Cater v. King County

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — — 8 — — 9 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE — 11 — HALFRED CATER, — 12 — Plaintiff, 13 Case No. 23-cv-451-RAJ v. 14 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT KING COUNTY, et al., — 15 — Defendants. — 16 — — 17 — 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 20 Dkt. # 26. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Halfred Cater contends that King County correctional officers used 23 excessive force against him on March 31, 2020 following his arrest and detention in the 24 King County Jail. Dkt. # 1, ¶¶ 4.1, 4.2. On March 29, 2023, Cater filed this civil rights 25 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against King County and a number of individual County 26 employees alleging federal and state law claims. — 27 — 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Cater failed to 3 exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 4 (“PLRA”). Dkt. # 26 at 5-6. Prisoners are not required to allege that they exhausted their 5 remedies; instead, defendants must plead and prove failure to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, — 6 — 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, 135 S.Ct. 403 7 (2014). When seeking to dispose of prisoner cases on exhaustion grounds, defendants 8 must do so through a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Id. 9 “Exhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits of a prisoner’s 10 claim.” Id. Judges may decide disputed issues of fact to determine whether exhaustion 11 occurred and have discretion to decide whether additional discovery is needed to 12 determine exhaustion. Id. 13 All other rules of summary judgment apply. The Court shall grant summary 14 judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and 15 the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 16 party has the initial burden of production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue 17 of material fact. Id.; see Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 18 banc). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 19 non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a 20 genuine issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) 21 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). The non-moving party 22 may not rely upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific 23 facts showing that there exists a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., — 24 — 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A plaintiff must “produce at least some significant probative 25 evidence tending to support” the allegations in the complaint. Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins 26 & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990). 27 Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 1 under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 2 jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 3 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 , 520 4 (2002) (“§ 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoners seeking redress for 5 prison circumstances or occurrences”). “[T]hat language is ‘mandatory’: An inmate 6 ‘shall’ bring ‘no action’ (or said more conversationally, may not bring any action) absent 7 exhaustion of available administrative remedies.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 , 638 8 (2016) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). 9 The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA does not apply to a formerly10 incarcerated individual who files a section 1983 conditions of confinement claim after 11 they are released from custody. Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 However, the facts on summary judgment indicate Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time 13 he filed the complaint and FAC and is therefore subject to the PLRA. (Dkt. # 27, ¶ 2); see 14 also Talamantes, 575 F.3d at 1024 (“[I]ndividuals who, at the time they seek to file their 15 civil actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for 16 criminal offenses are ‘prisoners’ within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.”) (emphasis 17 in original) (quoting Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000)). 18 In their motion, Defendants allege that Cater did not exhaust his administrative 19 remedies because he failed to file a written grievance related to the March 31, 2020 event 20 in King County Jail. King County’s grievance process requires the inmate to file a 21 grievance within 14 days of the incident. Dkt. # 28-2 at 5 (grievances “must be submitted 22 within 14 calendar days of the incident that you are grieving.”); Dkt. # 28-2 at 5 (When 23 completing grievance, “make sure the grievance form is signed, dated and legible. . . . 24 Submit your grievance by placing it in the grievance lock box in your unit. List only one 25 complaint per form.”). Cater does not dispute that he did not file a written grievance. The 26 facts also show that Cater was aware of King County’s grievance process because he 27 filed three grievances while in custody, including one a few months after the alleged 1 incident. Dkt. # 28-1 at 2-7. Accordingly, Cater’s arguments (1) that he made verbal 2 complaints, (2) that he was not required to follow the written grievance process, and (3) 3 that fairness and practicality require waiving the PLRA exhaustion requirement, are 4 without merit. 5 Cater further claims that the exhaustion requirement should be disregarded 6 because he felt that the guards would “beat [him] up again” if he filed a grievance. Dkt. # 7 29-2 at 3. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that acts by prison officials that prevent the 8 exhaustion of administrative remedies may make administrative remedies effectively 9 unavailable to a prisoner and thereby excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative 10 remedies.” McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2015); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 11 F.3d 1217, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2010). However, a prisoner must provide “a basis for the 12 court to find that he actually believed prison officials would retaliate against him if he 13 filed a grievance. McBride, 807 F.3d at 987 . This showing is made by a two-part test: (1) 14 the threat [of retaliation] actually did deter the plaintiff inmate from lodging a grievance 15 or pursuing a particular part of the process; and (2) the threat is one that would deter a 16 reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance or 17 pursuing the part of the grievance process that the inmate failed to exhaust. Id. at 987 18 (citations omitted). In this case, Cater fails to show what statements were made to him by 19 the prison officials, or whether the statements themselves made reference to a grievance 20 or to anything else that might trigger a future attack. Id. at 989 . Therefore, the Court finds 21 there is no objective indication that a reasonable inmate would have understood any 22 alleged threat to be aimed at deterring Cater from filing a grievance. 23 Based on all the evidence in the record, Defendants have met their burden of 24 establishing that Cater failed to fully exhaust the administrative review process available 25 to him on any of the claims he brings here. Therefore, his claims are premature and must 26 be dismissed without prejudice. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 27 2003), overruled on other grounds in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If a 1 prisoner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the appropriate remedy is 2 dismissal without prejudice.”). 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary 5 judgment. Dkt. # 26. — 6 — DATED this 7th day of November, 2023. — 7 — — 8 — A — 9 — — 10 — The Honorable Richard A. Jones — 11 — United States District Judge — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 —