Amazon.com Inc v. KexleWaterFilters

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON — 8 — AT SEATTLE — 9 — 10 AMAZON.COM, INC., et al., CASE NO. C22-1120JLR 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER v. — 12 — KEXLEWATERFILTERS, et al., — 13 — Defendants. — 14 — 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Plaintiffs Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services LLC, 17 (together, “Amazon”), General Electric Company (“GE”), and Haier US Appliance 18 Solutions, Inc., doing business as GE Appliances’s (“GEA,” and together with Amazon 19 and GE, “Plaintiffs”) ex parte motion for default judgment against Defendants Tan Mei 20 (doing business as the Amazon selling account Tamei-US), Dao Ping Yang (doing 21 business as the Amazon selling account icepy), and Liping Yang (doing business as the 22 Amazon selling account Purtech) (together, “Defendants”). (Mot. (Dkt. # 45).) The 1 court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the 2 governing law. Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of 3 default judgment and for a permanent injunction. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 This action arises out of Defendants’ alleged operation of selling accounts on 6 Amazon.com through which they sold counterfeit GE-branded water filters. (See Am. 7 Compl. (Dkt. # 34) ¶¶ 67-103 (describing each Defendant’s alleged sales activity); see id. 8 ¶¶ 3-6 (describing the GE trademarks and GEA’s role in manufacturing GE-branded 9 appliances); see also Parent Decl. (Dkt. # 46) ¶ 2, Ex. A (copies of registration 10 certificates for the GE trademarks).) According to Plaintiffs, Defendants sold hundreds 11 of thousands of dollars’ worth of products bearing counterfeit versions of GE’s registered 12 trademarks through their Amazon selling accounts between August 2019 and June 2021. 13 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67-103; see Haskel Decl. (Dkt. # 48) ¶ 3 (summarizing the sales made 14 through each selling account).) 15 Plaintiffs originally filed this case on August 11, 2022, against 16 Amazon selling 16 accounts and ten unknown Doe Defendants. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. # 1).2) On 17 October 26, 2022, the court granted Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion to expedite discovery for — 18 — 19 1 Defendants have not appeared in this case (see Dkt.) and Plaintiffs do not seek oral argument (see Mot. at 1). The court finds oral argument unnecessary to its disposition of the 20 motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 2 These Defendant selling accounts are KexleWaterFilters, HOM-POWER Store, — 21 — NO-MIIMS, CLANORY, Tomorrow-Citystor, HOMASZ, Romarotic, Dropsales, Tamei-US, DanielJames, icepy, WanHaoFilter, HNAMZ-US, DOOBOO-US, Purtech, and Barcelona-US. — 22 — (Compl. ¶¶ 13-28.) 1 the purpose of identifying the individuals or entities responsible for the selling accounts. 2 (10/26/22 Order (Dkt. # 14); see Mot. to Expedite (Dkt. # 11).) 3 On September 28, 2023, Plaintiffs moved the court for leave to amend their 4 complaint to name ten individuals whom their investigation had determined were 5 responsible for certain of the Defendant selling accounts. (See generally Mot. to Amend 6 (Dkt. # 31).) The court granted the motion, and Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint 7 shortly thereafter. (9/29/23 Order (Dkt. # 33); Am. Compl.) On November 15, 2023, the 8 court granted Plaintiffs leave to serve the newly named individual Defendants by email. 9 (11/15/23 Order (Dkt. # 37); 3d Serv. Mot. (Dkt. # 36).) Plaintiffs served the individual 10 Defendants on December 4, 2023. (Service Cert. (Dkt. # 38).) 11 On January 9, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for entry of default as to the ten individual 12 Defendants and voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Amazon selling accounts 13 for which they had not identified any associated individuals. (Default Mot. (Dkt. 39); 14 1/9/24 Not. (Dkt. # 40).) The Clerk entered default as to the individual Defendants on 15 January 10, 2024. (Entry of Default (Dkt. # 41).) 16 On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against seven of the 17 individual Defendants. (5/24/24 Not. (Dkt. # 44).) They filed the instant motion for 18 default judgment against the remaining three Defendants on that same day. (See Mot.) 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 Below, the court considers its jurisdiction over this action, sets forth the legal 21 standard for evaluating a motion for default judgment, and determines whether Plaintiffs 22 have satisfied the requirements for entry of default judgment. 1 A. Jurisdiction 2 As a preliminary matter, a court evaluating a motion for default judgment “has an 3 affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” 4 In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). The court concludes that it has jurisdiction 5 to decide Plaintiffs’ motion. 6 First, the court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this action 7 based on Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement, false designation of 8 origin, and false advertising. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (a) (providing district courts original 9 jurisdiction over actions arising under the Lanham Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing 10 district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the laws of the United 11 States); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (providing district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions 12 arising under any federal statute relating to trademarks); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 13 (providing district courts supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims). 14 Second, the court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because, taking the 15 factual allegations in the complaint as true, (1) Defendants transacted business using a 16 Washington state company as its sales platform, reached out to do business with 17 Washington residents through that platform, and sold counterfeit products to Washington 18 residents; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims arose from these contacts with Washington state; and (3) 19 the Amazon Business Solutions Agreement (“BSA”) between Defendants and Amazon 20 contains a forum selection clause setting jurisdiction in this court. (Am. Compl. 21 ¶¶ 42-43; id. Ex. B (“BSA”)); see Expensify, Inc. v. Swappoint AG, No. 22 22-CV-05720-LB, 2023 WL 6323103 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2023) (“Specific 1 jurisdiction exists when the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with 2 the forum.” (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014))). 3 Having determined that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, 4 the court proceeds to consider Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. 5 B. Legal Standard 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes the court to enter default 7 judgment against a defaulted defendant upon the plaintiff’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), 8 (b)(2). After the court enters default, the well-pleaded factual allegations in the 9 complaint, except those related to damages, are considered admitted and are sufficient to 10 establish a defendant’s liability. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915 , 917-18 11 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557 , 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). 12 Entry of default judgment is left to the court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, — 13 — 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising its discretion, courts in the Ninth 14 Circuit consider the seven “Eitel factors”: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff 15 if relief is denied; (2) the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims; (3) the sufficiency 16 of the claims raised in the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in relationship to the 17 defendant’s behavior; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 18 (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on 19 the merits when reasonably possible. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 20 1986). If the court determines that default judgment is appropriate, it must then 21 determine the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded. See TeleVideo, — 22 — 826 F.2d at 917-18 . 1 B. The Eitel Factors 2 Plaintiffs argue that the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment against all 3 three Defendants. (See Mot. at 5-9 (arguing that Plaintiffs have established Defendants’ 4 liability on each claim); id. at 9-10 (discussing the remaining Eitel factors).) The court 5 agrees with Plaintiffs. 6 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs 7 Under the first Eitel factor, the court considers whether the plaintiff will suffer 8 prejudice if default judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. 9 Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Without default judgment, Plaintiffs will suffer 10 prejudice because they will “be denied the right to judicial resolution” of their claims and 11 will be “without other recourse for recovery.” Elektra Ent. Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 12 F.R.D. 388 , 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of entering 13 default judgment. 14 2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint 15 “The second and third Eitel factors—the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claim 16 and the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint—are often analyzed together.” Curtis v. 17 Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citing PepsiCo, 18 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175). For these factors to weigh in favor of default judgment, the 19 complaint’s allegations must state a claim for relief. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 20 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint satisfies this standard when it “contain[s] 21 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 22 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 1 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). At the default judgment stage, the court “must take the 2 well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint] as true” but “necessary facts not 3 contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established 4 by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992); see 5 also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to take as 6 true “allegations that parrot the language of” the relevant statute). 