Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Cadena

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 8 — WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE — 9 — — 10 — WELLS FARGO BANK NA, CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00317-LK-BAT — 11 — Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 v. DISBURSE INTERPLEADED FUNDS 13 ARMANDO CADENA and EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, 14 INC., 15 Defendants. — 16 — 17 In November 2019, Expeditors International of Washington, Inc.’s Chief Financial Officer 18 contacted Wells Fargo Bank to report that Armando Cadena, an employee of “Expeditors,” had 19 embezzled funds from “Expeditors” and deposited them in his Wells Fargo account. Dkt. No. 1 at 20 3. In response, Wells Fargo initiated this interpleader action so that the Court could resolve two 21 purportedly competing claims to the funds in Cadena’s account. Id. at 1, 4–6. Less than a week 22 later, Expeditors Washington initiated a separate action against Cadena claiming broader 23 allegations of financial misconduct. See Dkt. No. 13 at 2 n.1; Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. 24 Santillana, No. 2:20-CV-00349-LK, Dkt. Nos. 77, 81, 86 (W.D. Wash.) (the “Direct Action”). The 1 Court then stayed this interpleader case while the parties litigated the Direct Action in anticipation 2 that the rightful ownership of the interpleaded funds would be revealed upon resolution of the 3 Direct Action. See Dkt. No. 25 at 2. However, when the Court dismissed the Direct Action with 4 prejudice and unstayed this action, the parties continued to dispute ownership of the funds.1 5 The matter is now before the Court on Cadena’s Motion to Disburse Interpleaded Funds, 6 Dkt. No. 41, which Expeditors Washington opposes, Dkt. No. 43. Having thoroughly reviewed the 7 parties’ submissions and the entirety of the record, including the record in the Direct Action, the 8 Court grants Cadena’s motion. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 As noted above, the genesis of this action is a communication from Expeditors 11 Washington’s CFO to Wells Fargo, stating that $59,160.89 related to Cadena’s alleged 12 embezzlement was transferred from Cadena’s Mexican bank account into his Wells Fargo account. 13 Dkt. No. 1 at 3. The Expeditors Washington officer “demanded that Wells Fargo ‘freeze all of 14 Armand[o] Cadena’s assets at Wells Fargo.’” Id. Wells Fargo separately observed, apparently on 15 its own accord, that Cadena had “transferred several hundred thousand dollars through numerous 16 wires” from the same Mexican bank account into his Wells Fargo account. Id. Expeditors 17 Washington also provided Wells Fargo with a “confession” from Cadena and shared its belief that 18 Cadena was responsible for embezzling more than $2 million from “Expeditors.” Id. Cadena 19 denied any wrongdoing, but based on the conflicting claims between the two parties, Wells Fargo 20 restrained the $1,115,321.96 in Cadena’s account and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1335 , filed a complaint for interpleader relief in this Court on February 27, 22 2020. Id. at 1–2, 4–6. — 23 — 24 1 The Direct Action is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. 1 On April 15, 2020, the Court adopted the parties’ stipulation and proposed order (1) finding 2 that “this Court has jurisdiction over the parties”; (2) permitting Wells Fargo to deduct $5,891 in 3 reasonable costs and fees and to deposit the remaining $1,109,437.23 in restrained funds with the 4 Court’s registry;2 and (3) dismissing Wells Fargo with prejudice from this action. Dkt. No. 13 at 5 4. The same day that Wells Fargo deposited the interpleader funds with the Court’s registry, see 6 Apr. 30, 2020 Docket Entry, Expeditors Washington moved to stay this case pending resolution 7 of the Direct Action, Dkt. No. 14. On August 31, 2020, the Court adopted United States Magistrate 8 Judge Brian A. Tsuchida’s Report and Recommendation and stayed this case while also denying 9 Cadena’s motion for a stay in the Direct Action. Dkt. No. 25 at 2. The order stated that “all pending 10 case deadlines are stricken, until such time as the rightful owner of the Interpleaded Funds is 11 determined in [the Direct Action].” Id. 12 On April 13, 2022, this case was reassigned to the undersigned United States District Judge. 