Safadi v. Snohomish County

[1] HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES [7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [9] 10 AMAR SAFADI, 11 CASE NO. 23-cv-00887 RAJ Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER [13] SNOHOMISH COUNTY, et al., [14] Defendants. [16] I. INTRODUCTION [17] THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Snohomish County’s (the [18] “County” or “Defendant”)1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary [19] 20 Judgment. Dkts. # 23, 38. Defendant moves for dismissal for proper service of process, [21] failure to state a claim, and summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff Amar Safadi [22] (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Safadi”) responded to these motions by filing numerous responses and [23] declarations. Dkts. # 26-33, 35. [26] 1 Defendant Snohomish County contends Plaintiff’s discovery response confirmed that the County is the “the sole defendant in this action despite summons being requested for other parties.” Dkt. # 23; see also Dkt. # 24. Plaintiff [27] does not refute this. Therefore, the Court considers Snohomish County as the only defendant in this action. 1 Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 23. Separately, 2 Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on statute of limitations [3] grounds. Dkt. # 38. Plaintiff filed responses and declarations opposing Defendant’s [4] Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkts. # 265 33, 35, 39-40. However, the Court does not reach the merits of the statute of limitations [6] 7 arguments presented in Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 38. 8 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary [9] Judgment, Dkt. # 23, and DENIES as moot Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary [10] Judgment on Statute of Limitations Grounds. Dkt. # 38. [12] II. BACKGROUND [13] 14 Plaintiff, Mr. Safadi, began this action on June 13, 2023, when he filed the initial 15 complaint with this Court. Dkt. # 6. On July 15, 2023, Mr. Safadi filed an Amended [16] Complaint (the “Complaint”) which is the operative complaint in this matter. Dkt. # 15. [17] Mr. Safadi, proceeding pro se, alleges Snohomish County, the Snohomish County [18] 19 Prosecutor’s Office, and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him for 20 the 2018 qui tam lawsuit (the “lawsuit”) he filed against the county and its officials alleging [21] RICO violations. Dkt. # 15. This Court dismissed the lawsuit, Safadi v. Roe et al., 18-cv22 01305, (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2019), sua sponte. Mr. Safadi alleges that since the lawsuit, [23] 24 the County and its officials have retaliated against him by filing criminal complaints against 25 him and arresting him four times. Mr. Safadi claims the County violated his Fourth, Eighth, [27] 1 and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Plaintiff’s allegations are set 2 forth in greater detail infra Sections IV. A, B, and C. [3] Defendant Snohomish County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February [4] 14, 2024. Dkt. # 23. Defendant filed a separate Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on [5] statute of limitations grounds, on March 6, 2024. Dkt. # 38. [6] 7 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, asserting Plaintiff did not 8 properly serve Defendant in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and [9] Washington law for serving a state agency, such as Snohomish County. In response, Mr. [10] Safadi argues that he perfected service by sending the Summons and Complaint to the [11] 12 Snohomish County Executive and the Snohomish County Auditor via certified mail 13 delivered by the United States Postal Service. Dkt. # 33. [14] Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. Defendant [15] argues this Court should grant summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to establish [16] 17 Monell liability on the part of Snohomish County or that a constitutional violation occurred. 18 Dkt. # 23. Defendant asserts the officers arrested Mr. Safadi pursuant to valid Failure to [19] Appear Bench Warrants. [20] Defendant moved for partial summary judgment based on statute of limitations [21] 22 grounds for alleged claims that occurred outside of the three-year limitations period for his 23 personal injury and §1983 claims. Dkt. # 38. Because the Court agrees with Defendant [24] that summary judgment as a matter of law should be granted in Defendant’s favor, it will [25] not analyze the limitations issues Defendant raised in Dkt. # 38. [27] 1 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) [3] Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to properly serve [4] Defendant in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Washington State [5] law. Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff argues he properly served the County. Dkt. # 33. [6] 7 A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a defendant without proper service of 8 process. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); [9] S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n the absence of proper service [10] of process, the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s [11] 12 person or property unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction or waived lack of 13 process.