Dickens v. State of Washington

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 6 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE — 7 — 8 JOSHUA A. DICKENS, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-05876-KKE-BAT 10 v. ORDER DECLINING SERVICE AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 11 STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., SHOW CAUSE 12 Defendant. 13 Plaintiff, a pretrial detained at the Kitsap County Jail, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint 14 against “State of Washington Kitsap County Superior Court.” See Complaint, Dkt. 5 at 2. 15 The Court must screen and dismiss a detainee’s complaint if it is: (1) frivolous, 16 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 17 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b); 18 accord § 1915(e)(2); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 19 Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint is subject to dismissal for at least two reasons. First, the 20 complaint alleges Defendants violated his rights by denying him a speedy trial, denying him 21 effective assistance of counsel, and abridging his right to speak in Court. These claims flow from 22 Plaintiff’s pending criminal prosecution and the Court cannot interfere with an on-going state 23 criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances under the Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 1 37, 43-54 (1971), abstention doctrine. The Younger abstention doctrine applies with full force 2 because (1) Plaintiff’s criminal judicial proceeding are pending; (2) Criminal proceedings 3 involve important state interests; and (3) Plaintiff avers his concerns were “addressed in open 4 court, denial by the judge,” (Dkt. 3 at 4 and 8) and thus the state court has afforded Plaintiff an 5 adequate opportunity to raise the issues herein. 6 The complaint is also fatally deficient because it names as Defendant the “State of 7 Washington Kitsap County Superior Court,” and alleges Plaintiff has been denied the right to 8 speak on his own behalf, the right to compulsory process of witnesses, the right to effective 9 counsel, and the right to a speedy trial “all conducted by the Kitsap County Superior Court.” Dkt. 10 3 at 5. 11 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the Kitsap County Superior Court over the manner in 12 which his criminal proceedings and defense have been conducted, Courts that are state agencies 13 have sovereign immunity from suit under the 11th Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 14 Police, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 15 F.2d 1103 , 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). The Kitsap County Superior Court is a state agency, established 16 by the Washington State Constitution and funded by the state government. See Wash. Const. art. 17 IV, §§ 1.6; City of Spokane v. Marquette, 146 Wash. 2d 124, 135 (2002) (en banc). Thus, 18 Plaintiff’s claims against the Kitsap County Superior Court over the manner in which his case 19 has been handled should be dismissed because the Court is immune from suit. 20 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the Kitsap County Superior Court Judge or Judges 21 who presided over his criminal hearings, the state court judges are also immune from suit. 22 Plaintiff claims a judge has heard and denied his claims regarding a speedy trial, defense 23 counsel, witnesses, and the right to speak in court. These actions fall within a state court judge’s 1 judicial capacity, and state court judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts 2 performed within their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 , 9–12 (1991); see Stump v. 3 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 , 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978); accord Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202 , 4 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Judges are absolutely immune from damages actions for 5 judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”) (citation omitted). Judicial immunity 6 applies even when a judge acts in excess of his or her authority. Id. at 356. This strong immunity 7 protects judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by 8 disgruntled litigants. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 , 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988). This 9 immunity is immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability, so a defendant with absolute 10 immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Mitchell v. Forsyth, — 11 — 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 , (1985). Accordingly, no action lies against any superior court judge as to 12 the manner in which Plaintiff’s criminal hearings were conducted or as to the judge’s rulings. 13 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court grants Plaintiff to show cause why the 14 complaint should not be dismissed, rather than dismissing the complaint immediately. 15 The Court accordingly ORDERS: 16 (1) Service of the complaint, Dkt. 5, is DENIED. 17 (2) Plaintiff shall show cause no later than November 1, 2023, why the present 18 complaint should not be dismissed. The failure to show cause by that date will result in a 19 recommendation the present complaint be dismissed. 20 (3) The Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order. 21 DATED this 17th day of October, 2023. 22 A — 23 — BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA United States Magistrate Judge