13 Apr. 13, 2022 Docket Entry.3 On February 10, 2023, following the dismissal of some of Expeditors 14 Washington’s claims in the Direct Action, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer and 15 file a joint status report “presenting their positions as to whether this action should remain stayed, 16 and if not, setting forth a proposed plan and schedule for resolving this action.” Dkt. No. 30 at 1– 17 2 (citation omitted). The parties indicated that they disagreed as to whether the action should 18 remain stayed in light of Expeditors Washington’s filing of a second amended complaint in the 19 Direct Action. Dkt. No. 33 at 1–3. Ultimately, this case remained stayed until after the Court 20 granted Cadena’s motion to dismiss Expeditors Washington’s second amended complaint with 21 prejudice, at which point the Court again ordered the parties to meet and confer and propose a plan — 22 — 23 2 On May 13, 2020, an additional $6.51 was deposited into the Court’s Registry. See May 13, 2020 Docket Entry. 3 The Direct Action was reassigned to the undersigned on December 20, 2021. Direct Action, Dec. 20, 2021 Docket 24 Entry. 1 for resolving this action. Dkt. No. 34 at 1–2. On January 2, 2024, the parties filed a status report 2 in which Expeditors Washington asked the Court to reimpose a stay and Cadena asserted that the 3 interpleader funds “should be disbursed to their owner and this action dismissed.” Dkt. No. 35 at 4 2–3. 5 Because the parties’ joint status report failed to comply with the Court’s directives, Dkt. 6 No. 34, the Court ordered Expeditors Washington to show cause why reimposing a stay in this 7 case would be warranted and to explain its basis for maintaining a claim to the interpleaded funds. 8 Dkt. No. 36. In its response, Expeditors Washington argued that reimposing a stay was appropriate 9 because the rightful owner of the interpleaded funds had yet to be determined in the now-dismissed 10 Direct Action. Dkt. No. 37 at 6. And rather than explaining, even in general terms, its potential 11 claim to the interpleaded funds, Expeditors Washington averred that it was too soon to determine 12 rightful ownership and that, in any event, the funds should not be disbursed to Cadena. Id. at 7–9. 13 Cadena then filed a response, arguing that his individual ownership of the Wells Fargo 14 account creates a presumption that he has a priority right to the funds interpleaded from that 15 account, and that the only other potentially relevant claimant is Expeditors Washington’s wholly 16 owned subsidiary, Expeditors International de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (“Expeditors Mexico”)—not 17 Expeditors Washington. Dkt. No. 38 at 8. On this latter point, Cadena pointed out that in the Direct 18 Action, Expeditors Washington had alleged that the interpleaded funds were embezzled from 19 Expeditors Mexico. Id. at 2 , 7–9; see also Direct Action, Dkt. No. 1 at 4 (alleging that Cadena’s 20 Wells Fargo account held funds “stolen from Expeditors Mexico”). Indeed, in its motion to stay 21 this case, Expeditors Washington itself noted that “Cadena was previously employed in the 22 accounting department of Expeditors’ wholly-owned subsidiary, . . . Expeditors Mexico,” until he 23 was “terminated with cause on December 4, 2019[.]” Dkt. No. 14 at 3, 4 n.2. As part of the same 24 motion, Expeditors Washington contended that in light of Wells Fargo’s dismissal, the only parties 1 with a claim to the Interpleaded Funds were Cadena and “Expeditors.” Id. at 7 . And in the Direct 2 Action, Expeditors Washington asserted that it, “through Expeditors Mexico,” was the “lawful 3 owner of the monies that were misappropriated[.]” Direct Action, Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Similarly, in its 4 first amended complaint in the Direct Action, Expeditors Washington alleged that Cadena’s Wells 5 Fargo account contained funds that he “embezzled from Expeditors Mexico,” and that “Expeditors 6 [Washington], through Expeditors Mexico, is the lawful owner of the monies that were 7 misappropriated by Cadena, including but not limited to the funds in the Wells Fargo account[.]” — 8 — Id., Dkt. No. 39 at 6, 8. In addition, Expeditors Washington’s first amended complaint claimed 9 that Cadena had “a stock plan account with Fidelity Investments that contain[ed] shares of 10 Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. common