7 Plaintiffs assert that they have plausibly alleged that Defendants are liable for 8 trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and violations of the WCPA. (Mot. 9 at 5-9.3) The court reviews each claim in turn. 10 a. Trademark Infringement 11 First, GE seeks entry of default judgment on its claim that Defendants infringed its 12 trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 . (Mot. at 5-7; see Am. 13 Compl. ¶¶ 108-14.) To state a claim for trademark infringement under § 1114(1)(a), GE 14 must plausibly allege that Defendants used: 15 (1) a reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of [the] plaintiff’s registered trademark, (2) without its consent, (3) in commerce, (4) in 16 connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods, (5) where such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause a mistake 17 or to deceive. 18 Amazon.com v. Kurth, No. C18-0353RAJ, 2019 WL 3426064 , at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 19 30, 2019) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a) and S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921 , 20 929 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark — 21 — 3 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss without prejudice the false advertising claims they pleaded — 22 — with their false designaton of origin claims. (See Mot. at 7 n.3; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 115-30.) 1 would probably assume that the goods it represents are associated with the source of a 2 different product identified by a similar mark.” KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 3 Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 608 (9th Cir. 2005). When a defendant uses a 4 counterfeit mark, courts presume that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion. See 5 Coach, Inc. v. Pegasus Theater Shops, No. C12-1631MJP, 2013 WL 5406220 , at *3 6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2013) (compiling cases). The Lanham Act defines a “counterfeit” 7 as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 8 registered mark.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ). 9 Taking Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, GE has plausibly alleged that it owns 10 the trademarks at issue (Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Parent Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A) and that Defendants 11 sold products on Amazon (that is, in commerce) that bore counterfeit imitations of those 12 trademarks (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 91, 99). Thus, the court presumes a likelihood of 13 consumer confusion, see Coach, Inc., 2013 WL 5406220 , at *3, and concludes that GE 14 has met its burden to demonstrate Defendants’ liability for trademark infringement. 15 b. False Designation of Origin 16 Second, all three Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to default judgment on their 17 claims for false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a). (Mot. at 7-8; see Am. 18 Compl. ¶¶ 115-23 (pleading claim on behalf of GE and GEA), 124-30 (pleading claim on 19 behalf of Amazon).) To state a claim for false designation of origin, Plaintiffs must 20 plausibly allege that Defendants: 21 (1) used in commerce (2) any word, false designation of origin, false or misleading description, or representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause — 22 — 1 confusion or mistake, or to deceive, as to sponsorship, affiliation, or the origin of the goods or services in question. — 2 — Luxul Tech. Inc. v. Nectarlux, LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing — 3 — Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007)); 15 U.S.C. — 4 — § 1125(a)(1)(A). A plaintiff need not own the trademarks that are infringed to state a — 5 — claim for trademark infringement. See Obesity Rsch. Inst., LLC v. Fiber Rsch. Int’l, LLC, — 6 — 310 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018). — 7 — Again taking the well-pleaded allegations as true, the court concludes that — 8 — Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants are liable on default judgment for false — 9 — designation of origin because Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants sold — 10 — products through their Amazon selling accounts that bore counterfeit GE trademarks. — 11 — (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 91, 99); Coach, Inc., 2013 WL 5406220 , at *3. — 12 — c. Washington Consumer Protection Act — 13 — Finally, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to default judgment on their WCPA — 14 — claim. (Mot. at 8-9; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131-35.) To state a claim for violation of the — 15 — WCPA, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, — 16 — (2) occurred in the course of trade or commerce, (3) impacted the public interest, — 17 — (4) injured the plaintiff’s business or property, and (5) was caused by the defendant. — 18 — Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. — 19 — 1986); RCW 19.86.020. A WCPA claim “may be predicated upon a per se violation of — 20 — statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive substantial portions of the — 21 — — 22 — 1 public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of 2 public interest.” Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013). 3 Federal trademark claims brought under the Lanham Act are “substantially 4 congruous” to state claims under the CPA. BBC Grp. NV LLC v. Island Life Rest. Grp. 5 LLC, No. C18-1011RSM, 2020 WL 758070 , at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2020) (quoting 6 Safeworks, LLC v. Teupen Am., LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2010)). 7 Indeed, “[a] finding of trademark infringement constitutes an ‘unfair or deceptive act’” 8 and “satisfies the ‘affecting public interest prong’” under the WCPA “because it involves 9 deception or confusion of the public.” Id. at *2-3 (citing Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, — 10 — 733 P.2d 208, 210 (Wash. 1987)). Thus, because Plaintiffs have established that 11 Defendants are liable for trademark infringement, they have also established Defendants’ 12 liability under the WCPA. As a result, the court concludes that the second and third Eitel 13 factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment. 14 3. Sum of Money at Stake 15 Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at 16 stake in relation to the seriousness of [the d]efendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 17 2d at 1176. Here, Plaintiffs ask the court to award GE statutory damages of three times 18 the total sales of counterfeit GE-branded water filters made through Defendants’ Amazon 19 selling accounts. They seek $426,622 from Tan Mei, $293,978 from Dao Ping Yang, and 20 $38,351 from Liping Yang, for a total award of $758,951. (Mot. at 13-15 (citing Haskel 21 Decl. ¶ 3).) These amounts are well within the range of statutory damages authorized by 22 Congress for the willful use of a counterfeit mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (c)(2) 1 (authorizing the court to award up to $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark); Derek Andrew, 2 Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that complaint’s 3 willful infringement allegations were deemed true after default); (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 104, 4 121, 126, 128-29 (alleging Defendants engaged in willful conduct)). The court concludes 5 that the fourth Eitel factor does not weigh against default judgment. 6 4. Possibility of a Dispute over Material Facts 7 Courts evaluating the fifth Eitel factor “consider[] the possibility of dispute as to 8 any material facts in the case.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. “When default has 9 been entered, courts find that there is no longer the possibility of a dispute concerning 10 material facts because the court must take the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.” 11 Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 . Because default has already been entered against 12 Defendants (see Entry of Default), the court concludes that the fifth Eitel factor weighs in 13 favor of default judgment. 14 5. Excusable Neglect 15 Under the sixth Eitel factor, courts consider the possibility that the defendant’s 16 default resulted from excusable neglect. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Plaintiffs 17 have provided evidence that Defendants were properly served (see Service Cert.); the 18 court entered default against Defendants (see Entry of Default); and there is no evidence 19 in the record that would support a finding that any Defendant’s failure to answer or 20 respond is the result of excusable neglect. Accordingly, the court concludes that the sixth 21 Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. — 22 — 1 6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 2 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, — 3 — 782 F.2d at 1472 . Where, as here, a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in the 4 action, however, the policy favoring decisions on the merits is not dispositive. PepsiCo, 5 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Therefore, the court concludes that the seventh Eitel factor does 6 not preclude entry of default judgment. As a result, because of the Eitel factors either 7 favor or do not weigh against entry of default judgment, the court concludes that default 8 judgment is appropriate here. 9 C. Requested Relief 10 Having determined that the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment, the court 11 now turns to the question of remedies. “A default judgment must not differ in kind from, 12 or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the [complaint].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see 13 Fong v. United States, 300 F.2d 400, 413 (9th Cir. 1962). Defaulting defendants are not 14 deemed to have admitted the facts alleged in the complaint concerning the amount of 15 damages. TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917 . Rather, the plaintiff “must ‘prove up’ the amount 16 of damages that it is claiming.