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) allows a defendant to move to dismiss [14] an action where service of process of a summons and complaint is insufficient. See Fed. [15] R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). [16] 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) provides that a plaintiff suing a state or local 18 government commences the action by “delivering a copy of the summons and of the [19] complaint to its chief executive officer” or “serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed [20] by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed. R. [21] 22 Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Washington law mandates that a plaintiff suing a county must serve the 23 County Auditor with the summons. See RCW 4.28.080(1). A court may dismiss claims [24] for failure to comply with Washington law service requirements. See Durbin v. [25] Washington, No. 2:22-cv-0200-JHC, 2022 WL 7636212 , at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2022) [27] 1 (dismissing claims where plaintiff failed to comply with RCW 4.28.080(1)), aff'd, 2023 2 WL 4486744 (9th Cir. July 12, 2023). [3] Here, proper service was not accomplished. Dkt. # 33. As discussed more below [4] infra Section IV. B, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff only served the County via [5] certified mail. Dkts. # 23, 33. [7] B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Summary Judgment [8] Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law, arguing Plaintiff [9] failed to establish Monell liability on the part of the County or that a constitutional violation [10] 11 occurred. See Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff opposes this motion. See Dkts. # 26-33, 35. 12 On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), if matters outside the pleadings are [13] presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary [14] judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “All parties must be given a reasonable [15] 16 opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. Snohomish 17 County moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, and both parties submitted [18] declarations. Therefore, the Court will convert the County’s motion to dismiss into a [19] motion for summary judgment. [20] 21 Summary judgment is supported if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 22 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material [23] fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). [24] The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute [25] 26 of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving [27] 1 party meets his or her burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and 2 identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & [3] Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223 , 1229 (9th Cir. 2000). A genuine dispute of material fact [4] is presented when there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for [5] the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986). [6] 7 To establish that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed, the movant may cite the record 8 or show “that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute, or [9] that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. 10 P. 56 (c)(1). In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must [11] 12 present specific facts, and cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 13 137, 138 (9th. Cir. 1993). Although “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in the non14 movant’s favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 15 144, 158-59 (1970)), “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [16] 17 plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 18 reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 . “The Court’s ultimate [19] inquiry is to determine whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the non-moving party, [20] coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or [21] 22 reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 23 Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626 , 631 (9th Cir. 1987). [24] However, a court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable [25] fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also White v. McDonnell [26] 27 Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1990) (the court need not “speculate on which 1 portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obliged to wade through and 2 search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s [3] claim”). The opposing party must present significant and probative evidence to support its [4] claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th [5] Cir. 1991). Uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” will not create a [6] 7 genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 , 1061 8 (9th Cir. 2002); T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. [9] Plaintiff failed to submit evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact to [10] establish Monell liability on the part of the County. Plaintiff’s evidence to support Monell [11] 12 liability is discussed in greater detail infra Section IV.C. [13] IV. DISCUSSION [14] A. Factual Allegations [15] Mr. Safadi alleges Snohomish County, the Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office, [16] 17 and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him for filing the lawsuit. [18] The Complaint alleges that shortly after Mr. Safadi initiated the lawsuit, a Snohomish [19] County prosecutor filed a “frivolous and retaliatory criminal complaint” against him for [20] violating a no-contact-order. Dkt. # 15. Mr. Safadi alleges the state court issued bench [21] 22 warrants for his arrest and he has been wrongfully arrested and incarcerated on four [23] occasions: 1) February 2, 2020; 2) June 17, 2020; 3) March 19, 2021; and 4) March 23, [24] 2023. Id. at 9. Mr. Safadi claims that the warrants were invalid, and therefore the arrests [25] violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges [26] 27 the warrants were invalid because the signing judge did not have her oath of office filed in 1 accordance with RCW 36.16.060, which requires all county officers to file “his or her oath 2 of office in the office of the county auditor and his or her official bond in the office of the [3] county clerk” before entering office. Mr. Safadi alleges that bail was set at $5000 after two [4] of the arrests, which he argues is excessive under the Eighth Amendment because of his [5] indigent status. Id. at 9. [6] 7 Mr. Safadi further alleges that during the March 19, 2021 arrest, the officers used 8 excessive force while taking him into custody causing him to suffer musculoskeletal [9] injuries and his glasses to break. Id. at 5. Mr. Safadi specifically alleges that officers [10] stopped him