stock and cash reserves with an estimated 11 value in excess of $1,000,000.00,” which it believed Cadena obtained “during the same time that 12 [he] was actively engaging in the embezzlement scheme” with respect to Expeditors Mexico. Id., 13 Dkt. No. 39 at 4, 6–7. Expeditors Washington’s second amended complaint made no mention of 14 the Wells Fargo account, but re-alleged the same facts regarding the Fidelity account. Id., Dkt. No. 15 62 at 3–4, 6.4 16 On February 12, 2024, the Court held a status hearing in this case to discuss the parties’ 17 responses to the order to show cause and to better understand whether discovery in this case could 18 alter Expeditors Washington’s claim to the interpleaded funds, particularly in light of the 19 distinction between Expeditors Washington and its subsidiary, Expeditors Mexico. Dkt. No. 40. 20 After hearing argument from both sides, the Court found that Expeditors Washington had failed to 21 adequately support its request to reimpose a stay in this case and also failed to demonstrate that — 22 — — 23 — 4 In its order dismissing the Direct Action, the Court held that Expeditors Washington “failed to sufficiently allege 24 that it is entitled to a judgment declaring that Cadena is precluded from exercising stock options” because it never identified any contract provision or legal theory supporting this claim. Dkt. No. 77 at 7–10. 1 discovery could change the dynamic vis-à-vis Expeditors Mexico as its sole link to the interpleaded 2 funds. Id. Accordingly, the Court directed Cadena to file a motion for disbursement of the 3 interpleaded funds, which he did on February 20, 2024. Id.; see Dkt. No. 41. In response, 4 Expeditors Washington asks that the Court deny the motion or in the alternative, “(a) provide for 5 a new case schedule with a discrete discovery period, followed by dispositive motions on the issue 6 of each claimant’s right to the property, and trial, if necessary; or (b) deny the motion and certify 7 the order for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 USC § 1292 (b).” Dkt. No. 43 at 3, 8. 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 A. Legal Standard 10 “The historical and still the primary purpose of interpleader is to enable a neutral 11 stakeholder, usually an insurance company or a bank, to shield itself from liability for paying over 12 the stake to the wrong party.” Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733 F.2d 13 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1984). “This is done by forcing all the claimants to litigate their claims in a 14 single action brought by the stakeholder.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2361 . “[T]he fund itself is the 15 target of the claimants” and “marks the outer limits of the controversy.” State Farm Fire & Cas. 16 Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). However, “the mere existence of such a fund cannot, by 17 use of interpleader, be employed to accomplish purposes that exceed the needs of orderly contest 18 with respect to the fund.” Id. 19 Interpleader actions involve two stages. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Ridgway, 293 F. 20 Supp. 3d 1254, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 2018). First, “the district court decides whether the 21 requirements for a rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a 22 single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund.” Lee v. W. Coast Life 23 Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). And second, “[i]f the district court 24 finds that the interpleader action has been properly brought the district court will then make a 1 determination of the respective rights of the claimants.” Id. (cleaned up). 2 “Absent special circumstances, the second phase [of an interpleader action] proceeds like 3 any other action.” In re 1563 28th Ave., San Francisco, CA 94112, 333 F.R.D. 630 , 637 (N.D. Cal. 4 2019). “Each claimant has the burden of establishing his or her right to the fund or property by a 5 preponderance of the evidence,” and actions may be resolved on summary judgment if there is no 6 genuine issue of material fact. Field, Tr. of Deshon Revocable Tr. v. United States, No. 2:15-CV7 00241-TLN-DB, 2022 WL 705615 , at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2022) (cleaned up); see also 7 Charles 8 Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1714 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 Update). 