Lewis v. Vail Resorts Inc

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE — 7 — 8 MIROSLAVA LEWIS, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00812-RSL 9 Plaintiff, v. — 10 — ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 11 VAIL RESORTS, INC., JUDGMENT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 12 Defendant. — 13 — — 14 — This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant’s Motion for Summary — 15 — Judgment,” Dkt. # 22, and “Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Her Complaint to Add Additional — 16 — Defendants,” Dkt. # 40. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured in January 2022 while — 17 — working as a ski lift operator at Stevens Pass Ski Area. At the time of the injury, plaintiff — 18 — was employed by VR NW Holdings, Inc., an indirect subsidiary of defendant Vail Resorts, — 19 — Inc. Since the accident, she has collected over $145,000 in workers’ compensation — 20 — payments from the Washington State Industrial Insurance fund. Vail Resorts seeks a — 21 — summary determination that plaintiff’s claims against it are barred because the remedy — 22 — provided by the Industrial Insurance Act is exclusive and applies to all entities in an — 23 — employer’s corporate structure. Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment and — 24 — seeks leave to add two additional defendants, both of which are subsidiaries of defendant — 25 — Vail Resorts. — 26 — ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR — 1 — Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the — 2 — parties, the Court finds as follows: — 3 — (1) The legal issue raised by defendant’s motion for summary judgment can be — 4 — decided without the need for discovery. Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is — 5 — DENIED. — 6 — (2) Under Washington's industrial insurance scheme, an employer is immune from — 7 — civil lawsuits by its employees for non-intentional workplace injuries. Vallandigham v. — 8 — Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16 , 17–18 (2005); RCW 51.04.010; RCW — 9 — 51.24.20. The Act provides, however, that “[i]f a third person, not in a worker’s same — 10 — employ, is or may become liable to pay damages on account of a worker’s injury for which — 11 — benefits and compensation are provided under this title, the injured worker or beneficiary — 12 — may elect to seek damages from the third person.” RCW 51.24.030(1). “When — 13 — compensable injury is the result of a third person’s tortious conduct, all statutes preserve a — 14 — right of action against the tortfeasor, since the compensation system was not designed to — 15 — extend immunity to strangers.” Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wn.2d 439, 450 (1997) — 16 — (quoting 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 71.00, at — 17 — 14–1 (1993)). In short, “immunity follows compensation responsibility” under the — 18 — statutory scheme. Id. (quoting 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN’S — 19 — COMPENSATION LAW § 72.33, at 14-290.3). — 20 — (3) Defendant’s reliance on Manor and Minton v. Ralston Purina Co., 146 Wn.2d 21 385 (2002), for the proposition that employer immunity applies to every corporation in the — 22 — employer’s corporate family is misplaced. In Manor, the Supreme Court held that a self23 insured parent company, Nestle, was immune from suit by its subsidiary's injured worker. — 24 — At the time, an administrative regulation conferred “employer” status on all of the — 25 — corporations covered by a certificate of self-insurance, and Nestle had already paid — 26 — $455,000 from its own funds as compensation for the workplace injuries. 131 Wn.2d at ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR — 1 — 450, 453. Thus, under the terms of the regulation and having fulfilled its obligation to — 2 — compensate the worker, the parent company was not a “third person” who could be sued — 3 — for additional damages. Minton likewise involved a self-insured family of corporations. In — 4 — that context, the Washington Supreme Court relied on Manor and concluded that the — 5 — parent, having agreed to pay its subsidiary’s industrial insurance obligations, was immune — 6 — from suit by the subsidiary’s injured worker. 146 Wn.2d at 393 . — 7 — Here, defendant acknowledges that it was not plaintiff’s employer at the time of the — 8 — accident, it does not claim that it self-insured the industrial indemnity obligations of its — 9 — corporate family, it has not identified any administrative regulation that extends immunity — 10 — to it, and it has provided evidence that plaintiff has been compensated out of the state fund — 11 — rather than out of Vail Resorts’ pocket. As the record currently stands, defendant is a — 12 — stranger to the workers’ compensation arrangement between plaintiff and her former — 13 — employer: it cannot, therefore, claim the employer’s immunity from suit under the — 14 — Industrial Insurance Act. See Jaimes v. NDTS Constr., Inc., 194 Wn. App. 1020 , at *3 — 15 — (2016) (finding that immunity flows from status as an employer or compensation — 16 — responsibility, not corporate relationships or premium payments); McGill v. Auburn — 17 — Adventist Academy, 127 Wn. App. 1047, at *7-8 (2005) (finding that immunity of a parent — 18 — corporation is not automatic). — 19 — (4) Whether a parent corporation that does not qualify as an employer and is not — 20 — part of a self-insurance agreement can be held liable in tort for workplace injuries depends — 21 — on whether the corporate veil can be pierced or whether defendant’s own tortious conduct — 22 — led to the injuries. Through discovery, plaintiff has identified two Vail Resort subsidiaries — 23 — that she alleges were responsible for safety and operational matters at Steven’s Pass Ski — 24 — Resort such that they are liable for their own acts or omissions. Leave to amend the — 25 — complaint to add the two additional defendants is appropriate under Rule 15(a), there being — 26 — ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR — 1 — no evidence of undue delay, bad faith, prior failures to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, — 2 — or futility. — 3 — — 4 — For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. — 5 — # 22) is DENIED, and plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Dkt. # 40) is GRANTED. — 6 — Plaintiff shall file the proposed amended complaint within seven days of the date of this — 7 — Order. — 8 — 9 DATED this 4th day of March, 2024. — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — Robert S. Lasnik — 13 — United States District Judge — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR