Recinos v. Health Insurance Commissioner of Washington State

[5] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [7] TIFFANY RECINOS, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-05612-JHC [8] Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT [9] WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND v. [10] HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSIONER [11] OF WASHINGTON STATE, ET AL., [12] Defendants. [14] I [15] INTRODUCTION [16] This matter comes before the Court sua sponte on Plaintiff Tiffany Recinos’s Amended [17] Complaint. Dkt. # 43. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. # 5), the [18] Court reviews the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e). [19] The Court DISMISSES the complaint and DENIES further leave to amend. The Court [20] STRIKES the motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. # 45. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this [21] case. [24] 1 II 2 BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff filed this action on July 9, 2023. Dkt. # 1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 4 on August 3, 2023. Dkt. # 8. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began filing numerous miscellaneous 5 motions, “notices,” and “letters” without leave to do so. See, e.g., Dkt. ## 9–19, 23–24, 26–27. 6 On August 7, 2023, the Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff’s first amended 7 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. # 30. The Court observed that there was 8 no federal question jurisdiction because the complaint asserted causes of action based on only 9 Washington state law, and that there was no diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not assert 10 diversity of citizenship. Id. at 2–3. The Court also warned that Plaintiff’s complaint was “sparse 11 and may be subject to dismissal in the future for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 4 . And the Court 12 struck Plaintiff’s various motions as procedurally improper. Id. But the Court granted Plaintiff 13 leave to amend her complaint. Id. 14 Plaintiff then filed three amended complaints over the course of several days. Dkt. ## 31, 15 34, 35. She also filed additional improper motions and letters. See, e.g., Dkt. ## 33, 36–40. 16 On August 14, 2023, the Court struck the additional motions and disregarded certain 17 other filings by Plaintiff. Dkt. # 42. The Court again explained that these filings were improper. [18] Id. The Court also told Plaintiff that it was improper to file three amended complaints, as 19 Plaintiff was entitled to file only one amended complaint. Id. The Court stated that it would 20 allow Plaintiff to file one, final amended complaint, and that this final amended complaint would 21 supersede all prior filings. Id. at 2 (“[The] amended complaint should contain all facts and 22 claims for relief that Plaintiff would like considered. No other filing—including past amended 23 complaints—will be considered.”). And the Court said that “if Plaintiff elects not to file an [24] 1 amended complaint, the Court will consider only the most recent amended complaint, found at 2 Dkt. # 35.” 3 Less than an hour after the Court’s order, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (which the 4 Court will refer to as the Second Amended Complaint). Dkt. # 43. 5 III 6 DISCUSSION 7 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 8 Based on the Second Amended Complaint, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 9 over this action. In all cases, the Court must ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the 10 action. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an 11 independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”). “In civil cases, 12 subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district courts either through 13 diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 , or federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .” 14 Peralta v. Hisp. Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005). And when a plaintiff proceeds 15 in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the complaint for frivolousness and determine whether 16 it states a plausible claim for relief. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 17 banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma 18 pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). 19 The Second Amended complaint appears to be nearly identical to the complaint 20 previously rejected by the Court. Compare Dkt. # 43, with Dkt. # 8; see Dkt. # 30 (order 21 dismissing previous complaint). As with the prior amended complaint, the Second Amended 22 Complaint does not allege facts or state claims conferring subject matter jurisdiction on this 23 Court. [24] 1 First, there is no diversity jurisdiction. The Second Amended Complaint does not state 2 the citizenship of the parties, so the Court cannot conclude that there is complete diversity of 3 citizenship. See Dkt. # 43. 4 Second, there is no federal question jurisdiction. The Second Amended Complaint 5 asserts causes of action based on only Washington state law. See id. The complaint does not 6 assert any causes of action arising out of federal law. Id. Prior versions of the complaint 7 vaguely reference the rights of the “ninth amendment” (Dkt. # 6 at 4), that the concealment of 8 documents violates Plaintiff’s right to “the enjoyment of life, liberty . . . and pursuing and 9 obtaining happiness and safety” (id.), and reference “Title IV of Civil Rights Act of 1963, equal 10 pay act of 1963, rehabilitation act of 1973 and Civil Rights Act of 1991” (Dkt. # 35 at 3). But 11 the Court repeatedly warned Plaintiff that “an amended complaint supercedes the original 12 complaint and renders it without legal effect.” Dkt. # 30 at 2 n.1 (quoting Lacey v. Maricopa 13 Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Dkt. # 42 at 2 (warning Plaintiff that “[n]o 14 other filing—including past amended complaints—will be considered,” and that the amended 15 complaint “should contain all facts and claims for relief that Plaintiff would like considered” 16 (emphasis added)). So the Court will not consider assertions found in other complaints. Even if 17 the Court considered these legal theories, however, these theories are entirely unexplained and 18 do not state a plausible claim for relief. The Seconded Amended Complaint provides almost no 19 facts that could support relief under any of these legal theories. 20 Because there is no subject matter jurisdiction over this case, the Court must dismiss the 21 complaint. 22 B. Leave to Amend 23 “In determining whether dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate, courts consider 24 such factors as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated l failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 2 || party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment.” CyWee Grp. Ltd. v. 3. || HTC Corp., 312 F. Supp. 3d 974, 981 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 , 4 182 (1962)). “A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment 5 || would be futile.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 The Court denies leave to amend. Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to properly allege 7 subject matter jurisdiction or state a plausible claim for relief. The Court has already granted 8 Plaintiff leave to amend once (Dkt. # 30), but that does not tell the whole story: Plaintiff has, in 9 fact, filed six amended complaints. Dkt. ## 6, 8, 31, 34, 35, 43. And granting further leave to 10 amend would be futile. The Second Amended Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting a 11 plausible claim for relief. The Court also finds the Second Amended Complaint frivolous under 12 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)q@). 13 IV 14 CONCLUSION 15 The Court DISMISSES the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 43) and DENIES further 16 leave to amend. The Court STRIKES the motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. # 45. The Clerk is 17. || DIRECTED to close this case. 18 Dated this 14th day of August, 2023. Cok 4. Chas 20 John H. Chun United States District Judge