9 However, “[c]ourts occasionally dismiss interpleader claimants for lack of standing.” Braid v. 10 Stilley, No. 21-CV-5283, 2022 WL 4291024 , at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2022), appeal dismissed, 11 No. 22-2881, 2022 WL 19561992 (7th Cir. Dec. 7, 2022); see, e.g., Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. 12 Constance, Case No. 13-C-4104, 2014 WL 2699757 at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2014) (dismissing 13 interpleader claimant for lack of standing where her claim was “too speculative to confer 14 standing”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Frank, 592 F. Supp. 3d 317 , 321–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Murphy 15 v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, Case No. 2:10-cv-1945, 2012 WL 1155714 at *2 (D. Nev. 16 April 6, 2012); cf. In re: Coho Energy Inc., 395 F.3d 198 , 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Even a claimant 17 to a fund must show a realistic likelihood of injury in order to have standing.”). In addition, 18 “[a]lthough summary judgment is usually improper prior to the conclusion of discovery, it is 19 appropriate where discovery would be futile.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Akopyan, No. 21-55280, — 20 — 2022 WL 474158 , at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022) (citing Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. 21 Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Rsrv., 323 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2003)). 22 B. The Court Grants Cadena’s Motion 23 Expeditors Washington argues that Cadena has not established his entitlement to the 24 interpleaded funds. Dkt. No. 43 at 5–7. Cadena counters that because there is no genuine dispute 1 as to his claim of ownership, an order authorizing the Clerk of Court to distribute the funds to him 2 is the last step needed to resolve this action. Dkt. No. 41 at 6–9; see also Dkt. No. 42 (Cadena’s 3 declaration and Wells Fargo bank statement from April 22, 2020). Cadena’s motion “effectively 4 amounts to a motion for summary judgment on the second stage of the interpleader action.” Wells 5 Fargo Bank NA v. Wyo Tech Inv. Grp. LLC, No. CV-17-04140-PHX-DWL, 2018 WL 6668487 , 6 at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2018); see also Dkt. No. 44 at 7 (Cadena noting that he “expressly invoked 7 Rule 56 in his moving papers when describing the legal standard applicable to the Motion”). For 8 the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that disbursing the interpleaded funds to Cadena is 9 warranted. 10 This case was stayed under the presumption that the rightful owner of the interpleaded 11 funds would be determined in the later-filed Direct Action. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 37 at 5. That did not 12 occur. Instead, during the course of that litigation, it became obvious that Expeditors Washington’s 13 claim to the interpleaded funds relied on a faulty premise; namely, its prospect of obtaining a 14 subsequent judgment or finding in a collateral action, as opposed to any preexisting claim of 15 entitlement to the money that was in Cadena’s Wells Fargo account at the time Wells Fargo 16 initiated this action. See Dkt. No. 42. 17 Expeditors Washington agrees that “a district court must normally determine the priority 18 of claims in an interpleader action as they existed at the time the action was initiated.” Texaco, Inc. 19 v. Ponsoldt, 118 F.3d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1997); see Dkt. No. 37 at 7–8. As one district court 20 reasoned: 21 A rule to the contrary would allow one claimant to obtain an advantage over others during the pendency of an interpleader action, which “would create the bizarre 22 result that the very act of setting up the ‘trust’ in order to protect and preserve property for the benefit of its rightful owner would be the indirect cause of that 23 rightful owner losing its rights to the property. Such an outcome is not only inequitable, but it is also inconsistent with the notion that the funds are held by the 24 Court pending determination of the rightful owner at the time of the interpleader.” 