Zayas v. Summit Classical Christian School

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON — 8 — AT SEATTLE — 9 — 10 MYRIAM ZAYAS, CASE NO. C23-1368JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. — 12 — SUMMIT CLASSICAL — 13 — CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, — 14 — Defendant. — 15 — Before the court is Plaintiff Myriam Zayas’s complaint against Summit Classical — 16 — Christian School (“Summit”). (Compl. (Dkt. # 5).) Ms. Zayas is proceeding pro se and — 17 — in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See generally id.; IFP Order (Dkt. # 4).) Under 28 U.S.C. — 18 — § 1915(e)(2), district courts have authority to review IFP complaints and must dismiss — 19 — them if “at any time” the court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim on which — 20 — relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , — 21 — 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e) applies to all IFP proceedings, not just — 22 — 1 those filed by prisoners). The court has considered Ms. Zayas’s complaint and 2 determined that the allegations therein fail to state a claim upon which relief can be 3 granted. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Ms. Zayas’s claims without prejudice and 4 with leave to amend. 5 Ms. Zayas brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Summit, a Christian 6 grade school, alleging that Summit unlawfully enrolled and religiously indoctrinated her 7 foster child without Ms. Zayas’s permission. (Compl. at 4.) Ms. Zayas claims Summit 8 “attempted to bargain with me through various state officials on keeping my child in their 9 school,” “attempted to get a court order to force the enrollment of my child,” and that, as 10 a result, her child is “a full blown [C]hristian.” (Id.) She seeks “[a]ll damages possible. 11 Cash. Paid to me.” (Id. at 5.) 12 Because Ms. Zayas is a pro se plaintiff, the court must construe her pleadings 13 liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, her 14 complaint must still contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above 15 the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although 16 the pleading standard announced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require 17 “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant18 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ) (requiring the plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows 20 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 21 alleged”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2) (requiring a pleading to contain “a short and 22 // 1 plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain 2 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 3 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must show: (1) that 4 the conduct complained of “was committed by a person acting under color of state law”; 5 and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff “of a right secured by the Constitution and 6 laws of the United States.” See Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 7 Dismissal of a § 1983 claim “is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations 8 that gave rise to a plausible inference of either element.” Id. at 1036. Regarding the first 9 element, courts generally presume that private parties do not act “under color of state 10 law” within the meaning of § 1983. See Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., — 11 — 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 12 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, private parties may be held liable under 13 § 1983 if a plaintiff shows that their “conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a 14 federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 15 922, 937 (1982). 16 “‘The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a private 17 [party’s] actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action 18 test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test.’” Tsao v. Desert 19 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 20 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002)). First, “[u]nder the public function test, ‘when private 21 individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in 22 nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its 1 constitutional limitations.’” Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 2 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)) (holding a private entity engaged in a public 3 function by regulating free speech on property leased from the City of Portland). Second, 4 “[t]he joint action test asks ‘whether state officials and private parties have acted in 5 concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.’” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 6 1140 (quoting Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445 ) (holding a private entity engaged in joint action 7 because its security guards operated under a “system of cooperation and interdependence 8 with” the Las Vegas Police Department). Third, “[s]tate action may be found under the 9 state compulsion test where the state has ‘exercised coercive power or has provided such 10 significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the [private actor’s] choice must in 11 law be deemed to be that of the State.’” Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th 12 Cir. 1997) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)) (finding no state action 13 under state compulsion test where homosexual plaintiffs argued that a California law 14 compelled a political committee to oust them, where the law merely authorized removal 15 of members). Finally, under the nexus test, the court considers whether there is a 16 “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated 17 entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 18 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); see also, e.g., Burton v. 19 Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961) (holding sufficient nexus existed 20 where a private coffee shop leased space from a publicly-owned parking garage and 21 served garage clientele)). 22 // 1 Here, Summit is a private entity (Compl. at 4) and thus is presumed not to act 2 “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983. Ms. Zayas’s complaint is 3 devoid of allegations that, if taken as true, show that Summit’s conduct was “fairly 4 attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Ms. Zayas claims that Summit was 5 “intricately intertwined with . . . state officials who . . . attempted to gain a court order 6 that would keep [her] child enrolled in their school,” though “they did not get the order.” 7 (Compl. at 4.) But these bare and conclusory allegations of state action do not reveal 8 how or the extent to which Summit was “intertwined” with state officials. (See generally 9 id.) Ms. Zayas also fails to identify those state officials. (See generally id.) Without 10 more, the court cannot discern the factual basis supporting Ms. Zayas’s claim that 11 Summit, acting under color of state law, deprived her of a constitutional right. See 12 Naffey, 789 F.3d at 1035-36 . Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Ms. Zayas’s complaint 13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). 14 When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, it must give the plaintiff 15 leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in 16 the complaint. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). In light of the 17 Ninth Circuit’s liberal policy favoring amendment, the court GRANTS Ms. Zayas leave 18 to file an amended complaint. If she does so, she must include short, plain statements 19 setting forth factual allegations demonstrating that: (1) Summit’s conduct amounted to 20 state action under one of the four above-mentioned tests; and (2) the conduct complained 21 of deprived Ms. Zayas of a constitutional right. Ms. Zayas shall file her amended 22 complaint, if any, no later than November 17, 2023. If Ms. Zayas fails to timely comply 1 with this order or fails to file an amended complaint that remedies the deficiencies 2 discussed in this order, the court will dismiss this case with prejudice. 3 Dated this 31st day of October, 2023. A — 4 — JAMES L. ROBART 5 United States District Judge — 6 — — 7 — — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 —