while he was driving, and Deputy Sheriff Blake Iverson “abruptly came [11] 12 running and smashed [his] driver-side window with a knife, physically assaulted [plaintiff], 13 and threatened his life.” Id. Upon his release, Mr. Safadi alleges his wallet was returned [14] to him with $150 missing. Id. at 6. [15] In the Complaint, Mr. Safadi alleges that the retaliatory prosecution and officers’ [16] 17 actions stem from a pattern, policy, or practice of Snohomish County or the Sheriff’s 18 Office. These allegations include: 1) the Sheriff’s Office lacks accreditation through the [19] Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs “likely due to an official policy, [20] custom, or practice of the Sheriff’s Office;” 2) the alleged police misconduct occurred after [21] 22 Mr. Safadi’s communication with a county-elected official which plaintiff alleges “is a 23 telltale sign of an official policy, custom, and or practice starting from the top-down to gag [24] uncomfortable voices of dissent;” and 3) “[t]he ongoing repeated and escalating [25] misconduct during the past three years is another proof of such pattern of malpractice in [26] 27 public safety.” Dkt. # 15 at 7-8. 1 B. Service 2 Mr. Safadi began this action June 13, 2023, when he filed the initial complaint with [3] this Court. Dkt. # 6. On July 5, 2023, the initial complaint was mailed to the Snohomish [4] County Auditor. Dkt. # 14. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and Praecipe for [5] Summons on July 24, 2023. Dkts. # 15-16. Summons were requested for the Snohomish [6] 7 County Sheriff’s Office and the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney. Dkt. # 16. On 8 July 26, 2023, the Amended Complaint, Summons, and accompanying documents were [9] mailed to the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the elected Prosecuting Attorney, and the [10] elected Sheriff. Dkt. # 19. Return receipts of the mail are noted on the docket. Dkts. # 811 12 10, 20-22. Plaintiff confirms that he served the Complaint and Summons via certified mail 13 and asserts that his service is sufficient. Dkt. # 33 at 4. [14] The parties’ filings in this matter demonstrate that Mr. Safadi has not effectuated [15] in-person delivery of the Complaint and Summons on the County. Therefore, Mr. Safadi [16] 17 has not perfected personal service on Snohomish County as required by the Federal Rules 18 of Civil Procedure and Washington state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (j)(2); RCW 4.28.080. [19] Where service is insufficient, courts have discretion to quash service and allow additional [20] time to serve the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court declines to exercise this [21] 22 discretion because Plaintiff’s claims cannot withstand Defendant’s Motion for Summary 23 Judgment, discussed below. [27] 1 C. Summary Judgment 2 Next, Snohomish County argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim and should [3] be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot prove Monell liability. As mentioned above, the [4] Complaint generally alleges that Snohomish County, the Snohomish County Prosecutor’s [5] Office, and the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office have criminally pursued him in [6] 7 retaliation for the lawsuit and Mr. Safadi asserts claims under § 1983 for violations of the 8 Fourteenth, Eighth, and Fourth Amendments. Id. [9] a. Monell Liability [10] Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of [11] 12 state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 1983. To establish municipal, or Monell liability, Plaintiff must prove the existence of an [14] unconstitutional government policy, regulation, or custom that caused the alleged [15] deprivation of rights. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988); see also [16] 17 Monell v. New York City. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 485 U.S. 112 (1978). To impose liability 18 against a county for alleged unconstitutional conduct of its officers and agents, “a plaintiff [19] must show: (1) that a county employee violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) that [20] the county has customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that these [21] 22 customs or policies were the moving force behind the employee’s violation of 23 constitutional rights.” Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). [24] Under Monell, municipalities can be liable for deprivation of constitutional rights [25] when the deprivation occurs pursuant to “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or [26] 27 custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 1 policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Monica, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2 2019) (discussing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95). A municipality may not be sued under a [3] theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-95. To prove a Monell claim, the [4] plaintiff must (1) identify a custom or policy that is attributable to the municipality and that [5] caused his injury; and (2) demonstrate that the custom or policy was adhered to with [6] 7 “deliberate indifference” to his rights. Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th 8 Cir. 2016). [9] Plaintiff does not clearly articulate a policy that caused his alleged constitutional [10] violations. Plaintiff broadly claims that Snohomish County has a practice and informal [11] 12 policy of retaliation, use of excessive force, and improper hiring practices. See Dkt. # 33 13 at 10-13. These broad assertions fall short of what is necessary to establish Monell liability. [14] i. Official Policy, Pattern or Practice [15] An official policy includes the decisions of the lawmakers, “the acts of its [16] 17 policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have 18 the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted). The [19] official policy in question then, may be either “formal or informal.