1 XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lakian, 243 F. Supp. 3d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Avant 2 Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 853 F.2d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also JPMorgan Chase 3 Bank, N.A. v. Neu, No. CV 17-3475, 2019 WL 4729269 , at *3–4 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2019) (assessing 4 competing claims to funds interpleaded from a bank account based on the claims as they existed 5 at the time the interpleader action was filed). Yet Expeditors Washington has not cited, nor has the 6 Court identified, a case in which a claimant has successfully claimed a priority right to funds 7 interpleaded from an individually held bank account based on a contingent, collateral claim, let 8 alone one based on a harm to a corporate claimant’s wholly-owned subsidiary. 9 On a general level, it would seem problematic that a company (or anyone) could contact 10 an individual’s bank, allege that the individual embezzled money, prompt the bank to restrain and 11 interplead the funds, and at that point, pursue a separate action to prove their entitlement to such 12 funds. Indeed, the law provides other means to secure a defendant’s assets before judgment where 13 necessary, such as a prejudgment writ of attachment. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 6.25 .010–6.25.280; 14 New Summit Partner Corp. v. Cornwall, LLC, No. C18-1599-JCC, 2018 WL 6696692 , at *1 (W.D. 15 Wash. Dec. 20, 2018); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Zadourian, No. 2:20-CV-07512-JFW 16 (JPRx), 2021 WL 1160478 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Akopyan, 2022 WL 17 474158, at *2. It is still unclear to the Court why Expeditors Washington orchestrated an 18 interpleader action. This is not a case where, for instance, the account is in the name of an entity 19 and multiple parties are making a claim to the funds in the entity’s account. See, e.g., Akopyan, — 20 — 2022 WL 474158 , at *1; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mesh Suture, Inc., 31 F.4th 1300, 1303 (10th 21 Cir. 2022); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. 29-33 Ninth Ave., LLC, No. 22-CV-3865 (JPO), 2024 22 WL 68527 , at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2024); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1267 , 23 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2007); cf. Wash. Rev. Code § 30A.22.090(1) (“Funds on deposit in a single 24 account belong to the depositor.”). Nor does Expeditors Washington allege that it has a claim to 1 the funds based on a lien or assignment from Cadena. See, e.g., United California Bank v. Fadel, — 2 — 482 F.2d 274, 275 (9th Cir. 1973). And Expeditors Washington sought a constructive trust over 3 the Wells Fargo funds in the Direct Action. See Dkt. No. 55 at 21–22; Dkt. No. 59 at 18. 4 Moreover, because Expeditors Washington has been unable to identify any potentially 5 redressable injury that it—and not Expeditors Mexico—suffered, specifically in relation to the 6 interpleaded funds, the Court finds it has failed to plausibly argue that it could, as a matter of law, 7 be entitled to any of the funds in the Court’s registry. See, e.g., Frank, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 321–22; 8 Murphy, 2012 WL 1155714 , at *2; see also Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (“Where there are two 9 claimants to specific property deposited in court, and one of the claimants moves to dismiss the 10 other claimant’s claims, the court may award the property to the first claimant . . . despite the first 11 claimant’s failure to answer formally claiming the property.” (citing Syms v. McRitchie, 187 F.2d 12 915 (5th Cir. 1951))). It is well settled that “corporations, including parent companies and their 13 subsidiaries, are treated as distinct entities.” Ahlstrom v. DHI Mortg. Co., Ltd., L.P., 21 F.4th 631 , 14 636 (9th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Bennett, 621 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t 15 almost goes without saying that a parent corporation does not own the assets of its wholly-owned 16 subsidiary by virtue of that relationship alone.”). Expeditors Washington has maintained that the 17 alleged embezzlement that gave rise to this interpleader action occurred against its wholly owned 18 subsidiary, Expeditors Mexico, and Expeditors Washington cannot stand in its place with respect 19 to the interpleaded funds. See Direct Action, Dkt. No. 55 at 18–21; Dkt. No. 59 at 18. 20 To avoid this conclusion, Expeditors Washington argues that “the factual record reflects 21 that Expeditors [Washington] asserted claims against Cadena in the Direct Action and those claims 22 are independent of any claims that might be asserted by Expeditors Mexico.” Dkt. No. 43 at 8. 23 Expeditors Washington notes that in its dismissed second amended complaint in the Direct Action, — 24 — 1 it asserted the following claims concerning “matters between Expeditors [Washington] and 2 Cadena”: 3 (i) Breach of Contract: regarding (A) the Stock Option Agreements between Expeditors and Cadena, and (B) the Expeditors’ Employee Stock Purchase Plan 4 pursuant to which Cadena purchased discounted Expeditors stock; 5 (ii) Breach of Contract: regarding Expeditors’ Code of Business Conduct (the “Code”), a foundational document of corporate and individual integrity that is 6 applicable to and binding on all Expeditors employees worldwide; and[] 7 (iii) in the alternative, quasi-contract. — 8 — Id. Based on these allegations, Expeditors Washington summarily asserts it “has plead claims that 9 would be a viable basis to support a claim to the Interpleaded Funds.” Id. But such “claims” have 10 been dismissed and do not actually clarify how Expeditors Washington would be able to show a 11 non-contingent, priority claim to the interpleaded funds that it alleged were wrongfully taken from 12 Expeditors Mexico. See Dkt. No. 41 at 8 (“Even if Expeditors Washington could establish that 13 some portion of the funds Cadena deposited into his Wells Fargo Cadena Account were at some 14 earlier moment the subject of conversion, the only possible claimant to that money is Expeditors 15 Mexico, not Expeditors Washington.”); see also Dkt. No. 44 at 2, 4. 16 For these reasons, the Court previously found that Expeditors Washington failed to justify 17 the need for discovery in this action. Dkt. No. 40; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Taylor v. Sentry 18 Life Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (the party seeking discovery in 19 opposition to summary judgment “has the burden of showing the trial court what facts [it] hopes 20 to discover that would raise an issue of material fact”); Hall v. State of Hawaii, 791 F.2d 759 , 761 21 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that it is “not enough” to claim that if a party’s “discovery requests 22 were allowed [it] would be able to unearth facts that would reveal that there exists a genuine 23 dispute as to material facts”; that party “must make . . . clear what information [it] is seeking and 24 how it would preclude summary judgment”). Expeditors Washington’s briefing to date has not 1 altered the Court’s conclusion that discovery would be futile. See Dkt. No. 37 at 6–9; Dkt. No. 43 2 at 7–8. 3 Accordingly, based on the record before it, the Court grants Cadena’s motion to disburse 4 the interpleaded funds. See, e.g., Akopyan, 2022 WL 474158 , at *1; Am. Gen. Life Ins. v. Fuqua, 5 No. 14-CV-14173, 2015 WL 3441177 , at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2015) (denying reconsideration 6 of order granting summary judgment and ordering disbursement of interpleader funds where, after 7 oral argument, the court had determined that “discovery would be futile”). 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Cadena’s motion. Dkt. No. 41. The Clerk 10 of Court is authorized and directed to draw a check(s) on the funds deposited in the registry of this 11 court in the principal amount of $1,109,443.74 plus all accrued interest, payable to Armando 12 Cadena Santillana and to mail or deliver the check(s) to the payee’s attorney of record who will 13 receive and maintain the check: Armando Cadena Santillana c/o Mathew L. Harrington, Stokes 14 Lawrence, P.S., 1420 Fifth Ave, Suite 3000, Seattle, WA 98101. See LCR 67(b); Dkt. No. 41-1 at 15 1. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 67(b), a completed IRS W-9 form must be emailed to the Clerk’s 16 Office Finance Department at seafin@wawd.uscourts.gov, but shall not be filed in the record. The 17 Clerk is directed to close this matter. 18 Dated this 26th day of June, 2024. 19 A 20 Lauren King United States District Judge — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 —