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 17 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 55(b)(2) 18 (requiring a plaintiff moving for default judgment to submit “a declaration and other 19 evidence establishing [the] plaintiff’s entitlement to a sum certain and to any 20 nonmonetary relief sought”). By analogy, the plaintiff must also “prove up” its 21 entitlement to other forms of relief, such as a permanent injunction. See Gucci Am., Inc. 22 v. Tyrrell–Miller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 1 1. Statutory Damages 2 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff may elect whether to recover the actual 3 damages caused by a defendant’s use of a counterfeit mark or statutory damages. — 4 — 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (c). GE and GEA have elected to seek statutory damages. (Mot. at 5 11-15; see Am. Compl. § VI.E (including an award of statutory damages to GE and GEA 6 in Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief).) If the court finds that a defendant’s use of a counterfeit 7 mark was willful, it has discretion to award statutory damages of “not more than 8 $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 9 distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (c)(2). Because Plaintiffs’ 10 allegation that Defendants willfully infringed the two GE trademarks is deemed true, the 11 court may award up to $4,000,000 in statutory damages. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6 12 (describing GE’s trademarks); id. ¶¶ 8, 25-26, 28-29, 36-37, 104, 121, 126 , 128-29 13 (alleging Defendants engaged in willful conduct)); Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 702 . 14 “[S]tatutory damages may compensate the victim, penalize the wrongdoer, deter future 15 wrongdoing, or serve all those purposes.” Y.Y.G.M. SA v. Redbubble, Inc., 75 F.4th 995 , 16 1008 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007 , 17 1011 (9th Cir. 1994)). The plaintiff, however, “is not entitled to a windfall.” Yelp Inc. v. 18 Catron, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Tilley, No. 19 C 09-1085 PJH, 2010 WL 309249 , at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010)). Therefore, courts 20 consider whether the amount of statutory damages requested bears a “plausible 21 relationship to [the p]laintiff’s actual damages.” Id. (quoting Adobe Sys., Inc., 2010 WL 22 309249, at *5). 1 Here, GE and GEA seek an award of three times the aggregate sales of counterfeit 2 GE-branded water filters made through Defendants’ Amazon selling accounts. (Mot. at 3 14-15.) According to Amazon, Tan Mei sold a total of $142,207.44 in counterfeit 4 GE-branded water filters through the Tamei-US selling account; Dao Ping Yang sold 5 $97,992.95 in counterfeit GE-branded water filters through the icepy selling account; and 6 Liping Yang sold $12,783.74 in counterfeit GE-branded water filters through the Purtech 7 selling account. (Haskel Decl. ¶ 3; see also Buckley Decl. (Dkt. # 49) ¶¶ 2-5 (describing 8 how Plaintiffs’ law firm linked the individual Defendants to their Amazon selling 9 accounts).) Thus, Defendants seek an award of $426,622 in statutory damages against 10 Tan Mei; an award of $293,978 in statutory damages against Dao Ping Yang; and an 11 award of $38,351 in statutory damages against Liping Yang. (Mot. at 14-15.) 12 The court concludes that these awards are (1) consistent with the amounts awarded 13 by other courts in this District for similar conduct, (2) proportional to the damages GE 14 and GEA actually suffered, and (3) sufficient to deter Defendants from further willful 15 infringement, but (4) not so large as to result in a windfall for GE and GEA. See, e.g., 16 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sirowl Tech., No. C20-1217RSL-JRC, 2022 WL 19000499 , at *5 17 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2022) (awarding statutory damages of three times Defendants’ 18 aggregate sales of counterfeit products); Amazon.com, Inc. v. White, No. C20-1773JHC, — 19 — 2022 WL 1641423 , at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 24, 2022) (same). Therefore, the court 20 grants Plaintiffs their requested statutory damages awards. — 21 — — 22 — 1 2. Permanent Injunctive Relief 2 Plaintiffs ask the court to enter an order permanently enjoining and restraining 3 “Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and other 4 persons who are in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of 5 the order” from: 6 a. selling counterfeit or infringing products in Amazon’s stores; b. selling counterfeit or infringing products to Amazon or any Amazon 7 affiliate; c. manufacturing, importing, distributing, offering to sell, or selling any 8 product using the GE brand or trademarks, or which otherwise infringes GE’s intellectual property, in any store or in any medium; 9 and d. assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in 10 engaging in or performing any of the activities listed in (a) through (c) above. — 11 — (Mot. at 16-20; Prop. Order (Dkt. # 45-1) at 2.) The Lanham Act empowers courts “to — 12 — grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court — 13 — may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark.” — 14 — 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (a). The WCPA also authorizes injunctions to prevent violations of the — 15 — statute. See RCW 19.86.090. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must — 16 — demonstrate: — 17 — (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 18 law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 19 defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. — 20 — eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (interpreting similar — 21 — language in considering a motion for permanent injunctive relief under the Patent Act). — 22 — 1 “Generally, an injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy only the specific harms 2 shown by a plaintiff, rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law.” Kurth, 2019 3 WL 3426064 , at *5-6 (holding that an injunction against the defendant from “opening 4 any Amazon Seller Accounts or otherwise selling products on any of Amazon’s 5 websites” would be overbroad (citing Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th 6 Cir. 2004))); (see also Am. Compl. § VI.A (seeking an injunction with broader terms than 7 those Plaintiffs request here).) 