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 20 at 131. [21] 22 A formal policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 23 among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final [24] policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 25 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality). An informal policy exists when a plaintiff “can prove the [26] 27 existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by an ordinance or an 1 express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or 2 usage with the force of law.” Praprotnick, 485 U.S at 127. A plaintiff must show a pattern [3] of similar incidents in order for the factfinder to conclude that the alleged informal policy [4] was “so permanent and well settled” as to carry the force of law. Id. Usually, an informal [5] policy cannot be established by a single constitutional deprivation. Christie v. Iopa, 176 [6] 7 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 Plaintiff provides insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that [9] Snohomish County had a pattern, practice, or policy that caused any of his alleged [10] constitutional violations. Indeed, most of the evidence submitted relies on negative media [11] 12 coverage of Snohomish County and is irrelevant to this case. 13 1. Retaliation [14] Mr. Safadi submitted exhibits in support of his claim that the County has a pattern [15] or practice of retaliation against “voices of dissent and punish those who dare to question [16] 17 authorities.” Dkt. # 15. In opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Safadi provided articles 18 discussing employment lawsuits against the County. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 8-9. Plaintiff also [19] submitted exhibits relating to a social media post about “retribution” in the Snohomish [20] County Sheriff’s Office. See Id. All the exhibits to support this point relate to workplace [21] 22 issues. These workplace disputes discussed in the media are unrelated to this case and are 23 insufficient to demonstrate a county-wide pattern, practice, or policy of the type of [24] retaliation Mr. Safadi claims. [27] 1 2. Excessive Force 2 Mr. Safadi submitted exhibits such as news articles, court filings, and a civilian [3] complaint to demonstrate the County has a pattern or practice of using excessive force on [4] civilians. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 9-10; see also Dkt. # 29, Ex. 21. One allegation is an [5] unsubstantiated Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office Complaint Intake form from a non6 7 party alleging officers beat him when arresting him during a domestic violence incident. 8 See Dkt. # 29, Ex. 21. This uncorroborated allegation of force, without context of how it [9] relates to Mr. Safadi’s case, cannot create a material issue of fact that a pattern or practice [10] exists. Plaintiff also submitted exhibits that pertain to a highly publicized fatal police [11] 12 shooting, subsequent litigation, and settlement. See Dkt. # 27, Ex. 9-10. Again, Plaintiff 13 failed to explain how this incident pertains to his case. See Id. Therefore, these exhibits [14] are insufficient to show the County has a pattern, practice, or policy of using excessive [15] force. [16] 17 3. Improper Hiring 18 Plaintiff submitted exhibits in support of his assertion that the County has a “long [19] track record of hiring, retaining[,] and rehiring incompetent deputies with [sic] history of [20] excessive use of force[.]” Dkt. # 33 at 12. Plaintiff included various allegations that the [21] 22 County and the Sheriff’s Office “missed red flags” in several officers’ background checks. 23 Id. at 13. In paragraphs 62 through 66 of the opposition brief, Plaintiff relied upon [24] unsubstantiated articles regarding the hiring practices of officers that are not related to the [25] claims in this case. Id. [27] 1 To the extent Plaintiff bases his Fourth Amendment claims against the County for 2 the decision to hire and retain Officer Iverson after “several written reprimands,” those [3] claims are insufficient to establish the County or the Sheriff’s Office has an improper hiring [4] policy. Id. Plaintiff cited to blemishes in Deputy Iverson’s employment record and [5] reprimand history, but he failed to connect these reprimands to his alleged constitutional [6] 7 violations. See Id.; see also Dkts. # 29, 31. 8 Mr. Safadi’s failure to articulate a pattern of hiring beyond missing “red flags” and [9] his reliance upon unsubstantiated allegations about hiring practices cannot create a dispute [10] of material fact that the County’s hiring practices violated his constitutional rights. [11] 12 Plaintiff failed to point to sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment that the County 13 was deliberately indifferent to his rights; that is that it “disregarded a known or obvious [14] consequence” of the decision to hire or retain Officer Iverson. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of [15] Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1997). Moreover, Plaintiff does not [16] 17 show any causal connection between a specific constitutional violation and the decision to 18 hire the officer or allow him to stay on the force. Flores v. City of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 19 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2014). [20] 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court [23] finds that Plaintiff fails to establish a formal or informal policy that caused the alleged [24] constitutional violations; therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish Monell liability. Because [25] Plaintiff failed to establish a policy under Monell, this Court need not reach Defendant’s [27] 1 argument in its Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that no constitutional violation 2 occurred. [3] For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is [4] GRANTED. Dkt. # 23. The Court will not address Defendant’s Motion for Partial [5] Summary Judgment based on statute of limitations grounds, which is DENIED as moot. [6] 7 Dkt. # 38. Plaintiff’s claims against Snohomish County are DISMISSED. [10] Dated this 17th day of April, 2024. [12] A [14] The Honorable Richard A. Jones [15] United States District Judge