Campbell v. Dell Technologies Inc

[5] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [6] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE [8] BARBARA CAMPBELL, an individual, Case No. C24-711-RSM [9] Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [10] v. [11] DELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CHAD BOPE, an individual; [12] and TODD LIEB, an individual, [13] Defendants. [15] I. INTRODUCTION [16] This matter come before the Court on Defendants Dell Technologies, Inc. (“Dell”), Chad [17] Bope, and Todd Lieb (collectively, “Defendants”)’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. #6. Plaintiff has [18] filed a Response. Dtk. #8. No party has requested oral argument. For the reasons stated below, [19] the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. [20] II. BACKGROUND [21] For the purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts all facts stated in the Complaint, Dkt. [22] #1-4, as true. The Court will focus only on those facts relevant to the instant Motion. All facts [23] below come from this pleading unless otherwise stated. [24] 1 Plaintiff is a resident of Washington. Defendant Dell is a Delaware corporation. Defendant Chad Bope is a resident of Texas. Defendant Todd Lieb is a resident of Massachusetts. [2] Plaintiff has worked in the technology industry for over four decades. Plaintiff alleges [3] she is a respected figure in her professional community. Plaintiff alleges that she only left her [4] prior workplace on Dell’s assurance of employment, whom she was recruited by in March 2022. [5] After her termination of employment at Dell, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bope and Lieb [6] engaged in a smear campaign against Plaintiff, tarnishing her reputation and interfering with her [7] ability to seek other work. Plaintiff states that, between December 12, 2023, and January 11, [8] 2024, Plaintiff engaged in the interview process with a different company, Equinix. However, [9] “on information and belief,” Dkt. #1-4 at ¶ 4.12. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of her [10] application to Equinix and interfered with her hiring process, causing Equinix to abruptly drop [11] her from consideration. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions have caused her inability to [12] find other employment due to Defendants’ “factual statements regarding Plaintiff’s professional [13] capabilities and accomplishments which were false and negligently and/or intentionally tarnished [14] her reputation.” Id. at ¶ 4.5. [15] Plaintiff alleges causes of action for defamation, defamation per se, and intentional [16] interference with economic relations. [17] III. DISCUSSION [18] A. Legal Standard [19] In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as [20] true and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. [21] Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). [22] However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual [23] allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 [24] 1 (2007)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This requirement is met when the plaintiff [2] “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant [3] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include detailed allegations, [4] but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of [5] a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Absent facial plausibility, a plaintiff’s [6] claims must be dismissed. Id. at 570. [7] Where a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, “leave to amend should be [8] granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the [9] challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well [10] Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 , 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). [11] B. Analysis [12] a. Defamation and Defamation Per Se [13] Under Washington law, a plaintiff must show “(1) a false statement; (2) lack of privilege; [14] (3) fault; and (4) damages” to allege claims of defamation or defamation per se. Phillips v. World [15] Pub. Co., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (quoting Herron v. KING Broadcasting [16] Co., 112 Wn.2d 762, 768 (1989). To establish falsity, a plaintiff must show the statement was [17] “provably false.” Id. (quoting Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wn.App. 579 , 590-91 [18] (1997). “‘Expressions of opinion are protected by the First Amendment’ and are ‘not [19] actionable.’” Id. (quoting Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 55 (2002). [20] Defendants argue that Plaintiff “pleads only a generic allegation of defamation in a [21] conclusory manner” and fails to provide to provide the specificity and particularity needed to [22] bring these claims. Dkt. #6 at 3-5. Plaintiff contends that her pleading is not merely a formulaic [23] recitation of the elements but “provide[s] the necessary information required . . . including who [24] 1 made the false statements, when, the nature of the false statements and their impact on Plaintiff’s reputation and employment prospects.” Dkt. #8 at 7. [2] The Court agrees with Defendants. While Plaintiff names two specific persons, [3] Defendants Bope and Lieb, who allegedly defamed Plaintiff by making “false statements about [4] her professional capabilities and accomplishments after her termination[,]” but Plaintiff provides [5] no information regarding what was possibly said or anything showing the provable falseness of [6] the alleged statements other than she believes their statements tarnished her reputation and [7] chances of employment. Dkt. #8 at 7. Plaintiff’s Complaint involves a time period between [8] Plaintiff’s termination of employment with Dell and a hiring opportunity with Equinix. Plaintiff [9] provides no further detail on where, when, or how these alleged defamatory statements took [10] place. From Plaintiff’s Complaint, taking all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court [11] cannot discern whether Defendants made defamatory remarks, gave personal opinions, or [12] whether they said anything at all. See Phillips at 1118 (“His defamation claim . . . fails on this [13] deficiency alone, as such scattershot and unsubstantiated allegations cannot withstand a motion [14] to dismiss.”); see also Johnson v. U.S. Bancorp, 2012 WL 6615507 , at *5 (holding that a plaintiff [15] provided sufficient support for a defamation claim where a plaintiff identified specific statements [16] from particular persons and asserted the statements were false). Accordingly, the Court shall [17] dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation and defamation per se claims. [18] b. Intentional Interference with Economic Relations [19] To establish a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff must [20] show: (1) an existing valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) defendant’s [21] knowledge of such relationship; (3) intentional interference causing breach or termination of said [22] relationship or business expectancy; and (5) resulting damages. See Edifecs, Inc. v. Welltok, Inc., [23] 840 Fed. App’x 224, 225 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Tamosaitis v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 182 Wn. 24 1 App. 241, 327 (2014). “The plaintiff must show that the future opportunities and profits are a reasonable expectation and not based on merely wishful thinking.” Id. at 226 (quoting Sea-Pac [2] Co. V. United Food & Com. Workers Loc. Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 805 (1985)). [3] Defendants argue that “Plaintiff does not allege that she was offered, received, or [4] otherwise had a valid expectancy in a contract for employment that was anything other than at5 will – and absent such an allegation, her claim should be dismissed as a matter of law.” Dkt. #6 [6] at 6. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff alleges not facts other than “conclusory allegations” [7] that Defendants knew of her Equinix application or how Defendants interfered with Equinix’s [8] decision. Id. Plaintiff contends that she established a business expectancy because “she was a [9] distinguished professional in the technology industry” that Equinix desired to hire, and she [10] “alleged that she had a reasonable expectation that she would get the job.” Dkt. #8 at 8-9. [11] Again, the Court agrees with Defendants. Taking all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s [12] favor, Plaintiff has provided facts that establish nothing more than she was in an interview [13] process with Equinix that did not work out in her favor. Plaintiff provides no facts showing that [14] her prospective employment with Equinix was an established expectancy or, again, how [15] Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s interview process. Plaintiff’s reputation and years of [16] experience are not enough to establish this requisite business expectancy. Perhaps Equinix [17] changed direction and went with a different candidate, perhaps Plaintiff’s former employer [18] provided an unfavorable recommendation. Plaintiff’s Complaint provides facts with no [19] particularity for Plaintiff’s claims. Barring facts showing otherwise, this Court cannot make the [20] conclusory jump that Plaintiff requests and shall dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional interference with [21] economic relations claim as well. [22] // [23] // [24] 1 C. CONCLUSION Having reviewed the relevant pleading, responsive briefings, and the remainder of the [2] record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. #6, is [3] GRANTED. This case is CLOSED. [4] DATED this 13th day of August, 2024. [5] 6 A [7] RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE