed by asbestos-containing products onboard the Princeton and Carronade. 1 See Dkt. # 32 at 7; Dkt. # 33 at 14, n. 4. Under maritime law, a manufacturer “has a duty 2 to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows 3 or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended 4 uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will 5 realize that danger.” Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. Devries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 991 . The product 6 in effect requires the part in order for the integrated product to function as intended when 7 (i) a manufacturer directs that the part be incorporated, (ii) the manufacturer itself makes 8 the product with a part that the manufacturer knows will require a replacement with a 9 similar part, or (iii) a product would be useless without the part. Id. at 995-96 (internal 10 citations omitted). 11 Velan argues that there is no admissible evidence showing: 1) that Velan equipment 12 “required” the use of asbestos-containing parts or would be useless if used with non13 asbestos components, 2) that Velan knew that working with asbestos-containing gaskets 14 and packing was likely to be dangerous, and 3) that Velan had no basis to believe that 15 the Navy was unaware of any potential issues associated with asbestos and its equipment. 16 Dkt. # 33 at 14, n. 4. Plaintiff presents evidence that Velan supplied replacement parts, 17 including asbestos-containing cover gaskets, for ship maintenance repair, citing to Velan 18 steam trap parts pricing lists that include parts for the “Type N” steam trap and Velan’s 19 technical manual for steam traps on Navy ships that refer to the same replacement part. 20 Ott Decl. at 166-67. In spite of this, Plaintiff’s argument as to Velan’s duty to warn fails 21 for the same reason Plaintiff’s causation argument fails: Plaintiff fails to place Mr. Welch 22 in proximity to Velan-branded equipment in particular during his time on the Princeton 23 and Carronade. This is insufficient to raise a question of fact regarding the three prongs 24 of the DeVries test, and Velan is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 25 Crane, citing Washington law, argues that equipment manufacturers may not be 26 held liable, under negligence or strict products liability, for failing to warn of the defects 27 and dangers posed by a product that they did not manufacture, sell, or otherwise place 28 into the stream of commerce. Dkt. # 32 at 7 (citing Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., [1] 165 Wn.2d 373, 396-97 , 198 P.3d 493 (2008); Simontta v. Viad Corp., 165 Wn.2d 341 , 2 353-54, 197 P.3d 127 (2008); and DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 ). Crane argues that the 3 Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Braaten, in which the Court found that Crane 4 Company catalogs advertised both asbestos and non-asbestos packing and gasket material 5 and held that Crane had no duty to warn under common law products liability or 6 negligence principles, is entitled to deference. Dkt. # 48 at 7; Braaten, 165 Wn.2d 373 , 7 395. Because of this, Crane argues, even if this Court were to apply the standard more 8 recently set forth in DeVries, it is still entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 9 Plaintiff maintains that questions of fact exist under each prong of DeVries. As to 10 the first prong, Plaintiff cites to Mr. Ott’s opinion that asbestos-containing gaskets and 11 asbestos-containing packets were “designed to be periodically disturbed” during their 12 normal service life. Ott Decl. at 10. Crane’s Master Parts List indicated that replacement 13 asbestos-containing components for Crane valves were supplied directly from Crane. Id. 14 at 132-133. Plaintiff also cites to a manual identifying gaskets made with Crane’s 15 “proprietary asbestos gasket material” called “Cranite” to be used on Navy ships. Id. at 16 135. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has raised an issue of fact as to the first 17 prong. Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp, 537 F. Supp. 3d 1162 (S. D. Cal. 2021) 18 (applying DeVries standard and finding that Crane made its products with asbestos and 19 knew that they would require replacement with similar parts). 20 Further, Plaintiff argues that Crane knew or had reason to know that the alleged 21 “integrated products,” asbestos gaskets and packing, were likely to be dangerous for their 22 intended uses, because by 1965, medical and scientific literature reflected a growing 23 realization as to the dangers posed by asbestos. Dkt. # 41 at 24. And finally, Plaintiff 24 argues that the third prong is met based on Mr. Ott’s opinion that the Navy was unaware 25 of the hazards of asbestos exposure during the relevant time frame, and he has found no 26 evidence that manufacturers raised potential alarms at the time. Ott Decl. at 293. The 27 Court is persuaded, and finds that Plaintiff has raised issues of fact as to the second and 28 third prongs. Spurlin, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 1174. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Velan’s Motion Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 3 33) is GRANTED. Defendant Crane’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 32) is 4 DENIED. [5] 6 DATED this 30th day of June, 2023. 7 A [8] 9 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 10 United States District Judge