8 First, Plaintiffs satisfy the “irreparable injury” element because a plaintiff seeking 9 a permanent injunction under the Lanham Act “shall be entitled to a rebuttable 10 presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of a [trademark] violation.” 15 U.S.C. 11 § 1116(a). 12 Second, remedies available at law are inadequate because Plaintiffs allege that 13 Defendants’ sales of counterfeit GE products through Amazon both threaten and have 14 injured their businesses, reputations and goodwill. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114, 119, 15 125, 129, 134.) “Harm resulting from . . . lost customer goodwill is irreparable because it 16 is neither easily calculable, nor easily compensable” and thus cannot be remedied by a 17 monetary award. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (N.D. 18 Cal. 2000 ) (citing Cal. ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 19 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1985)). In addition, Defendants’ failure to appear in this action 20 suggests that their infringing behavior may continue absent an injunction. See 21 Amazon.com Inc. v. Robojap Techs. LLC, No. C20-0694MJP, 2021 WL 5232130 , at *4 22 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2021) (so holding). 1 Third, the balance of hardships supports Plaintiffs. Absent an injunction, 2 Defendants could continue to sell counterfeit GE products and sell counterfeit products 3 on Amazon.com, thus causing continuing harm to Plaintiffs. And because Defendants 4 never had a right to infringe GE’s trademarks in the first place, they will suffer no harm 5 from an injunction prohibiting unlawful infringement in the future. See, e.g., Eve Nev., 6 LLC v. Derbyshire, No. C21-0251LK, 2022 WL 279030 , at *9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 7 2022) (finding the balance of hardships favored plaintiffs because the defendant “would 8 suffer no injury other than refraining from her infringing conduct”). 9 Finally, entering a permanent injunction would serve the general public’s interest 10 in protecting trademark holders’ rights and minimizing the confusion caused by the 11 presence of counterfeit products in the marketplace. See Treemo, Inc. v. Flipboard, Inc., — 12 — 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1368 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“[I]njunctive relief serves the public 13 interest by protecting the rights of trademark holders against infringement and also 14 minimizing consumer confusion.”); Internet Specialties W., Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio 15 Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The essence of trademark 16 infringement is the likelihood of confusion, and an injunction should be fashioned to 17 prevent just that.”). The court concludes, therefore, that Plaintiffs’ requested permanent 18 injunction is warranted. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for default 21 judgment (Dkt. # 45) and ORDERS as follows: 22 1. The court awards GE and GEA statutory damages in the amount of three 1 times the aggregate sales of counterfeit products from each Defendant’s respective 2 Amazon selling accounts, based on Defendants’ willful violations of the Lanham Act as 3 follows: 4 a. An award of $426,622 against Tan Mei for counterfeit sales from the 5 Tamei-US selling account. 6 b. An award of $293,978 against Dao Ping Yang for counterfeit sales 7 from the icepy selling account. 8 c. An award of $38,351 against Liping Yang for counterfeit sales from 9 the Purtech selling account. 10 2. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, 11 and other persons who are in active concert or participation with them who receive actual 12 notice of the order, are permanently enjoined and restrained from: 13 a. selling counterfeit or infringing products in Amazon’s stores; 14 b. selling counterfeit or infringing products to Amazon or any Amazon 15 affiliate; 16 c. manufacturing, importing, distributing, offering to sell, or selling 17 any product using the GE brand or trademarks, or which otherwise 18 infringes GE’s intellectual property, in any store or in any medium; 19 and 20 d. assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in 21 engaging in or performing any of the activities listed in (a) through 22 (c) above. 1 3. Plaintiffs’ false advertising claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. (See 2 Mot. at 7 n.3) (voluntarily dismissing these claims).) 3 4. The court retains jurisdiction over this case for the purpose of enforcing this 4 order and injunction, and for any supplemental proceedings that may be authorized by 5 law. 6 5. Plaintiffs’ counsel are DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order and the 7 accompanying judgment to Defendants at the last email addresses known to be used by 8 Defendants or at the last physical address at which they received service. 9 Dated this 30th day of May, 2024. — 10 — A — 11 — 12 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 —